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FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
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Reflections on the Quarter

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Foreign Policy

A FEW years ago, the danger of fallout from nuclear testing, however serious it may have been, was a subject of grave concern in Western quarters. Among many neutralists, French tests, but not Chinese, will continue to be scored as manifestations of a flagrant, indeed immoral, disregard of "world public opinion." But the conclusion of the partial nuclear test ban has virtually erased from the public consciousness the problem of possible contamination of the atmosphere.

Nuclear proliferation has replaced nuclear fallout as a prime object of concern. For at least seven years, a small group of arms control specialists has been preoccupied with the potential consequences of uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons to several states beyond the present group of *beati possedentes*. Their apprehension has now spilled over into the public political forum, especially as a result of the "Chinese acquisition." Prior to the two Chinese detonations, the anti-proliferation campaign was conducted in a low key. Since those two events, however, it has taken on great urgency. One is struck by the paradox that the primary purpose of the campaign for halting nuclear proliferation seems to be to prevent other states, the great majority of which are considerably more peaceable than Communist China, from manufacturing or otherwise procuring the instruments of nuclear defense.

Speculation about the nuclear intentions of such countries as India, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany, Pakistan, Israel, the UAR and Indonesia has been intensified in recent months. Within the 114-nation United Nations Disarmament Commission, convened in April upon a Soviet initiative, the problem of proliferation was the main subject of discussion. In late May, Prime Minister Wilson revealed that the United States and Great Britain had been collaborating in the draft of a nonproliferation treaty.

Then, the month of June brought three pronouncements, i.e., the maiden speech on the Senate floor by Robert F. Kennedy, an article in *Foreign Affairs* by William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a leak to the press concerning recommendations of a top-secret report by a special Presidential Panel set up in November 1964 under the chairmanship of former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric. All three dealt with the issue of nuclear diffusion in essentially similar conceptual terms. Comprising a pattern, they prompted speculation in more than one capital that a fundamental reorientation of U.S. foreign policy was in the offing.

Both Senator Kennedy and

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ACDA Director Foster called for stepped-up efforts to negotiate a nonproliferation treaty; an extension of the test ban treaty to cover underground tests as an anti-proliferation measure; a halt to, and reversal of, the growth of Soviet and U.S. nuclear capabilities, first by freezing and then by cutting the size of nuclear forces; a strengthening of the control system of the International Atomic Energy Agency even if this might lead to some slight damping of the "atoms for peace" program; and the creation of "nuclear-free zones." (Whereas Foster spoke of such zones in general, Kennedy urged the exploration of possibilities in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, but not in Europe or the Far East under "present circumstances.")

These proposals, of course, were not new. Early in 1964, the U.S. government proposed to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva a nonproliferation agreement, a comprehensive test ban, a halt in the production of fissionable materials, a verified freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the tightening of IAEA controls over atomic reactors for peaceful purposes. After a year of fruitless negotiations, President Johnson reiterated these proposals in his New Year's message to the Soviet leaders at the end of 1964. Later, the Administration, appealing mainly to France and Canada, urged allied governments to accept international controls over all foreign sales of reactors and fuels. Furthermore, in early June the U.S. Delegation at the UN Disarmament Commission submitted a resolution embodying the earlier U.S. proposals as subjects for negotation, and the United States pressed for a resumption of the Geneva talks. Thus the Johnson Administration has not displayed a lack of interest in this problem.

It was not the novelty of the anti-proliferation proposals, therefore, that made them controversial. Rather it was the basic assumption implicit in the proposals that there was a need for a reordering of U.S. foreign policy objectives, as well as the concessions which were suggested as the price which the United States should be willing to pay to obtain an anti-proliferation agreement.

The fundamental premise of the Kennedy speech, the Foster article and, so far as one can judge, the Gilpatric Panel Report is that the problem of nuclear diffusion has reached such critical proportions as to be assigned the highest priority in our foreign policy. Kennedy declared: "Of all our major interests, this now deserves and demands the greatest additional effort." Foster asserted that "in evaluating the implications of agreements which might affect the Soviet-American confrontation, we must give at least as much weight to the effect of such agreements on the proliferation problem as to their effect on the Soviet-American balance per se." In short, hardly any other aspect of U.S. security, it was suggested, is more important than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

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It is questionable whether the government of a great power, with worldwide interests, commitments and responsibilities, should elevate one goal to the absolute organizing principle which henceforth should guide the nation's foreign policy. One might easily agree with the proposition that the uninhibited dispersion of nuclear weapons throughout the world is not in the national interest of the United States. One might further concede the corollary proposition that the United States and its nuclear allies should do what they can to retard, discourage or prevent the indiscriminate export of nuclear devices which could be diverted from peaceful to military purposes. (Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that if the Soviet Union and Communist China view uncontrolled proliferation as contrary to their own interests, they, too, will pursue unilateral policies designed to obstruct it.)

It does not follow, however, that the concern with the proliferation of nuclear weapons should become the strongest motivating force of our foreign policy—stronger than loyalty to our staunchest allies or sensitivity to their security interests; stronger than all the considerations which have shaped our policy toward China through four Administrations; stronger than the United States' sense of purpose in helping countries abroad to defend their independence; stronger than the need for that strategic superiority which supports our foreign policies. If, because of Soviet objections, the projected NATO nuclear force stands in the way of an anti-proliferation treaty, presumably we must prepare to abandon it. If the treaty's purpose cannot be realized without coming to terms with China, then presumably we must consider an accommodation with Peking in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. If countries such as India will not adhere to the treaty unless "nuclear guarantees" are given, then we must be prepared to give them. If the treaty must be linked to a comprehensive test ban with a minimum of obtrusive inspection, then the lowest level of inspection tolerable to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee must be found and little thought given to the unpleasant possibility that a continuation or a resumption of testing may be needed to safeguard national security.

Mr. Foster was more careful than Senator Kennedy in asserting the relationship between the proposed allied nuclear force and the nonproliferation treaty. Foster pointed out that the impasse can be broken if the Soviets attach more importance to the treaty than to the exploitation of the MLF/ANF issue for its political effect. Senator Kennedy declared that we should continue "our search for a form of nuclear guarantee to West Germany and other countries of Europe which meets their needs without meeting with rejection by the Soviet Union. . . ." Yet it is doubtful that the Soviet Union should be given a virtual veto over the future organization of NATO nuclear strategy. This difficulty,

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Kennedy apparently hoped, might be circumvented by a device such as the NATO consultative arrangement suggested by Defense Secretary McNamara at the NATO Council meeting held in London in May.

Neither Kennedy nor Foster addressed himself to the problems which must arise should several of the countries of Western Europe work out a plan for a joint European nuclear deterrent. This possibility was officially recognized by the United States when it assured the European governments that the form of the projected allied nuclear force would not be prejudicial to the cause of European unity, and hinted that the question of a U.S. veto might be reopened once the movement toward unification in Europe had progressed sufficiently. It is understandable, then, in view of the delicate state of relations within the Atlantic Alliance, that the Department of State was reported to be strongly opposed to the alleged proposal of the Gilpatric Panel to subordinate the idea of an Atlantic nuclear force to the principle of nonproliferation.

Apparently, the Department of State concluded that, if West Germany were to lose faith in NATO as guarantor of its security, the ultimate consequences for Europe, the United States and the world would be grave indeed. The debate over nuclear sharing in NATO is now more than five years old, yet the issue of allied participation in alliance strategy remains unresolved. Should NATO founder on the nuclear issue, some Germans may be sorely tempted to acquire an independent nuclear force, or at least to threaten such a course as a bargaining ploy for reunification. Foreign Minister Schroeder has stated that, so long as the security requirements of the Federal Republic can be achieved through a multilateral deterrent or its equivalent, Bonn will have no need for nuclear weapons of its own. Yet a dogmatic approach to the proliferation problem might unhinge NATO and set Germany adrift. The effect of such calamities upon international stability would be incalculable. In the long run, nuclear nationalism in Europe, so it appears, can be scotched only by the development of a nuclear Europeanism which would represent a move away from, rather than toward proliferation.

Beyond the question of its effect upon NATO, the notion of an antiproliferation agreement poses a number of extremely complex policy questions. Under existing circumstances, for example, how many governments could be expected to sign such an agreement? It is far from evident that the 110 states which have adhered to the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be willing to sign a new treaty by which the existing nuclear powers would promise not to render assistance to nonnuclear states by transferring weapons, information or critical materials to their control, while the nonnuclear states would pledge themselves not to acquire these things.

It is conceivable that two nuclear powers—France and China—

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would refuse to sign the treaty inasmuch as it would be the product of negotiations from which those two powers have been excluded, the one by her own decision and the other by Western policy. At this point, it may be asked whether the United States should place in jeopardy some of its most important foreign policy objectives in order to conclude a treaty which probably would not be signed in any event by one or two of the major dramatis personae.

For years, most arms control specialists have agreed that in the long run there can be little substantial progress toward international arms agreements without China as a bona fide participant. But there is some disagreement concerning the short-run prospects for a treaty with or without China. Mr. Foster believes that "a nonproliferation agreement to which China did not accede would be better than none at all," and that both a freeze and a substantial reduction of strategic delivery systems might be negotiated without Chinese participation. Senator Kennedy is more inclined to stress that it may be impossible to prevent proliferation in the absence of Chinese cooperation, but he hastens to add that the United States should not wait upon the cooperation of China or, for that matter, of France and the Soviet Union, before "beginning our efforts." (Here the Senator is obviously speaking of unilateral U.S. efforts rather than a formal treaty.) Although some observers thought that Senator Kennedy was hinting at a package deal in which Communist China might be admitted to the United Nations in return for signing a treaty, he himself subsequently denied that he was recommending either diplomatic recognition or admission to the UN at the present time. He argued, however, that negotiations are possible without recognition, and referred to the talks between the U.S. and Communist Chinese Ambassadors in Warsaw.

Numerous other problems await solution. Would such states as Israel and Egypt, for instance, formally renounce the right to acquire nuclear weapons unless each had some assured means of inspection to make certain that the other was complying with the terms of the treaty? Some Americans, in their zeal for international arms agreements, are occasionally inclined to forget that other states may, with very good reason, be just as hesitant as the United States has always been to forfeit options deemed vital to national security without reliable methods of verifying that the adversary is living up to the agreement. What motives would impel the leaders of India to affix their signatures to a document that would rule out the production of defense capabilities which definitely lie within the realm of technological feasibility for that country? Within recent years, India has keenly felt the military pressure of the Peking regime. India has had good reasons for giving, sooner or later, a free hand to her scientists to do whatever they can do to en-

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hance the nation's military security.

The advocates of a formal nonproliferation treaty frequently speak of "guarantees" by the nuclear powers to the nonnuclear states as the most effective means of reducing the incentives of other powers to acquire nuclear forces, thus paving the way for virtually universal adherence. Yet the experience of the United States with its European allies suggests that peoples, many thousands of miles distant from our own territorial boundaries, may be prepared to rely upon a U.S. defense commitment only so long as they are militarily incapable of defending themselves, or so long as special political circumstances (as in the case of the German Federal Republic) render it imprudent to bid for nuclear independence. Once nations are able to develop their own military capabilities, they might cavil at placing complete reliance upon the pledge of a distant protector. Even the British Labour Party, whose spokesmen-in-opposition asserted that Britain should abandon her deterrent, seemed curiously reluctant, once in power, to dismantle the national nuclear arsenal.

If long-standing allies such as France can entertain doubts about the credibility of the U.S. readiness to invoke nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe, it hardly seems likely that the security apprehensions of a country such as India could be allayed by verbal defense guarantees extended by governments which have never been formally allied with India. Many other crucial questions remain unanswered. It is not clear whether the guarantees the major powers would be asked to furnish nonnuclear states would provide for a conventional or a nuclear response in the event a nuclear power commits aggression against a signatory; whether the guarantee would only be invoked in case of nuclear attack; or whether the guarantee is to be directed against the aggressor or against the party which initiates the use of nuclear weapons. Let us suppose that Indonesia signed the treaty—a rather remote contingency—and later launched a large-scale nonnuclear attack against Malaysia, and Britain then employed low-yield nuclear weapons in retaliation. What would the United States be legally obliged to do under the projected pledge? If it is even remotely conceivable that the United States would be expected to take action against Britain, then the whole idea collapses under the weight of its own political absurdity. Equally far-fetched is the notion that the Soviet Union would solemnly promise to retaliate against China if the latter should again attack India.

It is difficult to imagine how a universal collective security guarantee more categorical and more comprehensive than that envisaged under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty could ever be worded so that the nonnuclear states would forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons at some future date and put the protection of their vital national interests in the hands of the international nuclear aristoc-

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racy. Indeed, the very fact that under the hypothesis of an agreement among the five nuclear powers Communist China would be given a privileged status in the international hierarchy provides sufficient motivation for India to refrain from signing the treaty until she, too, had entered the nuclear ranks. At that point, would the mere decision by a government to reject the nonproliferation policy of the "nuclear pentopoly" and to acquire its own deterrent constitute a *casus belli?* If it did not in the case of China, why should it in the case of any other country?

The concept of a formal nonproliferation agreement represents, in sum, one of those abstractions which, from time to time, sway the discussion of foreign policy. This one is particularly misleading because it is based on the pretense that the United States can afford to place all nonnuclear states in the same category and, under one treaty, treat them alike. It is dangerous because it is based on the presumption that the United States, for the sake of preventing the spread of nuclear technology everywhere in the world, should now jeopardize relations with other NATO countries and alter fundamentally its philosophy of international security.

In a democratic society, the public discussion of a misplaced abstraction can often serve a useful didactic purpose by sharpening the distinction between the theoretically possible and the practically feasible, between romantic idealism and political common sense. It is to be hoped that the anti-proliferation proposal will serve such a pedagogical purpose, rather than give rise to an imprudent reversal of our foreign policy. Fortunately, in the current debate, the Department of State appears to be on the side of diplomatic wisdom.

Deadlock on EEC Farm Policy

ON the morning of July 1, a few hours after the French deadline for agreement on a common agricultural policy had passed, France withdrew her representative from the Brussels negotiations on EEC farm policy. This move caused the most serious crisis which has yet confronted the Common Market. The most immediate effect of the withdrawal of the French representative from the EEC was to freeze the organization at its present stage of development.

The EEC Commission and the majority of the Six sought to link an agreement on the financing of a joint agricultural market to a decision to take further steps toward political integration in Western Europe. The Germans, Italians and Dutch wanted revenues from levies imposed upon farm imports from countries outside the Common Market to be paid to the EEC, rather than to the national governments. Moreover, they wished to strengthen the European Parliament in order that it might control such levies or tariffs.

Because of her growing agricultural productivity, France regards the issue of agriculture in the Common Market as particularly im-

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portant. Therefore, she has been especially anxious to achieve agreement in the EEC for levies against imports from outside countries. France's partners in the EEC attempted to take advantage of this desire by linking an agreement for an agricultural accord to progress toward political integration.

De Gaulle, apparently angered at what he regarded as a breach of a commitment made by France's EEC partners in 1962 to finance the Community agricultural policy without attaching political conditions to it, ruled out any measures which would strengthen European institutions. In the absence of an accord on the financing of the Common Market agricultural policy, the French government recalled its permanent representative from Brussels. Although French representatives continued to participate in discussions whose purpose was to enact or carry out previous agreements, it appeared unlikely that France would be represented at meetings of the EEC Council of Ministers until the agricultural problems were resolved.

The inability of the Six to resolve their differences could have several implications for the European Communities and NATO as well as domestic politics in some EEC countries. There is little doubt that France's EEC partners will be forced to postpone their efforts to achieve a greater degree of European political integration. A division remains between President de Gaulle, who apparently believes that the powers of the European Community should not be enlarged, and the proponents of a greater degree of supranational control. The President of the Commission, Walter Hallstein, has sought to gain acceptance for the notion of a "mystique" by which the European Community is greater than the sum of its parts. To delay progress toward integration, in his estimation, might damage the cohesiveness of the Common Market.

Because of divergent viewpoints as to the proper course European unification should follow, it is conceivable that the French government may decide to block the merger of the executives of ECSC, EEC and Euratom, scheduled for 1966. Moreover, the French could attempt to delay the date when measures may be enacted within the EEC by majority vote. Such a step might presage an effort by France to revise the Rome Treaty to correspond more closely to De Gaulle's views on European integration.

The United States officially has kept aloof from the agricultural crisis. While few believe the French President had as his goal the dissolution of the EEC, there was justifiable concern in Washington as to the probable effects of the Common Market deadlock upon the Geneva trade negotiations. Failure of the EEC to agree on financial arrangements for a joint agricultural policy meant, in effect, that the Common Market countries, which negotiate as a unit in GATT, would be unable to bargain with the United States. U.S. negotiators have maintained that without the inclusion of agricul-

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tural products in the Geneva negotiations, there could be no agreement on trade expansion in industrial goods.

In the absence of an agreement on EEC agricultural policy, France threatened to return to the level of tariffs on industrial goods prevailing in the Common Market in 1962, i.e., 40 per cent instead of the current 70 per cent reduction from the levels which existed in 1958. Moreover, to offset the impact upon France's farmers of the EEC deadlock on agriculture, the French government decided to extend the scope of its farm price guarantees. The government-supported minimum price in the future will apply to about 8.7 million tons (instead of 8.1 million tons) of the annual French grain production of approximately 20 million tons. It remains to be seen whether such moves will satisfy the National Association of French Farmers who, as spokesmen for French farmers generally, have expressed their dissatisfaction with their government's policy in Brussels.

The agricultural crisis, should it not be resolved in the near future, is likely to have a considerable impact on the EEC's African associate members. In view of the French policy on agricultural trade in the Common Market, the other Five could become increasingly reluctant to continue their contributions to the EEC Development Fund, which is of benefit chiefly to France's former overseas territories. France's sponsorship of Algeria's association with the Common Market is likely to be held in abeyance, pending the resolution of the agricultural crisis.

The cause of European integration could be affected adversely by the inability of the Six to overcome the difficulties which beset them in the summer of 1965. The differences among EEC members came at a time when the division of Europe into competing trading blocs had become increasingly apparent. During the past year, EFTA exports to the Six have declined to the extent that EFTA now has a $3 billion trade deficit with the EEC. EFTA members, who have expressed an interest in discussions of measures to bridge the gap between the Six and the Seven, have scheduled a conference to be held in October to work out specific proposals to be submitted to the Six for their consideration.

The agricultural crisis, however dangerous its implications for the immediate future of the Common Market, is not likely to result in the breakup of the EEC. Each of the Six has important economic interests in the Common Market. In order to compromise their differences, the Six might conclude short-term agreements on a common agricultural policy. Whatever the outcome of the crisis, the Six will probably proceed even more slowly than they might otherwise have done in the creation of political unity in Europe.

The agricultural crisis of the EEC represented a deep cleavage in Europe between those who favor a Europe politically united on federalist principles, and those who support a looser, confederate struc-

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ture. The crisis represented a test of wills between France and those of her partners who wish to proceed toward the creation of a politically united Europe. If events in Brussels during recent months provide a guide to the future, France's partners in the EEC may attempt to make the resolution of problems which are of direct interest to Paris contingent upon French agreement on European political unity. The manner in which the Six resolve the agricultural crisis will provide a measure of the relative strength of opposing forces within the European Community, as well as a test of the assumptions implicit in the Treaty of Rome.

The Vietnam Conflict

DURING May and June, Communist China and North Vietnam reaffirmed their opposition to President Johnson's offer in April which could have led to a negotiated settlement of the war in Vietnam. A peace mission consisting of several British Commonwealth heads of government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Wilson, was rebuffed by Moscow, Peking and Hanoi on the ground that it served as a front for "United States imperialism." Several weeks later a left-wing member of the British Labour Party, sent to Hanoi, failed to gain access to the leaders of North Vietnam.

The Chinese and North Vietnamese opposition to negotiations appears to stem from communist confidence in the prospects for a victory in South Vietnam. The propagandists of Peking and Hanoi proclaim the inevitability of the insurgents' victory. During the first half of 1965, the Viet Cong had improved their military position vis-à-vis the South Vietnamese army. As a result, the United States undertook a substantial buildup of its military forces and prepared for direct encounters between U.S. troops and the Viet Cong.

The Soviet Union appeared confident that the communist insurgents would gain control of South Vietnam. Early in July, Moscow announced increases in its military assistance to North Vietnam, and, later in the month, Premier Kosygin declared that any "new aggression" by the United States would be countered by the "forces of national liberation and the socialist states." It was announced on July 28 that North Vietnam had signed aid agreements with the Soviet Union, China, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and North Korea. Moreover, it was reported that weapons from East Germany have been combined with Soviet shipments of arms to the Viet Cong. Many Soviet bloc ships have transported matériel and other cargoes to North Vietnamese ports in recent months.

The Soviets continued to express their desire for "peaceful coexistence" with the West, even while they declared that U.S. policy in Vietnam jeopardized efforts to improve East-West relations. Soon after announcing the granting of additional military aid to North Vietnam, the Soviet Union called for a resumption of the seven-

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teen-nation disarmament talks in Geneva.

The Soviets, because of their alleged concern with peaceful coexistence and failure to provide massive military assistance to North Vietnam, remained the target of public criticism from Peking. In its propaganda statements, Communist China reiterated the contention that the Soviet Union was indifferent to the needs of the revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Moreover, Peking suggested that Soviet leaders were unnecessarily afraid of U.S. nuclear power and sought to reach agreements with the West even at the expense of communist parties in other countries.

The dimensions of the military problem confronting the United States became evident in July when Secretary of Defense McNamara declared, after a brief visit to South Vietnam, that the position of the Saigon government had deteriorated in the southern part of the country where the Viet Cong had expanded their terrorist operations. McNamara carried back to Washington requests by the Saigon government and the U.S. command in South Vietnam for more U.S. forces. After a review of the Vietnam crisis, President Johnson announced, on July 28, that additional troops would be dispatched to Vietnam. There was no indication, however, that U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam would be immediately increased.

The limitations which the United States had placed upon its military action had apparently confirmed communist estimates that the U.S. objective was simply to force the communists to enter negotiations. U.S. military intervention, however, fell short of even this limited aim, for it failed to prevent the Viet Cong from improving their military position. Hence it seemed clear to the Administration that more effective military measures, especially against North Vietnam itself, would be needed if the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong were to be persuaded to come to the conference table, and that even stronger measures would be required to drive the Viet Cong from South Vietnam.

Apparently, the Johnson Administration has taken the decision only to step up the U.S. participation in the Vietnam conflict in order to induce the Hanoi regime to enter negotiations. Presumably, even to prevent further Viet Cong advances, the United States and South Vietnam must establish a ratio of at least 5 to 1 in their troop strength vis-à-vis the communists. Moreover, additional targets in North Vietnam, including communications lines, port facilities and supply depots, must be struck. A greater effort must be made to halt the infiltration of supplies and military personnel into South Vietnam by land and sea. In all likelihood, the growing U.S. military participation in the Vietnam conflict will lead to changes in the command structure. Thus far U.S. and South Vietnamese forces have maintained separate commands. If a duplication of effort is to be avoided, new arrangements for the

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joint military command must be worked out.

The question remains of the objective which guides U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia. Is it a "neutral" South Vietnam, or the desire to return to the principles of the Geneva settlement of 1954? Or is it the unification of Vietnam under a noncommunist government? Administration spokesmen have declared that U.S. participation in the conflict will end when Viet Cong forces have halted their infiltration into South Vietnam. It has been suggested that the Geneva accords of 1954 might form the basis for negotiations about the future of Vietnam. However, the United States has not indicated precisely the kind of settlement envisaged.

Presumably, the creation of a unified Vietnam is an objective which has considerable support on both sides of the 17th Parallel. The Viet Cong appear to have enhanced their position because they have announced their support for a unified Vietnam. If the Hanoi regime should persist in its unwillingness to end the conflict, the United States might match its increase in military participation with a call for the unification of Vietnam under a noncommunist regime. By embracing such a policy objective the United States might give new impetus to efforts in South Vietnam to defeat the Viet Cong, while orienting South Vietnamese public opinion toward the unification of the entire country and thus providing what is now lacking, namely, a positive goal for the South Vietnam defense effort.

If the United States, however, should opt for a "neutral" Vietnam, U.S. policymakers must address themselves to the problem of defining the concept of South Vietnamese neutrality, as well as its implications for the future of Southeast Asia. For example, what would be the position of the Viet Cong in the government of South Vietnam? What kinds of military forces would the Saigon government retain in order to prevent future infiltration? How could the United States, if its military forces were withdrawn from Southeast Asia as the price of a settlement, thwart renewed communist infiltration?

If the Administration is able to demonstrate its ability to deny communist objectives in Vietnam, the Hanoi regime may be induced to enter negotiations. The success of such talks would depend upon the ability of the United States, even while discussions were in progress, to harass the Viet Cong and thus prevent the communists from utilizing diplomacy to buy time to prepare for new military operations. Thus the achievement of U.S. political objectives in Southeast Asia bears a fundamental relationship to the military pressure the United States is prepared to exert against Hanoi and the Viet Cong.

New Directions in South Asia

DEVELOPMENTS in India, Pakistan and Ceylon during the past quarter seem to have reversed, at least temporarily, some of the alarming trends of previous months. The new leaders of India,

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without the guidance of their great charismatic chieftain, Jawaharlal Nehru, have survived a sea of troubles in the first year of their rule. In Pakistan Ayub Khan is in a stronger position as a result of his electoral victories. The agreements between India and Pakistan for a cease-fire in the Rann of Kutch and for a withdrawal of troops all along the borders have removed the immediate threat of an armed clash, and have provided an opportunity for another effort to reach accord on the basic issues that divide the two South Asian neighbors. In Ceylon, after nearly a decade of increasingly left-wing rule, a new regime, dedicated to more moderate policies at home and to a "truly nonaligned" policy abroad, has come into power.

The agreements of June 30, which were worked out by President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India at the Commonwealth Conference in London, with the British Prime Minister as a useful intermediary, brought at least temporary surcease to the mounting tensions between the two South Asian states. Apparently at least 30,000 Indian and Pakistani troops were facing each other in the Rann of Kutch, and the desultory clashes between the two armies might have flared into a larger conflagration. Ayub Khan said in commenting on the agreements: "Never before have India and Pakistan been closer to war than during recent weeks when armies of both countries stood in menacing confrontation along the entire Indo-Pakistan border." President Ayub expressed the hope that the agreements "will constitute a turning point in Indo-Pakistan relations." Nevertheless, clashes along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and at various places along the borders of East Pakistan and West Bengal and Assam have been more numerous and more serious than usual in recent months; and these clashes have occurred in areas where Hindu-Muslim animosity has been particularly marked.*

Pakistan continues to pursue its rather quixotic course in foreign relations. In March Ayub Khan received a warm reception during a state visit to China, and a somewhat cooler one during a subsequent visit in April to the Soviet Union. His plans to continue his personal diplomacy by an American visit were abruptly checked when President Johnson, for reasons which are still incomprehensible to Pakistanis—and to many Americans as well—asked Ayub to postpone his trip.

Pakistan's recent "chumming up" with China, to use Nehru's words, continues, and has taken many tangible and intangible forms, including the much-discussed border agreement; but there are some signs that Ayub Khan does not wish the Chinese dragon

*EDITOR'S NOTE: Shortly before this issue went to press, the newspapers carried reports of alleged Pakistani infiltrations into the Indian-held part of Kashmir, followed by guerrilla-like operations. Thus, relations between India and Pakistan seem once again to have taken a turn for the worse.

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to come too close. He has gone out of his way to show his interest in cultivating closer relations with the Soviet Union, and while he has often been openly critical of the United States, he has by no means been indifferent to the importance of continuing relations with the great Western power with which Pakistan is still somewhat uneasily allied and on which it must depend for a substantial part of its badly-needed foreign aid. Pakistan has also established closer relations with Nepal, and with its CENTO allies in the Middle East, Turkey and Iran, with which it is now also associated in a new organization called Regional Cooperation for Development.

As a result of a series of elections in 1965—first for President of the Republic of Pakistan, then for the National Assembly, and finally for the two provincial assemblies in East and West Pakistan, in all of which the 80,000 "Basic Democrats" served as the electoral college—Ayub Khan has been given a mandate for another five years, and his supporters are overwhelmingly in the majority in the national and provincial assemblies. Pakistan's economic growth, which an American economist has called "an economic miracle," continues to be impressive. The targets of the Second Five Year Plan were largely realized, and in some cases exceeded, and the Third Plan, calling for expenditures of $10.9 billion, was launched on July 1, with every expectation that its stepped-up targets would be attained.

In early March, India, too, staged an important election in the South Indian state of Kerala. The outcome only added to the political confusion in that "problem state," and perhaps in India as a whole. It was a definite defeat for the ruling Congress Party, which won only 36 seats out of 127 in the new Assembly, whereas in the previous Assembly it had had 51. A group of dissident Congressmen, who broke away from the Congress Party in Kerala and defied the Congress high command, won 24 seats, and the "left" wing of the Communist Party of India scored the most dramatic success by returning 40 members to the Assembly (29 of whom were among the more than 800 "leftist communists" who were arrested in late December 1964). In contrast, the "right" wing of the CPI, which had 19 representatives in the old Assembly, returned only 3 members.

Kerala was not the only headache for Prime Minister Shastri and other Congress leaders in the post-Nehru era. Other troubles arose from the crisis of confidence in the capacity of the new leadership, from a serious food crisis in late 1964, from linguistic riots in Madras when the Government of India tried to make Hindi the sole official language of India in January 1965, and from communal disturbances in Kashmir, West Bengal and elsewhere. These crises were at least temporarily surmounted, and by mid-1965 there were evidences that the post-Nehru leadership was gaining in confidence and popular support. Even Prime Minister Shastri's rather petulant and impulsive

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action in canceling his projected visit to the United States when President Johnson asked him to postpone it seemed to find favor in India.

Emergency rule in India, proclaimed immediately after the Chinese attack in late October 1962, still obtains, providing concrete evidence that India's leaders regard the threat from China as a continuing one. Largely because of this threat India has given special attention to improving its relations with Nepal, with gratifying results, and with Burma, with less success. It is also keeping a careful watch on Sikkim, Bhutan, NEFA and other Himalayan border areas, to guard against Chinese pressures, infiltration and subversion. It has redoubled its pacifying efforts in troubled Nagaland, in order to avoid giving China other tempting "targets of opportunity."

Chinese troops are still entrenched in Ladakh, and there is very little that India can do about this, except to fulminate verbally. According to Indian sources, there are more Chinese troops along India's Himalayan borders now than there were in October-November 1962, and many of these now operate out of permanent encampments just north of some of the border passes. China's explosion of two nuclear devices, the first in October 1964 and the second in May of this year, raised new alarms in India, and even led to publicly voiced demands that India too should develop nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Shastri, in the tradition of Gandhi and Nehru, firmly resisted these pressures, but he was forced to admit that the question might have to be reconsidered if China continued to be hostile and to move ahead rapidly in developing its nuclear capability. Some Indians, including M. R. Masani, General Secretary of the Swatantra Party, and General Cariappa, former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, urged that India ask both the Soviet Union and the United States to provide a "nuclear umbrella" for India, to forestall the Chinese nuclear threat.

In foreign affairs India has continued to follow a modified version of nonalignment, and to seek to preserve good relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. In a joint communiqué at the end of his state visit to the Soviet Union in May, Prime Minister Shastri joined with the Soviet leaders in reiterating "their continued adherence to the principle of peaceful coexistence," in welcoming the "growing international recognition" of the policy of nonalignment, and in expressing "great concern" over the situation in Vietnam. Specifically, Shastri agreed with his Soviet hosts "that bombings of D.R.V.N. should be stopped immediately," and that "a solution of the problem of Vietnam can be found only within the framework of the Geneva agreements of 1954." The communiqué was significantly silent about Viet Minh and Viet Cong activities against the South Vietnamese, about India's difficulties with China, about the Sino-Soviet dispute, and about Indo-Pakistan differences.

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India is clearly concerned about the aggressive tactics and policies of Communist China, but seems to be concentrating largely on the Chinese north of its own borders, and not on other parts of the world, not even Southeast Asia. There can be no doubt, however, that the present leaders of India are alert to existing dangers, and will not allow any doctrinaire devotion to nonalignment to prevent them from taking steps which they deem essential for India's defense and survival.

In one other South Asian country, namely Ceylon, a recent election has had important results. In December 1964, Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike, who succeeded her murdered husband as Prime Minister in 1960, was forced to resign because of defections within her own Sri Lanka Freedom Party. In nationwide elections on March 22 of this year the SLFP and its Marxist allies were able to capture only 55 seats out of 151 in the new House of Representatives. In the election campaign, the United National Party attacked Mrs. Bandaranaike's government for its coalition with the Marxists, its nationalization of most of Ceylon's economy, the deteriorating economic situation in the country, its restrictions on freedom of the press, and its alleged links with Communist China. The new UNP government, headed by Dudley Senanayake, is trying to strengthen Ceylon's economy and to overcome the effects of nearly a decade of increasingly left-wing policies at home and abroad. It was quickly able to reach an agreement with the foreign oil companies (British and American) on compensation for the properties which had been expropriated in 1962. Once this impasse was resolved, American aid to Ceylon, which had been suspended in February 1963, was renewed. Mr. Senanayake announced that Ceylon would follow a "truly nonaligned" foreign policy, which will almost certainly lead to a considerable change in orientation more pleasing to the Western than to the communist powers.

It is to be hoped that these recent changes in India, Pakistan and Ceylon will contribute to an improved situation in South Asia and to more cooperative and more realistic policies in foreign affairs.

Crisis in the Caribbean

THE assassination four years ago of Rafael Trujillo, President of the Dominican Republic, ended one of the most oppressive tyrannies Latin America has ever known. The demise of Trujillo created a political vacuum in the Republic. From Trujillo's death until April of this year a series of governments have held power in Santo Domingo. Only one regime, that headed by Juan Bosch who was chosen President in December 1962 in an election supervised by the Organization of American States, resulted from an expression by ballot of the wishes of the Dominican people. Bosch entered the Presidency with the good will and support of practically all nations of the Western Hemisphere. After an unimpressive seven months in office he was

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ousted by a military coup and sent into political exile in Puerto Rico.

Succeeding an interval of junta governments, Donald Reid Cabral, a successful businessman and lawyer, took office in late 1963 and served until April 24, 1965, when a revolutionary movement supporting the return of Juan Bosch deposed him. The revolutionary group contained elements of the military and leaders from several center and left-of-center parties, including Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party. It also included representatives of the two Dominican parties which are clearly pro-communist, the Partido Socialista Popular and the Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario, and of the communist-infiltrated 14th of June movement.

Radical elements quickly assumed active leadership of the revolutionary movement. They seized a substantial amount of military equipment, some of which fell into their hands through the efforts of officer groups antagonistic to President Reid Cabral, and issued large quantities of arms to civilians. They organized gangs to burn and loot. After taking over a major radio station in Santo Domingo, the revolutionaries issued public statements which bore a marked similarity to those issued by Castro in Cuba. A civil war ensued between members of the movement and those elements of the military that had not favored Reid Cabral's overthrow. The fighting produced considerable destruction in Santo Domingo, together with casualties which may have numbered in the thousands.

More moderate leaders within the revolutionary movement found themselves forced into the background during the increasing chaos. As the advocates of violence gained control, some members of the movement took refuge in foreign embassies. Some pro-Bosch leaders, including Rafael Molina Ureña, José Francisca Peña Gómez and Martínez Francisco went into asylum. Others, in public statements, denounced the communist attempt to usurp the leadership of the movement. By April 28, the disorder in Santo Domingo was such that no authority commanded power sufficient to safeguard the lives of the Dominican population or the foreign nationals residing in the city. It was feared that communist and pro-communist activists might soon assume control of the country. Thus President Johnson decided to send U.S. troops to protect lives and property in the interest of restoring law and order. Within hours after the President's decision, U.S. Marines were landing in the Dominican Republic. Augmented by U.S. Army paratroop units and combat teams, the force eventually numbered more than 30,000 men.

The Administration first announced that U.S. troops had been sent to protect the lives of American and other foreign nationals. Within a short time the danger of a communist takeover was added to the reasons given by the Administration to justify its action. President Johnson made it clear that the United States would not allow the communists to seize power in

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another state in the Western Hemisphere.

After some initial skirmishes, the U.S. forces succeeded in placing themselves between the contending factions. The revolutionists, who termed themselves Constitutionalists in order to emphasize their support for the return of ex-President Bosch under the Constitution of 1963, controlled the central section of Santo Domingo including such strategically important points as the port facilities, the telephone company and the main radio station. Their military opponents were headquartered at the San Isidro air base outside the city. The presence of superior U.S. forces enabled the Administration to obtain a cease-fire.

The United States, on April 27, the day before U.S. troops were ordered to the Dominican Republic, had called for a meeting of the OAS Peace Committee. When the peace committee met during the evening of April 28, it was decided that the OAS Council should be convened. This produced yet another delay of forty-eight hours. In the absence of an immediate effort by the OAS to consider the Dominican crisis, the United States dispatched forces unilaterally.

Subsequently, the United States sought the creation by the OAS of an international force to patrol the Dominican Republic. While some of the member governments, notably Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, opposed the creation of such a peace force to replace U.S. troops, the force was approved by a majority of OAS members and sent to the strife-ridden country. President Johnson immediately withdrew the Marine Corps units and assigned the remaining Army units to the OAS command headed by a Brazilian general. Four nations, in addition to the United States, sent at least token units to the peace force. Three of the countries sending military units—Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica—have been threatened by the communists ever since Castro gained power in Cuba. The fourth, Brazil, narrowly escaped a leftist coup in the spring of 1964. Looking beyond the immediate crisis in the Dominican Republic, some OAS members, including Brazil and Argentina, have voiced an interest in the creation of a permanent inter-American peace force.

The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic has evoked varying reactions in Latin America. The governments of Chile and Venezuela were critical of what was alleged to be a return to the Yankee intervention of an earlier period. President Johnson sent his special assistant, Averell Harriman, to key Latin American capitals in an effort to clarify U.S. policy. At no point did communist agitators succeed in stirring public demonstrations against Harriman's visit.

Former President Bosch maintained that the United States, suffering from a "communist psychosis," had embarked upon an unwarranted intervention in the Dominican Republic. Yet the original cadre which supported the Castro revolution consisted of only twelve people. At no time did the

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Castro "army" number more than 3,000. Of this number, only a small percentage were actually communists. The General Directorate of Intelligence in Cuba continues to train communist guerrillas from all parts of Latin America, including the Dominican Republic.

Bosch apparently did not play a leading part at any stage of the crisis, even though he insisted, in flamboyant statements, that the U.S. intervention was unjustifiable. He maintained that the constitutionalists were not communist-infiltrated. The Administration was unable to convince him that the constitutionalist movement was at any time in danger of falling into the hands of the communists. Hence efforts by the Johnson Administration to obtain Bosch's aid in support of a democratic solution were not successful.

It is appropriate to inquire as to the meaning of the term "intervention." The communists have "intervened" in the affairs of nations in Latin America. To ignore this fact is to overlook a basic characteristic of contemporary international politics in the Western Hemisphere. Should the United States, in order to avoid the "interventionist" label, refrain from action designed to thwart communist efforts to seize power by exploiting the pressing political and economic problems confronting Latin American states? As John Stuart Mill once suggested: "The doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all governments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the free states. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes to but this miserable issue: that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help the right."

A political settlement in the Dominican Republic remains to be worked out. With the arrival of U.S. forces, the communists "melted away" to wait for future opportunities. U.S. efforts to promote a viable settlement have included continuous communication with remaining political groups: the military portion, led by Wessin y Wessin, the junta headed by Imbert Barrera, and the rebel constitutionalists under the leadership of Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deño. Whatever the outcome of efforts to form a provisional government, the Dominican Republic will continue to be faced with the formidable problems of illiteracy, poverty and political instability which are the legacy of the Trujillo regime. Such problems invite continued manipulation by communist-trained cadres.

The geography of the Caribbean dictates continuing U.S. interest in the region. Three great islands—Cuba, Hispaniola and Puerto Rico—stand on the edge of the Caribbean between North and South America. The loss of Cuba to communism impaired the U.S. strategic position on its southern border, and opened much of Latin America to the threat of communist subversion. The imposition of a communist government upon the Dominican Republic would probably have led quickly to the seizure of Haiti,

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which lies between Cuba and the Dominican Republic, and have extended communist influence for eleven hundred miles in the Caribbean. Such a loss would have been a great setback to the United States, which would have appeared as either unable or unwilling to prevent the extension of communist influence adjacent to its borders.

The Administration, by its action in the Dominican crisis, may have served notice of its intention to thwart communist efforts to seize power elsewhere in Latin America. There now remains the difficult task of resolving the economic and political problems facing the Dominican Republic.

The Coup in Algeria: Its Significance and Ramifications

EARLY on the morning of June 19, a group of high-ranking officers of the Algerian army, including the Chief of Staff, Colonel Tahar Zbiri, placed President Ben Bella under arrest. By dawn, the insurgents held vital communications centers in Algiers and soon thereafter broadcast an announcement that a Revolutionary Committee had seized power. The announcement accused Ben Bella of "the sordid calculations, the political narcissism, and the morbid love of power" of a "diabolical dictator." He would suffer, it was stated, "the fate reserved by history to all despots" for "his unspeakable betrayal and his high treason."

Colonel Houari Boumedienne, gaunt, publicity-shy leader of the coup, had originally been the man most responsible for putting Ben Bella in power in Algeria during the factional struggle with Youssef Ben Khedda in 1962. Boumedienne's liberation army, sweeping in from both east and west, had paved the way for Ben Bella's assumption of power. In return for their support, the military leaders were granted a strong voice in the government. Colonel Boumedienne himself became Minister of Defense, and his close associates were given the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs. Moreover, numerous posts of lesser importance went to men loyal to Boumedienne.

Since Algerian independence, the alliance between Boumedienne and Ben Bella had been one of the few stable elements in the Algerian political system. Yet, in order to consolidate his rule, Ben Bella shifted alliances repeatedly. By June 1965 he had eliminated from the government all national leaders who might conceivably pose a threat to him, including most of the men who had helped him attain power—with the exception of Boumedienne. Of the six "historic leaders of the Algerian revolution" still living after the war for independence, only Ben Bella retained power. Only two men of the seven-member political bureau which had backed his takeover in 1962 were still in favor. The President's alliance with Boumedienne had enabled him to prevent the formation of a hostile coalition.

By the middle of 1964, however, relations between Ben Bella and Boumedienne began to deteriorate.

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In July 1964 came the announcement that a popular militia, under party control, would be created. Such a step represented an effort by the President to weaken the power of the army. At the same time, the resignation of the pro-Boumedienne Interior Minister, Ahmed Medeghri, was announced. Ben Bella himself assumed the duties of Interior Minister. In December 1964, in a cabinet shake-up, four more ministries were consolidated and placed under the personal control of Ben Bella, thus reducing the influence of the military leaders under Boumedienne.

When Ben Bella, early in June, demanded the resignation of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the pro-Boumedienne Minister of Foreign Affairs, the military may have felt that the time had come to thwart the President's effort to diminish the influence of the army. While Ben Bella withdrew his demand for Bouteflika's resignation when faced with strong opposition from Boumedienne, he scheduled a meeting of the seventeen-member Political Bureau of the National Liberation Front on June 19 to discuss the retention of Bouteflika. The outcome of such a meeting could hardly have been in doubt. The coup may have been timed to prevent this meeting from taking place.

There had been widespread rumors that Ben Bella was planning to use the forthcoming Afro-Asian Conference, scheduled to begin on June 29, as a means of disposing of Boumedienne himself. It would have been difficult for the army to contest a shake-up during the conference with the leaders of more than sixty nations convened in Algiers.

Were the coup to have been postponed until after the conference, the prestige of having presided over such a distinguished gathering might have so enhanced Ben Bella's reputation as to make his removal more difficult. Thus, Boumedienne may have calculated that the moment had come to remove Ben Bella before the President had strengthened his position.

The coup appears to have stemmed from a personal struggle for power rather than to have been based upon differences over substantive policy issues, although such disagreements certainly existed. The nonideological nature of the new regime was underscored by its reluctance to make immediate changes in Ben Bella policies. The new rulers quickly announced that they would continue to follow a policy of nonalignment in foreign relations.

Although the coup of June 19 was not originally planned as an anti-communist revolt, the leaders quickly moved to curtail communist influence in Algeria. Communists and persons suspected of having communist leanings were excluded from the new government. Such persons formed the bulk of those arrested in the aftermath of the coup. There was increasing hostility to the new regime among communists in Algeria. Many of the pro-Ben Bella demonstrators were led by communist elements. Much of the propaganda within

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Algeria against the coup was communist-inspired. Thus, although the new regime was not anti-communist in character, it appeared to have been driven into an increasingly anti-communist stance.

The French Communist Party has denounced Boumedienne for deposing Ben Bella. The Central Committee of the French Communist Party passed a resolution calling for the freeing of Ben Bella, and *L'Humanité,* the leading French communist newspaper, advocated the formation of dissident groups within France to work for the overthrow of the Boumedienne regime. When *L'Humanité* published accounts of a "massacre" of pro-Ben Bella demonstrators in Bone, Boumedienne ordered its correspondent to leave Algeria. When the Cuban press agency circulated copies in Algeria of a Castro speech condemning the new regime, its office was closed down. These events led Foreign Minister Bouteflika to warn the ambassadors of communist and neutralist countries against interference in Algeria's politics.

Since the coup, the Algerian government has toned down its anti-Western propaganda. The speeches of Boumedienne and other leaders of the coup have been notable for the absence of the anti-imperialist jargon which so often characterized the public statements of Ben Bella. On June 28 Foreign Minister Bouteflika is alleged to have told the Soviets that Algeria will not allow itself to become an outlet for Soviet propaganda.

However, Algeria is not likely to adopt a pro-Western foreign policy. Efforts to crush communist activity in the country apparently were prompted primarily by communist hostility to the new regime. The basic continuity of Algerian foreign policy is underscored by the views of the new government toward Africa south of the Sahara. For example, when asked about the attitude of the Boumedienne regime toward the Congo, Finance Minister Kaid Ahmed responded that, in his estimation, Tshombe's government "does not represent the Congo." Finally, Algeria's army has been equipped by the Soviet Union: One of the first acts of the new rulers was to request assurance that Soviet arms deliveries would not be halted.

The postponement of the Afro-Asian Conference to November 5 was a setback to the Chinese communists, who favored convening the meeting as scheduled. The coup led also to a Soviet cancellation of the Moscow-sponsored World Youth Conference. However, disruption in the plans for these conferences cannot be attributed solely to the new regime.

The postponement of the Afro-Asian Conference came as a stunning blow to the plans of Communist China and Indonesia to use the event as a propaganda platform from which to condemn the West, especially the United States. The Algerian government, however, had not sought a postponement; this decision was reached only after a bomb blast at the conference site seemed to make such a move prudent. Moreover, the cancellation of

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the World Youth Conference was a decision which appears to have been taken by the Soviets at the behest of the French Communist Party rather than of the Algerian government. In fact, the Algerian delegation protested strongly against the cancellation.

A shift of emphasis from the flamboyant foreign policy declarations of Ben Bella to the more urgent tasks of internal stabilization is indicated in official statements which have stressed the necessity for economic development and political stability. According to the original proclamation of the Revolutionary Committee, the major task, after re-establishing political stability, is that of "reorganizing and putting our economy in order. . . ."

Formidable problems confront the new Algerian regime. Even though more than 500,000 Algerians work in France, there are well over a million unemployed in Algeria in a population of nine million. When French rule ended in 1962, almost all French technical and administrative personnel departed. The seizure of foreign-owned land has left more than 100,000 acres of Algeria's best soil uncultivated. Algeria is heavily dependent upon the United States to feed her population. She must rely upon aid from France and other countries for economic development. Industries nationalized since independence are managed by workers committees, which in most cases have contributed to inefficiency in production. Algeria's industrial output in 1965 remains well below the level which existed when French rule ended. Only a major effort will restore her economy to the level of production prevailing when the French departed.

Most of Ben Bella's former colleagues continue to hold positions in the new regime. The cabinet has remained for the most part unchanged, although the Revolutionary Committee, presently the highest decision-making body in Algeria, is composed almost exclusively of military leaders. Even though Ben Bella still has the passive support of most of the Algerian people, the demonstrations immediately following the coup were small and scattered, and the countryside remained quiet in spite of widespread communist agitation.

The coup has also been disruptive of Nasser's efforts to strengthen his position in the Arab world. Prior to Ben Bella's overthrow, Algeria, Iraq and Yemen remained the only Arab nations upon whose leaders Nasser could count for support. He had failed in his attempt to impose sanctions on the German Federal Republic for its recognition of Israel. Jordan and Lebanon had resisted strong pressure from Cairo to make provocative moves against Israel. The division within the Arab world widened when President Bourguiba of Tunisia advocated conciliation of Israel. Even Nasser's long-standing policy of isolating Israel was now being questioned.

Cairo's initial response to the Algerian coup was mild. However, when assurances regarding Ben Bella's safety were not forthcoming

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from Algiers, the tone of statements issued by the Egyptian government became more hostile. This hostility was reciprocated by the leaders of the Algerian coup. Shortly after the bombing of the hall in Algiers where the Afro-Asian Conference was to have been held, Egyptian workers were rounded up and questioned. According to Egyptian sources, more than 200 Egyptians employed in Algeria were subsequently sent home.

Shortly after the coup, events elsewhere jeopardized Nasser's position in the Middle East. In Iraq, President Abdel Salam Arif dismissed several pro-Nasser army officials. This prompted the resignation of six pro-Nasser members of his cabinet, one of whom had just returned from a secret visit to Cairo, and their replacement by supporters of President Arif. In Yemen, the resignation of the entire cabinet posed a further embarrassment to the Nasser regime. Following one another in such close succession, these events have reduced Nasser's influence in the Middle East. Yet deterioration in relations between Algeria and Egypt may not be permanent: they may improve after the issue of Ben Bella's fate is resolved.

The Algerian coup marked at least a temporary disruption of communist efforts to gain greater influence in Algeria and the nonaligned world. The communist propaganda drive against U.S. policy received a setback in the decision to postpone the Algiers conference of nonaligned Afro-Asian states. Whatever stance the new rulers of Algeria choose to adopt in their foreign policy, they have inherited from their predecessor serious domestic problems which demand prompt attention. Should the new leaders focus their efforts primarily on the resolution of the pressing problems of economic development, rather than on foreign relations, the Boumedienne regime will signify a major departure from the government it ousted.

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NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: AN ASSESSMENT*

by Mason Willrich

IN the wake of each of its nuclear explosions Communist China has reaffirmed that "under no circumstances" would it be the first to use nuclear weapons. Communist China has also called for a world summit conference to reach general international agreement to ban all use of nuclear weapons. In a rare display of Sino-Soviet solidarity, the USSR has supported Peking's initiatives and come forward with similar proposals of its own.[1]

"Ban-the-bomb" is a hardy perennial for the communist propagandists. In 1946 the USSR responded to a far-reaching and detailed U.S. proposal for the international control of atomic energy by calling for an immediate prohibition on the use of atomic weapons.[2] Most Western governments have rejected any declaratory ban on the use of nuclear weapons unaccompanied by verified disarmament.[3] Despite this repeated disparagement the ban-the-bomb theme has gained considerable support in recent years

[1]For the text of the Communist Chinese proposal following its first nuclear test in October 1964 see *Peking Review, A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views,* October 23, 1964, p. 6. For the Soviet response, see *Soviet Documents: Current Statements, Speeches, Reports and Editorials,* January 25, 1965, pp. 8-9. The text of the communiqué reaffirming Peking's position following its second nuclear test in May 1965 may be found in the *New York Times,* May 15, 1965, p. 2. On May 27, 1965 the USSR introduced a resolution in the United Nations Disarmament Commission calling for a world conference to agree on the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons "not later than the first half of 1966" and inviting the nuclear powers, pending conclusion of a convention, to declare that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. This resolution, however, was not pressed to a vote.

[2]For the U.S. proposal see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959,* I, 7-16, 25-42 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), and for the Soviet response, *ibid.,* pp. 17-25.

[3]The official U.S. views are set forth in Secretary Rusk's reply of June 30, 1962 to the inquiry of the UN Acting Secretary-General on the question of convening a special conference on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, in *Documents on Disarmament, 1962,* I, 629-631. Replies by all governments may be found in UN General Assembly *Official Records: Seventeenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 26,* and *ibid., Eighteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 27.*

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any U.S. government department or agency.

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at the United Nations[4] and has been the subject of debate at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) in Geneva.[5]

In light of the continuing solidarity in the communist camp on this issue and attendant support from many nonaligned nations, U.S. policy against any declaratory restraint on the use of nuclear weapons deserves a fresh appraisal. Moreover, with China rapidly emerging as a nuclear power, there is a heightened sense of urgency about steps to prevent further "nuclear spread." This underlines the importance of assessing the implications for potential nuclear powers of any change in the present U.S. policy of opposition to ban-the-bomb.

This article will explore the ramifications of a ban on first use of nuclear weapons, primarily from the point of view of U.S. interests. General issues connected with any such ban will be analyzed in relation, first, to the USSR; second, to NATO; third, to Communist China; and, finally, to general U.S. disarmament policy. Consideration will also be given to various types of bans on the use of nuclear weapons, ranging from a blanket prohibition to a no-first-use policy limited to narrowly defined circumstances.

U.S. Relations with the USSR

Any declaratory ban on the use of nuclear weapons would reduce to some extent U.S. freedom of action and number of options in responding to a Soviet threat or use of force.[6] Whether a mutual restriction on the number of options available at the nuclear end of the weapons spectrum would operate in the U.S. interest in its relations with the USSR would depend primarily upon (a) which side, if either, would obtain military advantage,

[4]E.g., A/Res/1653 (XVI), November 28, 1961; A/Res/1909 (XVIII), November 29, 1963 (General Assembly resolutions). For the text of the 1961 resolution, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961,* pp. 648-650.

[5]For a report of discussions on this issue in the 1964 session of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, see UN document A/5731—DC/209, September 22, 1964, p. 4. Views of the eight nonaligned members of the ENDC can be found in ENDC/144.

[6]Of course, all UN members have undertaken to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" (Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 4). Moreover, the U.S. government, while pointing out that the UN Charter "makes a distinction, not between one weapon and another, but between the use of force for aggression and for defense," has offered "the fullest assurances that it will never use any weapon, large or small, with aggressive intent." (Secretary of State Rusk in his reply to the UN Acting Secretary-General's inquiry, see footnote 3.)

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assuming the conditions of the ban are observed, and (b) whether the ban would in fact have comparable restraining effects on the USSR and the U.S.[7]

(a) *Military consequences.* The United States at present enjoys a considerable margin of superiority in both strategic and tactical nuclear weaponry. Therefore, a no-first-use policy or agreement, taken alone, would affect a broad range of armaments where the United States is ahead without exacting a Soviet *quid pro quo.* However, the two ends of the nuclear weapons spectrum deserve separate analysis.

With respect to strategic use, the United States has publicly declared its preference for concentrating the weight of a retaliatory strike against Soviet military targets. This is the counter-force option. The U.S. preference for city avoidance is intended to provide Moscow with the greatest possible incentive to withhold attack against U.S. cities in a nuclear strike. However, the USSR apparently still adheres to a primarily counter-population strategy, and Secretary McNamara has, himself, concluded that "under today's circumstances . . . any nuclear attack by the Soviet Union on the United States will include an attack on the major urban areas of the United States."[8]

On this basis, it might seem that the United States could safely propose an agreement limited to no first use of nuclear weapons against cities.[9] The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 is a nerve-wracking example, however, of the need for Washington to retain complete flexibility of nuclear response. On that occasion the U.S. threat of nuclear retaliation pronounced by President Kennedy was carefully phrased to permit "a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union" if any nuclear missile was launched from Cuba "against any nation in the Western Hemisphere."[10] Because the United States had a wide margin of conventional superiority in the Caribbean it would not have had to be the first to use

[7]The question of the potential impact on the general U.S.-USSR political atmosphere is considered below in connection with the effect of a ban on U.S. disarmament policy.

[8]*Hearings (No. 4) on Military Posture and H.R. 2440, to Authorize Appropriations During Fiscal Year 1964, Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (88th Congress, 1st Session), p. 332. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.)

[9]The interpretation that the U.S. open declaration of a city-avoidance option was a solicitation of agreement to "rules of nuclear war" has been officially denied. See Department of Defense official, John T. McNaughton, "Arms Restraint in Military Decisions," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* September 1963.

[10]*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1962,* p. 808.

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nuclear weapons in order to prevail in Cuba. However, President Kennedy's statement did not foreclose the possibility that the United States would be the first to strike at cities. In view of the unforeseen nature of future U.S.-USSR nuclear confrontations, therefore, it may be questioned whether it would be in the U.S. interest to enter into any mutual restraint on the use of nuclear weapons, even one which merely made more obligatory and formal its announced city-avoidance policy.

In a broader strategic sense, U.S. agreement to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would seem to raise doubts about the continuing validity of the current U.S. policy of a controlled and flexible nuclear response. That policy has been summarized by Secretary McNamara in the following terms:

> Our forces can be used in several different ways. We may have to retaliate with a single massive attack. Or, we may be able to use our retaliatory forces to limit damage done to ourselves, and our allies, by knocking out the enemy's bases before he has had time to launch his second salvos. We may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by using our forces as a bargaining weapon—by threatening further attack. In any case, our large reserve of protected firepower would give an enemy an incentive to avoid our cities and to stop a war. *Our new policy gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitment with respect to doctrine or targets. We shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way,* so as best to pursue the interests of the United States, our Allies, and the rest of the Free World. (Emphasis added.)[11]

With respect to tactical nuclear weapons, the U.S. also enjoys superiority over the USSR. Doctrine regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons is at best in a rudimentary stage of development. Secretary McNamara has recently stated that the United States would be required to use tactical nuclear weapons in order to defend Western Europe against "an all-out Soviet attack, even if such an attack were limited to nonnuclear means." This appears to be the situation in spite of increases in the effectiveness of NATO's conventional forces since 1960 and recent downward revisions in the best estimates of the nonnuclear strength of the opposing Warsaw Pact forces.[12]

U.S. defense of West Berlin against Soviet attack would appear

[11]In his speech before the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, February 17, 1962, reprinted in *Vital Speeches of the Day,* March 1, 1962, p. 297.

[12]*Hearings (No. 36) on Military Posture and H.R. 9637, Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (88th Congress, 1st Session), pp. 7021, 7022. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.)

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to be even more difficult than on the Central Front. How long the Berlin garrison could hold out, surrounded and isolated 110 miles inside communist territory, is arguable. Moreover, a variety of means are available for rescuing or at least avenging a Soviet takeover of West Berlin. Nevertheless, as General Maxwell Taylor has pointed out, "Berlin has always been untenable as a military position. . . . [W]e have thus far protected Berlin by the evident resolution that we would not accept interference with our rights without a very violent reaction on our part. . . . We must be willing to go all the way down the road."[13]

It is clear that the United States presently relies on its margin of nuclear superiority as an integral part of the deterrent against Soviet aggression. Moreover, the U.S. deterrent, as well as its political position in Europe, depends in certain vital situations on the credibility of U.S. willingness to resort to the first use of "tactical" nuclear weapons.

(b) *Comparability of restraint.* A ban on first use of nuclear weapons would be to the advantage of the side that had less regard for it. There can be little doubt that the United States would take a no-first-use pledge more seriously than the USSR. For its part, the U.S. government would have to enter into any no-first-use commitment with a reasonable degree of good faith, if for no other reason than because the Executive Branch would have to be able to respond publicly to sharp criticism of such a move from some quarters on Capitol Hill. On the other hand, although the USSR would derive military advantage from a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons, its advocacy of "ban-the-bomb" proposals in the past has been largely a propaganda gambit. In their more candid moments, Soviet leaders have recognized that, if protection of vital interests required resort to nuclear weapons, a no-first-use pledge would make a liar out of any nuclear power which had given it.[14]

In the absence of a comparable restraining influence on the use of nuclear weapons by the USSR, a declaration by the United States of its willingness to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons might invite Soviet miscalculation in crucial areas of

[13] *Major Defense Matters: Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (with Emphasis on Fiscal Year 1960 Military Budget and Berlin Situation)*, Part 1 (86th Congress, 1st Session), pp. 6, 15. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959.)

[14] For examples, Premier Khrushchev's interview reported in *Sunday Times* (London), August 16, 1964, and an earlier interview on September 5, 1961, reported in *New York Times*, September 8, 1961, p. 11.

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potential conflict. If, for example, prior to the Cuban crisis the U.S. government had formally restricted its complete freedom of action regarding nuclear weapons, Chairman Khrushchev might well have reached a different conclusion regarding U.S. resolve—with disastrous consequences for both sides.

In sum, therefore, both from the point of view of the efficacy of the restraint and its effect on the military relationship, the general concept of a mutual ban on use of nuclear weapons seems to be to the decided advantage of the Soviet Union. Whether the disadvantages of such a measure to U.S. interests with respect to the USSR would be offset by advantages elsewhere in U.S. foreign relations will now be examined.

U.S. Relations with the NATO Allies

The impact of a U.S. proposal to ban the first use of nuclear weapons upon U.S. interests in the NATO area may be judged primarily in terms of two policy clashes: (1) On the one hand, U.S. interest in maintaining within NATO a unity of planning and control over the nuclear defense of the North Atlantic area, and, on the other, French interest in developing an independent nuclear defense under "European" control; and (2) on the one hand, U.S. interest in strengthening a NATO conventional response to the threat of Soviet conventional aggression in central Europe, and, on the other, European interest in a conventional-tactical nuclear defense posture requiring prompt nuclear escalation.[15]

An indication of U.S. willingness to commit itself in advance to restrictions on the use of its nuclear forces would feed the already existing doubts about the long-term reliability of the U.S. commitment to the nuclear defense of Western Europe. A U.S. initiative of this kind would provide grist for the advocates of a Gaullist policy for Europe. Moreover, West Germany's position in favor of continuing firm defense ties with the United States is based in part on its evaluation of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe. A U.S. initiative which put in question that commitment could, in the present circumstances, push West Germany away from the United States and toward France on the crucial matter of European nuclear policy.

[15]The U.S. dialogue with NATO on these issues, with liberal quotation from official sources, is set forth in William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), Chapter 3, pp. 102-134.

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The effect which a U.S. agreement to a declaratory ban on use of nuclear weapons would have on the buildup of NATO's conventional forces would be more complex and difficult to determine. It may be argued that a restraint on the use of nuclear weapons would provide a stimulus to U.S. efforts to build up NATO's nonnuclear option.[16] Increased emphasis on the early use of nuclear weapons would be a militarily unsound European reaction to a situation where the U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons in defense of NATO was under some restriction. However, France and West Germany might react, at least initially, more on political than military grounds and emphasize a common strategy of prompt nuclear escalation. The British Labour Government would, no doubt, have difficulty reacting in less than positive terms to a U.S. no-first-use initiative in view of sentiments in the Party's left wing. However, in light of British military doctrine with respect to NATO, as well as its already burdensome commitment of conventional forces on the Continent, a U.S. initiative might well receive—privately—a cool reception in London. Similarly, in other NATO capitals public acquiescence might cloak a good deal of private concern with such a sharp, albeit narrow, reversal of U.S. policy.

U.S. Interests in Communist Chinese Containment

The effect which a U.S. no-first-use pledge would have on U.S. interests in the Far East and South Asia must be weighed carefully before arriving at a judgment on such a far-reaching proposal. An extra measure of caution is needed now that the Communist Chinese have detonated two nuclear devices. The basic issue is whether a U.S. initiative would advance or set back U.S. policies in regard to Communist China. The effect such an initiative would have on the Chinese and on the countries around the rim of the Chinese land mass which believe themselves threatened by Communist China are both relevant to this issue.

Any U.S. initiative regarding non-use of nuclear weapons could be turned to propaganda advantage by the Communist Chinese. If acceptable to them, it could be interpreted as acceptance of their own proposal[17] and recognition by the United States of the power—if not legality—of the Peking regime. If a U.S. initiative were phrased in unacceptable terms, the Communist Chinese

[16]See the "F.A.S. [Federation of American Scientists] Stand on Nuclear Weapons Control," in *F.A.S. Newsletter,* November 1964.
[17]See *Peking Review,* January 1, 1965, pp. 21-22.

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would still have been successful in establishing the kind of dialogue which would enhance their prestige and could become a source of international and domestic embarrassment to the U.S. government.

However, security interests outweigh propaganda considerations. If a no-first-use agreement would decrease Communist Chinese aggressiveness or enhance U.S. ability to deal with it, then U.S. interests might, in the long run, be served. It may be argued that the United States is less likely to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in a situation where nuclear retaliation is a possibility and that, therefore, a declaratory ban on first use would restrict the United States less against a nuclear armed Communist China than was formerly the case against a nonnuclear China. At least as plausible an argument can be made to the effect that, despite its continued references to the atom bomb as a "paper tiger," Communist China with nuclear weapons is likely to be, or to become, more aggressive than before. Given the relative nuclear capabilities of the two sides, a U.S. threat of nuclear escalation may well be required in the future to deter large-scale Communist Chinese aggression.

With respect to the effect of a U.S. no-first-use agreement on areas threatened by the Communist Chinese, Southeast Asia is a special case deserving priority attention. Nuclear weapons may not be considered an integral part of the local military balances in this region. Hopefully, this will remain the case. The initiative with respect to the intensity of the conflict below the 17th Parallel seems to rest to a large extent in Hanoi and Peking. However, the initiative for widening the geographical bounds of the conflict seems to rest with the United States. In the process of broadening the geographical dimensions of the war, the initiative regarding escalation of its intensity has also shifted largely to Washington. Thus, the threat of nuclear escalation, although not directly relevant to the present situation in Southeast Asia, may well have a dampening effect on the level of military effort Hanoi and Peking are prepared to exert in the region.

In other areas threatened by the Chinese communists it would seem probable that the impact of U.S. adoption of a no-first-use policy would also be generally adverse. It would be difficult to overestimate the demoralizing effect this would have on the Chinese Nationalists. Taiwan, together with Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

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Now that Communist China is a nascent nuclear power, it would seem to be a singularly inopportune time for the United States to raise doubts about the effectiveness or comprehensiveness of its defense commitments to these countries.

Washington is under no comparable commitment to India. The Indians have been, and will continue to be, faced with the issue of whether to develop a nuclear weapons capability of their own. Indian ability to do so is clearly established by the size and quality of their peaceful nuclear programs.[18] The *possibility* of a U.S. nuclear response in defense of India, although never formalized into a commitment which would remove India from her nonaligned position, may be sufficient to postpone, if not prevent, India's decision to acquire its own nuclear weapons. That possibility was carefully kept open by President Johnson in his statement following the first Communist Chinese nuclear explosion when he said: "The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it."[19]

Therefore, to the extent that a U.S. no-first-use proposal raised doubts about our political resolve to contain Communist Chinese aggression it would create serious problems for the countries most in sympathy with U.S. interests throughout the Far East and South Asia. This would be true for countries to which the U.S. is bound by treaty obligations of mutual defense, and no less true for countries relying in a less formal way on U.S. nuclear power.

Effect on U.S. Disarmament Policy

If the foregoing analysis is accepted, a declaratory ban on first use of nuclear weapons would be, in general, prejudicial to U.S. interests with respect to the USSR, NATO, and containment of Communist China. Now we turn to assess whether compensating advantages may be found in regard to the prospects for disarmament.

An important objective of U.S. disarmament policy since 1961 has been gradually to deflate a Soviet propaganda balloon and at the same time increase the pressure on the USSR to engage in a serious dialogue on selected aspects of disarmament. In perspective, U.S. tactics appear to have been threefold. First, the United

[18]H. J. Bhabha, Indian Atomic Energy Commissioner, speech at UN Day celebration, New Delhi, October 24, 1964.

[19]*Department of State Bulletin,* November 2, 1964, p. 613.

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States has met the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament with a detailed blueprint of its own.[20] Second, the U.S. government has put forward a rather impressive array of arms control and partial disarmament measures for serious discussion.[21] And, third, U.S. officials have, thus far, been wary of extended debate concerning largely propaganda proposals such as a nonaggression pact,[22] a denuclearized Europe, and "ban-the-bomb."

The success of U.S. efforts to obtain agreements regarding the Washington-Moscow "hot line" and the limited nuclear test ban may be attributed in part to its past efforts to shift the focus of discussions from propaganda to a more serious vein. From the point of view of U.S. disarmament policy, therefore, the United States, by taking up a proposal for a ban on first use of nuclear weapons, would in effect be reversing a comparatively long-standing policy intended to lead in the direction of small but concrete steps in the arms control field.

Nevertheless, aside from the propaganda game, there may be value in agreement for agreement's sake. Any agreement that will keep up "the momentum of agreement" between antagonists, it may be argued, will advance the cause of disarmament. Certainly, a substantial part of the value of the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to both sides lies in the mere fact that its existence proves agreement between the two major antagonists is possible. An approach of "agreement for agreement's sake" may have considerable merit if the agreements arrived at do not conflict with the interests of the United States. In this respect, however, a ban on first use of nuclear weapons, as the previous sections have indicated, falls short.

It has been suggested that a ban-the-bomb agreement would have a salutary effect on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

[20]For the U.S. disarmament plan, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, I, 351-382; II, 718, 728-730; and *ibid., 1963*, p. 327. For the Soviet, see *ibid., 1962*, II, 913-938, and ENDC/2/Rev. 1/Add. 1, February 4, 1964. The proposals may also be found in *Current Disarmament Proposals as of March 1, 1964*, published by the World Law Fund.

[21]See President Johnson's message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, January 21, 1964, in the *Department of State Bulletin*, February 10, 1964, pp. 224-225.

[22]In the United Nations and at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference the U.S. has resisted discussion of the USSR proposal for a NATO-Warsaw Treaty Organization nonaggression pact largely on the grounds that the forum was improper. However, the U.S. has from time to time indicated willingness to discuss the subject. See Kennedy interview with Adzhubei, November 25, 1961, *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 655, and Tripartite Communiqué on the Conclusion of the Moscow Test Ban Negotiations, July 25, 1963, *ibid., 1963*, p. 250.

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The argument has been made that "the longer the use of nuclear weapons remains unprohibited by international convention—and therefore, by implication, tolerated—the greater the number of countries which will attempt to find security and protection in dependence upon them."[23] If it is true that the nuclear powers, by continuing to emphasize the importance they attach to nuclear weapons, tend to prompt nonnuclear countries to attach similar importance to these weapons, then an agreement which seemed to recognize the lack of utility of nuclear weapons might curb their further spread. However, if a nation without nuclear weapons is threatened by an aggressive nuclear power, or a country believed to be bent on becoming one, then this nation's alternative to obtaining nuclear weapons, in the face of a nuclear attack, would seem to lie in whatever assurance of protection it could obtain from a friendly nuclear power. In this situation, an agreement to ban use of nuclear weapons could stimulate rather than suppress a desire for an independent nuclear weapons capability in other nations.

A clue to which of these represents the more likely pattern of reaction of nonnuclear countries can be derived from the fact that Communist China's pledge, immediately following its first nuclear explosion, "that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons"[24] has apparently done little to ease the security problems of countries such as Japan and India. Therefore, from the standpoint of a policy of nonproliferation, U.S. agreement to a ban on first use of nuclear weapons, unaccompanied by substantial progress in physical disarmament, could prove to be a liability rather than an asset.[25]

Types of Possible Bans on Use of Nuclear Weapons

Having considered the broad implications of a U.S. willingness to agree to ban the use of nuclear weapons, it is now in order to explore the effects of particular types of restrictions.

[23]Statement by the Ethiopian representative at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference on August 20, 1964 (ENDC/PV.209, p. 10).

[24]See footnote 17.

[25]In a recent article, Dr. Bernard T. Feld concludes that nonproliferation is impossible unless the nuclear powers diminish their reliance on nuclear weapons. Dr. Feld lists a no-first-use agreement as a step in this direction, but goes on to say that acceptance of the concept of minimum deterrence would be necessary in order for such an agreement to remain effective. "The Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1964, pp. 2-6. India and Sweden have stated recently in the United Nations Disarmament Commission that an "integrated" or "package" proposal is necessary to solve the nuclear proliferation problem.

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No use and no first use compared. A declaratory ban on first use of nuclear weapons has been considered by some to be more acceptable than a complete prohibition on use. This may be based in part on the erroneous conclusion that if one side used nuclear weapons the other side could still be held to its promise of restraint. Under the international legal doctrine of reprisals, if one nation performs an illegal act the nation or nations affected are justified in taking steps, even steps which would ordinarily be illegal, in retaliation.[26] Therefore, if one side fails to adhere to the terms of an agreement not to use nuclear weapons the other side would be free of any obligation.

A flat prohibition on use may have the appearance of a stronger and more precise obligation, in form if not in substance, than a renunciation of first use. However, in order to clarify the nature of the commitment for public presentation, phrasing in terms of no first use may well be preferable. Moreover, a flat prohibition may provide the basis for an argument that all nuclear weapons, whether used or unused, have been declared illegal.[27] Therefore, while a flat prohibition on use and a ban on first use would be legally binding to the same extent, political reasons appear to exist for the more cautious wording of an undertaking in this regard.

No first use of "strategic" nuclear weapons. One of the basic reasons for U.S. reluctance to consider seriously a ban on the use of nuclear weapons has been the necessity of retaining its freedom to use nuclear weapons to offset Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, and perhaps Communist Chinese conventional superiority in Asia. However, the United States could balance Sino-Soviet conventional superiority in most circumstances by the use of "tactical" as distinguished from "strategic" nuclear weapons. This suggests the possibility of a limited ban on use of strategic nuclear weapons.[28]

[26]L. Oppenheim, "Disputes, War and Neutrality," in H. Lauterpacht, editor, *International Law, A Treatise* (New York: David McKay, 1961), II, p. 136, section 33.

[27]For example, the 1961 UN General Assembly resolution cited in footnote 4 came close to making such a declaration.

[28]Depending on whether the warhead or the delivery vehicle is emphasized, such a ban might be phrased alternatively as a ban on first use of strategic nuclear weapons, or a ban on first strategic use of nuclear weapons. In the former case warhead yield would be emphasized, and in the latter the range of the delivery vehicle. In any case, what might seem tactical use to one country could be considered strategic to another, depending upon whose territory was the target of the nuclear attack.

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An advantage of an agreement to prohibit the use of strategic nuclear weapons is that it would place both sides in a declared second-strike position. This would perhaps reduce reciprocal fear of surprise attack and give the Soviets greater assurance of U.S. second-strike intentions even though the United States retained its present superiority in numbers of strategic weapons and delivery vehicles.

Some of the disadvantages of a ban on the use of strategic nuclear weapons, in terms of reduced freedom of action in unforeseeable circumstances, have been discussed previously. Another obvious problem with such a ban is that of distinguishing between a strategic and a nonstrategic nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons involve a continuum of explosive power. The choice of the size of weapon to be used in a particular situation would depend on a large number of variables. The difficulties involved in making distinctions of this kind other than on a nuclear/nonnuclear basis have been recognized by Secretary McNamara: ". . . while it does not necessarily follow that the use of tactical nuclear weapons must inevitably escalate into global nuclear war, it does present a very definite threshold, beyond which we enter a vast unknown."[29] Therefore, the only clear-cut threshold may well be that which exists between nuclear and conventional weapons.[30]

No first use against certain targets (cities). It is the declared policy of the United States, in the event it is compelled to use nuclear weapons, to maximize military and minimize civilian damage. Therefore, a ban on first use of nuclear weapons against cities or civilian populations might be useful as a further extension of our present policy.

A limited prohibition of this sort has the appeal of reintroducing into the present strategic environment the distinction between combatants and noncombatants—a distinction which became blurred as a result of the strategic-area bombing of cities by both sides in World War II. Such an agreement might appeal to Europeans in view of the population concentrated on the comparatively small land mass of the Continent and the fact that Western Europe is targeted by great numbers of Soviet intermediate-range missiles. However, even if such a prohibition should be acceptable to the United States and NATO, it is doubt-

[29]Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, January 30, 1963. *Hearings (No. 4) on Military Posture . . . , op. cit.*, p. 299.

[30]See Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 81 ff.

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ful that such a limited ban would be acceptable to the USSR since the Soviet deterrent posture appears to be based primarily on a counter-city strike with large-yield weapons.

There are, in addition, other practical difficulties which deserve mention. One is the definition of a city. Smaller towns in the zone of combat, and probably large cities, would be used as military bases of operations and thus would be prime theater targets in wartime. Another difficulty is the proximity of launch pads to cities, although this may be less of a problem for the United States, which has carried out a program of wide dispersal of airfields and missile launching facilities in order to separate these targets from cities.

Ban on use except in "zone of combat." Another possible partial restraint on the use of nuclear weapons would be an agreement to limit the area within which nuclear weapons would be used to the "zone of combat." The problem is how to define the "zone of combat." It might be done in advance in terms of lines of confrontation such as the Iron Curtain in central Europe. An agreement not to be the first to use nuclear weapons except within a defined zone on either side of the Iron Curtain might appeal to Europeans whose countries would be completely devastated if nuclear weapons were used against intermediate targets in the rear areas.

However, any such advance limitation would seem to imply that as the conflict spreads nuclear weapons, having already been put to use within the defined limits, would not be used further. Examined in this light, such a declaration becomes unrealistic. Indeed, such a restraint runs counter to the general proposition that nuclear weapons are weapons of last resort.

There may, however, be possible utility in the concept of a declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons except within a particular *ad hoc* combat zone. If a local conflict breaks out and the decision is reached to use nuclear weapons, further escalation might be avoided if, in advance of first use, it were announced that nuclear weapons would not be used, except in retaliation, outside the zone of combat. Such a declaration immediately in advance of use would give an opportunity to the side initiating use to define the zone of combat in that particular instance. This might encourage the opposite side to limit its nuclear retaliation to the zone of combat as previously defined by the initiator, or as redefined in a declaration of its own.

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Prohibition on use unless conflict spreads. An example of this type of restriction would be an agreement not to use nuclear weapons in Europe unless the forward movement of conventional forces went beyond a given distance on either side of the Iron Curtain. Two arms control advantages can be cited in favor of this type of ban: First, the danger of crossing the nuclear threshold in a local conflict would be reduced; and second, the increased threat that nuclear weapons would be used if the conflict spread beyond established limits might be an incentive to keep it confined.

There are several problems involved in such a limitation. It might be interpreted as an invitation to a conventional attack which would carry to the limits of the agreed zone of non-use of nuclear weapons, but no farther. This move might be followed by a denunciation of the limitation on use of nuclear weapons, and a positive declaration of intent to use such weapons to preserve to the aggressor the fruits of the attack. Furthermore, in particular circumstances which could not be defined in advance the optimum use of nuclear weapons might be at the outset of a conventional attack. The threat of immediate use of nuclear weapons would inhibit the concentration of forces required for a massive conventional assault. Moreover, damage caused by the tactical use of nuclear weapons would be maximized on enemy territory and minimized on friendly territory if used promptly to resist the onslaught of conventional forces. Finally, it might be argued that a clear determination to use tactical nuclear weapons at the outset would provide the most effective insurance against conventional attack.

These are some of the considerations advanced by some European strategists in support of a NATO force structure and posture requiring rapid nuclear escalation in the event of Soviet attack. The divergent U.S. point of view has been forcefully argued by Secretary McNamara:

> If we have shown ourselves able and ready to engage in large-scale non-nuclear warfare in response to a Communist provocation, the Soviets can hardly misconstrue two things: first, that we regard this provocation as a challenge to our vital interests; and second, that we will use nuclear weapons to prevail, if this becomes necessary.[31]

However, the United States and NATO have yet to achieve a buildup of conventional forces in central Europe to a level which

[31]Speech before the American Bar Foundation, *op. cit.*

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would make this type of ban on the use of nuclear weapons a viable alternative.

No use against nonnuclear nations. Recently it has been suggested that the nuclear powers should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against nations not possessing such weapons themselves.[32] The main advantage of such a proposal is the nonproliferation incentive it may provide. However, an assurance of this kind from the nuclear powers, without more, would not seem to be an adequate nonnuclear solution to the security problem of a country, such as India, threatened by Communist China (which has itself already renounced first use of nuclear weapons).[33]

If phrased in terms of no first use *against* a nonnuclear power, such a restraint would not necessarily preclude a nuclear power from initiating the use of nuclear weapons in defense against any attack, whether conventional or nuclear, by another nuclear power. The situation would seem to be the same whether the attack which was met with nuclear weapons had been directed against the nuclear power itself, against a nonnuclear nation it was committed by treaty to defend, or even against a previously uncommitted nonnuclear nation. However, the territory of a nonnuclear country which aided or acted as a springboard for aggression by a nuclear power should not be insulated by such a no-first-use agreement from nuclear retaliation.

A pledge not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries could, however, create difficulties in countries where U.S. nuclear forces are stationed but which do not have their own national nuclear forces. For a nonnuclear country to be in a position to claim an exemption under such a no-use pledge, any nuclear weapons stationed on its territory under the custody and control of a foreign nuclear power might conceivably have to be withdrawn. In this way such a pledge might reinforce the long-

[32]Statement by the representative of India in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, DC/PV. 75, May 4, 1965, p. 17.

[33]The suggestion for a pledge by nuclear powers of no first use against nonnuclear countries was made by India as one of five measures included in an "integrated proposal" to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Other required measures in the package are (1) an undertaking by nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to others; (2) an undertaking "through the United Nations" to safeguard the security of nonnuclear countries against threats from those having or "embarking on" a nuclear weapons capability; (3) tangible progress toward disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban, a freeze on production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery, and substantial reductions in existing inventories; and (4) an undertaking by nonnuclear powers not to acquire nuclear weapons. (*Ibid.*) From this, it is clear India is not presently in a mood to give up its nuclear option for nothing, although it may not have a present intention of exercising it.

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standing Soviet proposals for the abolition of foreign bases, withdrawal of foreign troops and denuclearization of various areas, particularly central Europe. This is a propaganda pitfall it would be well for the U.S. to avoid.

Conclusion

For better or worse, the nuclear capability of the United States is at the core of its national power. Therefore, any restraint on its freedom to exercise that power raises questions of fundamental importance to U.S. interests. A generally negative conclusion has been reached regarding the advisability of the United States entertaining serious notions about a ban on first use of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

A flexible approach to each situation where the nuclear deterrent operates and where nuclear weapons may, in a crisis, come into play is the approach most likely to result in maximum security. This appears to hold true even in the face of a continuing threat of further increases in the number of national nuclear forces. Furthermore, it is fair to conclude that making short shrift of any "ban-the-bomb" proposals advanced by others may, in the long run, serve U.S. interests in achieving gradual international control over the nuclear arms race without seriously impairing the security of any nation.

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND SOVIET STRATEGY*

by Walter F. Hahn and Alvin J. Cottrell

A PERSISTENT focus of political-military debate in recent years has been the development of an anti-ballistic missile defense and its implications for the strategic-nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Ever since the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile, a defense against this new and spectacular family of weapons systems has loomed as the logical next stage in the military-technological competition between the U.S. and the USSR. The question took on new significance when the "missile gap" fears of the late 1950's and early 1960's gave way to a recognition of a clear U.S. superiority in the strategic-nuclear competition: Soviet ABM development was seen as a possible means whereby the USSR might stage a technological "end run" against the United States, neutralizing America's superiority in strategic delivery vehicles and degrading the U.S. strategic deterrent. This apprehension underlay much of the controversy surrounding ratification of the test ban treaty concluded in 1963. Many of the opponents of the accord warned that the Soviets had gained an edge vis-à-vis the United States in the race for an effective ABM capability, and that, accordingly, a cessation of atmospheric tests would seriously and perhaps fatally disadvantage the United States.

The controversy seems destined to continue, if only because it is prodded by the periodic need within the U.S. defense establishment to decide whether or not a given ABM system in the research and development process should be marked for eventual deployment. It seems clear, also, that the controversy will revolve not only upon the cost effectiveness of the particular ABM system under consideration, but will continue to be influenced as well by

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estimates of Soviet progress and intentions in the anti-missile defense field.

Therefore, it is useful to "don the Soviet hat" and look at ABM development from Moscow's vantage point in order to adduce clues to possible long-range Soviet intentions and actions —to deduce them not from any "hard" intelligence of the moment but from the broader sweep of Soviet strategic options, limitations and expectations. The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to gauge Soviet intentions with regard to an ABM deployment within the context of Soviet strategic nuclear policy; (2) to assess the various ways in which the Soviets would hope to exploit an ABM capability; and (3) to project likely Soviet reactions to a U.S. deployment.

The ABM in Soviet Strategic-Nuclear Policy

The General Soviet Strategic Outlook

Unfortunately for the West, the leaders of the Soviet Union are not in the habit of disclosing their intentions explicitly. To the extent that one can place trust in official Soviet utterances, the Soviet leadership does not seem to have abandoned the classical communist long-term commitment to the achievement of global hegemony (if not world dominion) through whatever means may prove consistent with the realities of the world environment. Whatever specific form these means may assume, it seems clear that the Soviet military posture is a key to overall Soviet strategy.

The Soviet Union leans heavily on its deterrence capabilities for advancing its foreign interests. At the same time, its strategic postulates reflect a strong emphasis on defense, i.e., conjectures of how a nuclear conflict would evolve in the event that deterrence fails. Hence, any Soviet ABM decisions will undoubtedly be weighed in the light of their effect both on Soviet deterrence and defense requirements.

In general, Soviet foreign policy seeks to alter the status quo without the direct employment of Soviet force because the latter, given the power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, might endanger Soviet national survival.[1] Under Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership emphasized a deterrent strategy vis-à-vis the United States and NATO, coupled with an offensive

[1]See Raymond Garthoff's introduction to V. D. Sokolovskii, editor, *Soviet Military Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

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Cold War strategy of direct and indirect encouragement of unrest ("national liberation movements") in newly emergent and technologically backward states. Occasionally the Soviets have fanned crises involving some risk of direct military confrontation with the United States. However, the primary thrust of Soviet strategy in recent years has been toward weakening and isolating the West, and ultimately the United States, by an assortment of "ploys" without, in the process, edging too closely to the brink of a thermonuclear exchange.

Soviet strategy could, of course, turn either more radical or more conservative at any time, depending on world developments. In fact, the new communist thesis, that war is no longer inevitable, first promulgated by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956, has been qualified to permit considerable flexibility in long-range Soviet doctrinal commitments on the role of war in the thermonuclear age.

Whatever may be the Kremlin's long-range objectives, a combination of direct and indirect evidence makes it fairly clear that the Soviet leaders, at least for the moment, have had no choice but to face the fact of U.S. strategic superiority. Certainly, they cannot persuade themselves that the strategic posture of the USSR is superior to that of the United States. On several occasions Khrushchev admitted that he saw no way to contain nuclear devastation of the Soviet Union within tolerable limits, should general war erupt.

The Theoretical Role of ABM in Soviet Strategy

A salient premise of Soviet strategic doctrine has been the concept of protracted nuclear war, which would be "won" by the side possessing the greater capability to survive the initial phase of the exchange, thus gaining a dominant edge in the subsequent conflict. Furthermore, consonant with this doctrine, the Soviets believe that, in order to destroy the enemy's will and ability to fight a prolonged engagement, the Soviet Union must either seize his territory or destroy his national political and economic foundations. Since the option of occupying U.S. territory is not a practical one, the alternative is to destroy the bases of U.S. political and economic power. This means, in effect, a countercity war.[2]

[2]The Soviet exposition on military strategy states that while in past wars defeat in battle was necessary, "in the conditions of nuclear war . . . the mass use of nuclear weapons can lead to the destruction and devastation of the most im-

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A Soviet "city strategy" would seem to accord not only with doctrine but also with the Soviet force posture relative to that of the United States. The Soviets have rejected consistently the concept of a purely counterforce war. They question how an attack on major industrial and political centers can be avoided if breaking the enemy's will to fight remains a major rationale of war. They have pointed out that, in any event, these centers are frequently located close to military bases and facilities which would be prime targets in a future war, e.g., Denver, Tucson, Cheyenne.[3]

Furthermore, from the Soviet viewpoint, a counterforce contest favors the United States for the following reasons: (1) It leaves the United States the "winner," since a counterforce war would preserve the U.S. economic lead, enabling it to recover and rebuild its armed might faster than the Soviets could. (2) Such a strategy requires a numerical strategic-offensive superiority by one side—a superiority which the United States has made clear it intends to preserve and, in any event, is better able to afford economically than the Soviets.

Thus, the Soviets seem to have opted for a countercity posture on the grounds both of doctrine and strategic-economic necessity. An ABM system would recommend itself to the Soviets on both these grounds. In the context of a deterrent strategy based on a countercity threat, an ABM system would upgrade the credibility of that threat by reducing Soviet vulnerability to retaliation in kind. At the same time, should deterrence fail, it could diminish damage to Soviet society.

In addition to being theoretically consistent with the "objective circumstances" of the current (and foreseeable) strategic equation, an ABM system might also appeal to the Soviet military in the light of two *traditional* strains in Soviet military thinking and action: namely, an emphasis on terminal defense and, connected with the latter, a greater concern for "close-proximity" threats than for their long-range counterparts. Both of these appear to reflect a general defensive psychology rooted in Russia's

portant industrial objects, economic regions and other undermining of the economy of the opposing country or the coalition of countries as a whole. The country, subjected to the catastrophe as a result of massive nuclear-missile blows, can find itself faced by the need to capitulate even if its armed forces do not suffer a decisive defeat." *Voennaya Strategia,* p. 28.

[3]With regard to Soviet skepticism about how either the U.S. or the USSR can pursue a purely counterforce strategy, see *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn,* No. 3, 1963, p. 34.

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historical experience, particularly the long history of foreign incursions into Russia.

Although the point is open to controversy, it can be argued that the thrust of Soviet weapons development since World War II is indicative of these traditional preferences. Thus, for example, the Soviets never built the massive long-range bomber force which was predicted (on the basis of Soviet capabilities) by many Western intelligence sources in the 1950's. While failing to live up to these expectations, however, the Soviets made considerable investments in intermediate-range bomber capabilities and active air defenses. Possibly, reasons other than bias accounted for these decisions: the geographical obstacles confronting a Soviet intercontinental bomber force (i.e., lack of overseas bases and refueling capabilities), as well as the early decision to concentrate on the ICBM.

The fact remains, however, that the same trend has marked their missile development. They have failed to deploy the large force of ICBM's projected by Western intelligence analysts. Instead, they have concentrated on continental delivery capabilities and apparently made substantial expenditures in anti-missile R&D. Again, this trend may mirror other factors: e.g., (1) the recognition of defects in first-generation ICBM systems and the resulting decision to muster only a small deterrent force pending a more massive development of more refined systems; (2) connected with this, the belief that Soviet secrecy would enhance this deterrent in Western eyes; or (3) a "Europe hostage" premise of Soviet deterrence. The latter possibility would, however, precisely document the defensive-tactical emphasis of Soviet strategy noted earlier. To cite one of Europe's leading military commentators:

> If the deterrence of attack by the United States is based on a small force of ICBM's of great destructive power, the Soviet leaders retain enough of their traditional fear of invasion to employ both a psychological and an active military deterrent in relation to their close neighbors. In contrast to her small number of ICBM's, she has deployed some 600 medium-range missiles targeted on Western Europe and about 100 targeted on Japan.[4]

This "proximity consciousness" may suggest another Soviet motive for ABM development, namely, Soviet apprehensions regarding the possible creation of European, and specifically West

[4]Alastair Buchan, *NATO in the 1960's: The Implications of Interdependence* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 14.

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German, strategic-nuclear forces. Almost all observers of the Soviet scene report that the Soviets voice what seems to be almost an obsessive preoccupation with West German rearmament, and particularly the fear that this rearmament may eventually assume nuclear dimensions. It is impossible to say to what extent this reflects a genuine Soviet concern for its own security, and to what degree it represents a propaganda line beamed both at its East European satellites and other victims of past German aggression in Western Europe. Be that as it may, the argument of protection against Nth countries of the future may figure fairly prominently in Soviet deliberations regarding an ABM capability. Soviet Nth country apprehensions conceivably could extend to a nuclear-armed China.

Internal Constraints Upon Soviet ABM Development

The previous section has discussed the theoretical role of the ABM in Soviet strategy. Undoubtedly, however, some practical considerations inhibit Soviet strategic options. Since the end of World War II, the USSR has demonstrated more than once that, whenever high priority is assigned to the acquisition of a weapons capability, associated scientific and technological problems can be solved within the same, if not shorter, lead-time parameters as those which are applicable to the United States. By contrast, the cumbersome machinery of the USSR's "planned economy" is still inadequate to permit the Kremlin simultaneously to match U.S. lead-time parameters in *all* areas of weaponry. There is even less possibility of staying abreast of the United States in the overall weapons lead-time race while concurrently allocating a sufficient proportion of the gross national product to urgently needed improvements in civilian sectors of the national economy.

The domestic needs are obvious. The Soviet economy today has passed the stage of primary development and is moving ahead on a broad technological front. The leadership is now on record, as of the promulgation and adoption of the new Party Program for the CPSU, to insure greater improvements in the civilian sector of the domestic economy between now and 1970.

The quest for industrial maturity requires not only a careful allocation of material reserves but also a constantly swelling number of highly skilled technicians, scientists and administrators. This "new class" of privileged specialists adds another spur to the spiral of rising consumer expectations, already trig-

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gered by the post-Stalin promise to raise the living standard of the Soviet people. In addition to these purely domestic economic considerations, resource-allocation decisions also must take into account the needs of the bloc. Furthermore, something must be left over for stoking the Soviet offensive in underdeveloped areas. Although the argument over relative allocation of resources to the consumer and heavy industry (including military) sectors of the Soviet economy is chronically unresolved, it seems clear that the Soviet leadership cannot make its military R&D decisions with the same flexibility as in the past.

To these economic constraints upon Soviet weapons choices may be added more variable "political" constraining factors: e.g., estimates of U.S. reactions, intrabloc problems (particularly Communist China) and domestic rivalries. These will be discussed in more specific contexts below. The main point to be made here is that, no matter what may be the long-range Soviet decisions regarding an ABM capability, it is highly doubtful that the Soviets could, in the foreseeable future, move into a crash program of extensive ABM development and deployment without doing serious harm to domestic commitments, foreign policy objectives and competing military programs.

Soviet Actions Thus Far

The preceding sections have discussed in a general way some of the factors which would influence a Soviet decision on the ABM. Although Soviet secrecy still obscures the Soviet decision-making machinery, particularly its military components, there have been a number of Soviet statements which may shed some light on possible motivations and intentions with regard to ABM development. The purpose of this section is not to provide hard intelligence on Soviet ABM efforts to date; rather, it is to deduce attitudes from the Soviet official dialogue and to suggest their possible meaning in terms of future Soviet action.

In the past, Soviet declaratory disclosures of significant weapons developments have invariably been partly exaggerated boasts and partly valid indicators of Soviet R&D. Generally, Soviet leaders, while they have attempted to inflate the value of weapons systems still in the development stage (frequently hinting that these systems were already fully operational), have refrained from claiming to possess systems which existed only on the drawing boards or in theory.

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The interesting fact about Soviet ABM pronouncements thus far is that they have been played in a relatively low key. Existing Soviet ABM capabilities have been given relatively little publicity at home or abroad; certainly the Soviets have not suggested that their ABM achievements have nullified the U.S. ICBM threat, thus altering radically the strategic balance of power.

The first prominent allusion to Soviet ABM development came in September 1961, when Khrushchev told a Western journalist that at the same time that Soviet scientists and engineers began work to develop intercontinental missiles, another group had been asked to work on means for countering such missiles. Khrushchev continued: "We expressed our great satisfaction with the work of the experts who produced the ICBM's. At the same time, we remain very satisfied with the work of those who produced means for combatting such rockets."[5] Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, declared to the Twenty-second CPSU Congress: "The problem of destroying missiles in flight has been successfully solved in the USSR."[6]

The next phase in Soviet ABM publicity saw the appearance of Soviet statements to the effect that Soviet scientists, engineers and technicians had designed and constructed systems able to give the Soviets an effective missile defense capability. This new theme, initiated in December 1962,[7] hinted that the Soviets were close to having an operational capability. However, these assertions have given no indication of the type, or types, of weapons systems under development, the sophistication of these systems, or the pace at which work is proceeding.

Similarly, the Soviets have been very cautious about citing Western reaction to Soviet ABM claims. Only rarely have there been references to Western statements about the alleged Soviet lead in missile defense. In the few instances when such allusions were made, only unidentified Western sources were cited[8] —an approach starkly different from the normal Soviet practice of citing authoritative Western sources by name and date in order to bolster the given Soviet claim.

In a book described by its Soviet authors as the first definitive

[5]Khrushchev interview with Arthur Sulzberger, *New York Times,* September 8, 1961; and *Izvestia,* September 9, 1961.
[6]*Pravda,* October 25, 1961.
[7]See Marshal Biryuzov in *Krasnaya Zvezda,* December 4, 1962.
[8]*Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye,* No. 1, 1963, p. 18.

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volume on Soviet strategy published at large since 1962, the following pertinent passage appears:

> Further improvements in antimissile and antiaircraft defense, primarily by automated control of antiaircraft missile complexes, the creation of effective means of combatting enemy ballistic missiles in flight and mastery of the techniques of using them, and the organization of a defense against weapons of mass destruction plus other measures should maximally reduce losses from enemy nuclear attacks and should preserve the continued functioning of the interior of the country and the combat capacity of the Armed Forces.[9]

It is significant to note the qualifications in this passage, particularly the words "further improvements" and "should maximally." Moreover, the above statement is linked with the reminder of the continued dominance of offensive systems in modern nuclear war: "But one must recognize that the present instrumentalities of nuclear attack are undoubtedly superior to the instrumentalities of defense against them."[10] The editors of one U.S. translation of the above-mentioned book comment as follows on these passages: "Although this and similar treatment elsewhere in the book suggests that the Soviets hope their active defense efforts will pay off, one also gets the impression that they may not be altogether confident that this would in fact be the case."[11]

Of late, the pace of Soviet ABM claims has been stepped up somewhat. Thus, featured in the May 1965 parade in Moscow, commemorating World War II, was a projectile described by TASS as an anti-missile. Also in May an anti-missile missile and other powerful rockets were shown in action for the first time in a film presented on Moscow television. One sequence of the film showed the firing of an ABM and its interception of an ICBM at an unspecified altitude. Also depicted were installations of the Soviet anti-missile defenses, including testing stations, computer centers and launching sites. The judgment of knowledgeable persons who viewed the film seemed to be that its purpose was more to reassure the Soviet people of the adequacy of the steps taken to defend their homeland than to boast about Soviet anti-missile capabilities to the outside world. Furthermore, the pre-

[9]Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, editor, *Soviet Military Strategy*, translated with analysis and annotation by H. Dinerstein, L. Gouré and T. Wolfe, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, for the RAND Corporation, 1963), p. 307.

[10]*Ibid.*

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 56.

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sumption was that the film did not show recent developments but disclosed tests of at least three years ago.[12]

In summary, the official Soviet "dialogue" over ABM development betrays considerable caution. The argument may be raised that if the Soviets have decided to deploy an ABM system around one or two major cities it would seem that they have relatively high confidence in the effectiveness of their ABM system. Without trying to judge the viability of the Soviet ABM, suffice it to state that such a conclusion does not necessarily follow. The nature of Soviet society allows its leaders to make selective decisions involving the population without risking the pressures which might greet similar choices on the part of democratic governments. Thus, the Soviets can decide to deploy a token ABM system around one or two cities, knowing that the decision will not be challenged publicly by skeptics doubting its effectiveness or by other population centers seeking similar protection.

Moreover, the Soviets have tended in the past to stage the deployments of new weapons systems which, by U.S. development standards, might be termed premature. Thus, they quickly mounted first-generation ICBM's, but did so on what turned out to be a relatively modest scale. One can speculate that the level of success which the United States has achieved thus far with its own ABM system might, in the Soviet *modus operandi,* be adequate to justify small-scale deployment.

Conceivably, another motive for the laconic Soviet treatment of their ABM capability thus far might be the objective of surprise—i.e., the hope of using the secrecy of their society to shield an extensive ABM buildup and then dramatically announcing to the world that the balance of strategic-nuclear power had now shifted unalterably to the Soviet side. Yet, one must assume that the Soviet leaders are perfectly aware of the improved Western intelligence capabilities. Although there may still be controversy, even within knowledgeable U.S. circles, about the lead-time and accuracy of U.S. strategic intelligence of the Soviet Union, it seems clear that the Soviets can no longer bank with the same confidence as in earlier years upon the protection of the Iron Curtain. Moreover, by its very nature, an ABM deployment would be concentrated in those geographical areas of the USSR in which Western surveillance is greatest, i.e., the major cities and industrial complexes. Added to this is the

[12] *New York Times,* May 11, 1965.

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fact that (as the Soviets themselves have pointed out) [13] any ABM program, in order to serve its purpose effectively, must be accompanied by the kind of comprehensive civil defense effort which would be extremely difficult to hide or disguise.

A plausible hypothesis would seem to be, therefore, that the Soviet leaders have deferred an ABM procurement decision for the moment, meanwhile continuing research and development. Such action on their part would be consistent with the continuing debate on broad strategic issues among the military leaders of the USSR. It also would make sense in the light of the chronic Soviet problem of reconciling the growing requirements of the civilian sector of the economy with concomitant demands for continued large investment in a wide range of military programs.

There may be still another reason for a Soviet "go-slow" approach to an ABM system. A substantial ABM procurement decision logically should take into account the relevant decisions by the opponent concerning his strategic force postures and weapons systems mixes for the time period during which the ABM defensive systems would be operational. It is quite likely, therefore, that the Soviets are withholding larger procurement pending an ABM design which will meet this criterion. The new technological knowledge which had been gained in the interim through Soviet research and development on a follow-on generation of long-range and medium-range offensive missiles also could be applied in the attempt to perfect a more durable ABM design.

Possible Exploitation of ABM Capabilities

The major psychological and political value, if any, of a Soviet ABM capability would be to magnify further the image of Soviet military and technological power in the pursuit of the primary objectives of Soviet foreign policy, specifically: (1) To force the United States to give way peacefully on issues of direct interest to the Soviets, e.g., Berlin, and to inhibit further U.S. resistance to Soviet-instigated or supported "national liberation movements" in the "third world." (2) To weaken the ties between the United States and its allies, and generally to undermine

[13] Thus, the RAND translation of *Soviet Military Strategy* (see footnote 9) contains the following passage on p. 420: ". . . no matter how effective an anti-aircraft and antimissile defense system may be, it is essential to have prepared civil defense forces to eliminate rapidly the aftermath of nuclear attack, evacuate people from regions subjected to nuclear attack, organize emergency medical aid, extinguish fires, reestablish order, and carry out other urgent measures."

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the basis of Free World security. (3) To encourage those nations now unaligned with the West to maintain their neutrality, and ultimately to draw them into closer relationship with the communist bloc. (4) To increase bloc cohesion by demonstrating the continued primacy of the Soviet Union in the world communist movement and the dependence of bloc countries on Soviet military power.

Exploitation Vis-à-Vis the United States

How the Soviets will exploit either a token or a more extensive ABM capability in pursuit of the foregoing objectives will depend largely on their calculations about the likely reaction to Soviet achievements. Since a token ABM force will not significantly affect the strategic-nuclear balance of power, its optimum impact will be largely psychological. Hence, the opportunities for Soviet political exploitation in the early stages of any ABM program would depend primarily on the extent to which the West might be persuaded that a token Soviet deployment portended a massive and highly effective ABM capability. Soviet appreciation of this possible opportunity is reflected in their reference to Western fears that a Soviet missile defense "lead" will have "a traumatic political-psychological impact" on the West.[14]

The foregoing implies a Soviet hope that a small-scale Soviet deployment will cause a "missile defense gap" psychology in the United States similar to the "missile gap" fears in the late 1950's. At a maximum, such a reaction by the United States, by attributing to the Soviets a greater capability than they possess, might enable the latter to forgo an extensive ABM buildup entirely—especially if the Soviets themselves lacked confidence in the system's effectiveness. At a minimum, if the Soviets intended ultimate large-scale deployment, it would allow them to stage a buildup over a longer period of time, thus making it more compatible with competing economic requirements and other military programs. In either case, the Soviets would, as they have done in the past, attempt to "buy deterrence at low cost" by inflating their capabilities in Western eyes.

There might be another, a more devious Soviet strategy for exploiting an apparent ABM gap. If the Soviets should (1) come to the conclusion that the ultimate military payoff of an ABM

[14]See *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye, loc. cit.*

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program is too small to merit continued heavy investment of R&D and productive resources, and (2) estimate that a U.S. ABM program would be similarly unproductive, they conceivably might propagandize and exaggerate their existent capabilities and future intentions in order to induce deliberately a U.S. crash program in anti-missile missiles. There is still considerable controversy over whether the United States was similarly "decoyed" in the 1950's into a massive buildup of bomber forces. Although opinions may differ on whether or not this tactic was used in the past (and whether or not it paid off), it is nonetheless conceivable that the Soviets might resort to such a ruse in the future.

Were they to do so, they would run some severe risks. One of these inheres in the improved intelligence capabilities of the United States. The Soviets know that their margin for deception has narrowed, that they cannot base their policy on the hope that either their ABM capabilities or the extent of the system's deployment could be obscured for any length of time. They must calculate, furthermore, that even in the realm of projected capabilities, Western intelligence agencies and decision-makers have profited from past mistakes: they will not be as prone to make the kind of pessimistic evaluation which gave rise to inordinate fears of a "missile gap."

Conceivably, the Soviets might attempt to overcome this hurdle by aiming their propaganda shots over the heads of the U.S. government at its critics and the public at large, in the hope of triggering a fear-reaction-from-below which would ultimately overwhelm U.S. decision-making. But the Soviets would be taking a serious risk, namely, what form would this reaction take? Would it result in a U.S. Cold War retreat, or would it lead to the more likely contingency of a stepped-up U.S. development effort? And, should the United States opt for the latter course, what direction would this accelerated effort take? Would it be aimed at matching the (assumed) Soviet ABM capability, or would it be directed at overwhelming it through a massive buildup of offensive power? Indeed, might not a fear psychosis, aggravated by the image of approaching Soviet "immunity" to nuclear attack, move the U.S. government and people toward a "preventive war" consensus? Perhaps it is this uncertainty about U.S. reactions which accounts largely for the relatively subdued official Soviet treatment of their ABM program thus far, and which sug-

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gests the likelihood that the Soviets will continue to play whatever ABM progress they make *sotto voce*—both in their propaganda and their Cold War behavior.

Unforeseeable developments might prompt the Soviets to face the risk of an unpredictable American response and attempt to exploit a real or imagined ABM "lead" over the United States. They may do so, for example, if they believe that the credibility of their deterrence posture vis-à-vis the United States has deteriorated to the point where some drastic remedy is in order.

Alternatively, dislocations within the communist domain (e.g., an intensification of centrifugal forces within the bloc or a succession struggle in the Soviet Union) or the thirst for short-term Cold War gains (e.g., Berlin) might cause the Soviets to risk the boomeranging of an ABM propaganda campaign. Yet, it seems unlikely that the Soviets will attempt to make propaganda capital of ABM progress until such time as (1) they are fairly certain of the form the Western response will take, or (2) they have developed their system to the point where they are confident of its decisive impact in the strategic-nuclear equation and of the inability of the United States to match or overcome the system.

Implications of Soviet ABM Deployment for Intrabloc Relations

The above discussion has been based on the premise that the Soviets intend their ABM development as an ultimate weight in the U.S.-Soviet strategic-nuclear balance. There is, of course, the possibility that the Soviets have also a minimum objective in mind: defense against potential "third-power" threats, specifically a West European force or even a nuclear-armed Communist China. The latter contingency brings us to a discussion of a Soviet ABM decision in the context of intrabloc relations.

It seems clear by now that Communist China poses a major and apparently durable problem for the Soviet Union within the communist movement. It seems clear, also, that this problem could become more acute as China improves her fledgling nuclear capabilities. A future Chinese military threat to the Soviet Union may not be an important factor in current Soviet estimates generally, and its ABM decisions specifically. Nevertheless, one can assume that, given the acrimonious nature of the current Sino-Soviet debate, this factor does intrude into Soviet calculations.

There are, however, more immediate, if less direct, implica-

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tions of a Soviet ABM deployment for intrabloc relations. One of the risks which confront the Soviets in any attempt to deploy an extensive ABM system, let alone exploit it propagandistically or parlay it into limited Cold War gains, is the Chinese pressure for a more adventurous communist political and military offensive. In their protracted debate with Peking, the Soviets have consistently invoked U.S. strategic-nuclear power as a justification for a relatively cautious communist approach to the Cold War. Should they imply that their ABM capabilities had seriously degraded the Western nuclear threat, the People's Republic of China would be able to argue with greater force of logic within the bloc that the overall communist offensive be stepped up commensurately.

Even if the Soviets resisted Chinese verbal and political pressures, Peking might take matters into its own hands by unilaterally pressing a more militant policy in Asia—either in an effort to force the Soviet hand or in the expectation that, in the final analysis, the Soviets would feel compelled to back them up in any serious imbroglio. Still, it seems unlikely that a Soviet ABM system as such would prompt the Chinese to undertake military adventures or risks of war which they would not otherwise embark upon. Although perhaps more impatient than the Soviet leaders, they seem to have worked out a fairly prudent strategy of aggrandizement by stages, based on a general appraisal of power factors that probably would not be significantly altered, in their estimation, by a marginal technical achievement like the ABM. Nor is it likely that, whatever unilateral action is taken by the Chinese, the Soviets would underwrite an aggressively expansionist program by Peking at the risk of being drawn into a conflict situation which could escalate into general war.

While the prospect of reckless Chinese action is not great, the Soviets have indicated some concern that a nuclear-armed CPR might, through miscalculation, blunder into a conflict situation with the United States which could escalate into a U.S.-Soviet war. Long before China exploded its first nuclear device in October 1964, the Soviets, through various media, had been pointing out the nuclear realities to the CPR, including the fact that a token nuclear capability will not give Peking license to pursue its interests with impunity, a lesson which the Soviets already had learned firsthand.

Conceivably, present alignments within the world communist

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movement might change in such a way that Chinese pressures on Moscow might become more difficult for the latter to resist. If, for example, resentment at the Soviet Union's "go-slow" approach to the Cold War should become more widespread in bloc councils, the Soviets might be tempted to exploit whatever ABM capability they had achieved in an effort to demonstrate dramatically the communist bloc's continued dependence upon Soviet technological-military power. In the event of such a shift, however, it seems likely that the Soviet Union, for the reasons stated in the preceding section, would attempt "selective exploitation"—i.e., limit ABM publicity as much as possible to the bloc's leaders while seeking to avoid a propaganda challenge to the United States. While this separation of target audiences could not be airtight, the intrabloc system of elite-to-elite communications is still sufficiently insulated from the outside world to permit at least some "volume selectivity" in Moscow's propaganda signals.

In attempting to play up its ABM capabilities vis-à-vis the bloc, however, the Soviet Union would run an additional danger, namely, a possible bloc demand for ABM sharing. Admittedly, such pressure from the lesser members of the communist system would not confront the Soviets with as acute a problem as the United States would encounter if subjected to comparable demands by its allies. The main source of pressure would again be Communist China, which could argue vehemently on humane as well as doctrinal grounds (i.e., the principle of "equality" among members of the communist system) that Moscow afford the other peoples of the communist world the same opportunity for surviving a nuclear conflict that it was giving its own population. Inasmuch as the Soviets seem to have been able to resist Chinese pressures for nuclear sharing in the past, however, it seems plausible to assume that they would not find this new demand irresistible. It is worth noting that the Soviets thus far have apparently been under little, if any, compulsion to give their allies on their "forward front" even the limited nuclear role that the United States has accorded some of its NATO partners. Nevertheless, the possibility of at least some low-level demand for ABM sharing by other communist states undoubtedly could be a factor in a Soviet ABM decision.

This analysis of some major factors in intrabloc relations which would bear on Soviet ABM policy decisions obviously has not exhausted the full range of possible developments. On balance,

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however, the following might be said: The constraints which bear on either a Soviet ABM deployment or its exploitation would seem to be as strong as, if not stronger than, the factors favoring deployment and its exploitation. It seems safe to say that the Soviet Union can no longer make decisions without considerable concern for their possible intrabloc ramifications.

The ABM and Soviet Objectives in Third Areas

The question of whether and how the Soviets might hope to exploit an ABM capability to further their objectives in the "third world" can be divided into two parts: First, would an ABM capability encourage the Soviets to undertake military actions which they would eschew in the absence of such a capability? Second, what political "payoff" could the Soviet Union anticipate from an extensive ABM deployment?

It seems reasonable to assume that Soviet achievement of an ABM capability would be quite unlikely to upgrade the USSR's willingness to take conventional military actions along its periphery, let alone to wage nuclear war. In the NATO areas, Soviet strategy thus far has concentrated on the use of political and psychological gambits. In the non-NATO regions, the tactic has been one of nonmilitary penetration, accompanied, in unusual cases, by indirect military support of insurrections. It does not seem probable that the acquisition of an ABM capability in itself would change this policy materially.

The Soviets might attempt isolated Cold War probes (e.g., in Berlin) with the maximum objective of forging Cold War gains and the minimum aim of testing the credibility accorded their "new" strategic posture by Washington and its allies. Generally, however, it is doubtful that an ABM capability alone, in the absence of other favorable circumstances, would incline the Soviets toward a more adventurous policy.

Rather than using ABM accomplishments to underwrite a more aggressive military and political strategy, the Soviets could attempt to harness them to the general image of communism as the "wave of the future." Thus, in line with previous policy, the Kremlin might dramatize its ABM capability in order to prove that the USSR is a great, ascendant military and scientific power, which, having gained at least virtual parity of nuclear striking power with the United States, must be greatly feared and respected in the whole arena of international politics. Soviet leaders

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could hope that this impression would give added weight to the arsenal of Soviet diplomatic and internal political pressure.

Again, however, the Soviets would have to weigh potential propaganda advantages of this type against the battery of risks cited earlier—e.g., the uncertainty of a U.S. response to a flaunted ABM capability and the potential boomerang effects of too much advertisement of Soviet strategic-nuclear prowess within the communist movement.

Likely Soviet Reactions to U.S. Deployment

Although Soviet intelligence capabilities may have been exaggerated occasionally in the past, there is little question that the Soviet decision-maker has a fairly comprehensive and accurate view of the U.S. force posture and our projected military-technological programs. From such open media as hearings on the military budget in Congressional committees and the U.S. press, supplemented by covert intelligence, the Soviet strategist can piece together a comparatively incisive picture of the main trends in U.S. strategic thought and military decision-making. Moreover, the constraints on presenting to their superiors an accurate assessment of enemy capabilities which inhibited Soviet strategists during the past years of Stalin's lifetime no longer seem to be operative.[15]

The second premise is that the Soviets use this intelligence in determining their own programs. This is not to suggest that Soviet military policy tends to be exclusively, or even predominantly, reactive to U.S. endeavors. It does, however, argue against the reverse notion which appears to have enjoyed wide currency in the past, namely, that the Soviet Union, in the R&D field as well as in other areas of East-West competition, has almost totally monopolized the initiative, casting its policies within the framework of absolute and immutable objectives and with only an occasional side-glance at the direction of the U.S. effort in order to gauge its own. There is no question that the Soviet Union, by dint of totalitarian control and a closed society, can shape its strategy and weapons procurement decisions with relatively greater

[15]The purportedly unclassified USSR recapitulation of the threat which NATO now poses against the USSR contained in the recently published book on Soviet military strategy edited by Marshal Sokolovskii testifies to the current freedom of Soviet military analysts to report to their superiors the objective facts free of the pretense of correlating facts with Marxist-Leninist dogma. See the RAND version of *Soviet Military Strategy, op. cit.*, pp. 149-167 and *passim*.

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freedom than the United States. On the other hand, other factors impinge upon this freedom, not least among them the more limited economic capacity of the Soviet Union. Precisely because the Soviet economy has not progressed to the point where it can satisfy equitably the requirements of both the heavy productive (including military) and consumer-oriented sectors of the society, the argument in policy councils over relative allocations of resources is apparently vehement and chronic. We may assume that, just as factions in the U.S. defense establishment often invoke this or that development on the Soviet side in their arguments for a larger share of defense spending, elements in the Soviet military lean heavily on evidence of the U.S. effort to support their own predilections.

With this as background, we might venture some speculation regarding likely Soviet reactions to an extensive ABM deployment by the United States. Again, as in the previous discussion over Soviet expectations of a U.S. response, it is impracticable to "game out" the full range of possible actions and reactions, dependent as these are upon a host of unpredictable variables. All that is necessary in the compass of this effort is to draw the principal parameters of possible Soviet responses.

Let us assume that the United States decided to go into a crash program of ABM deployment, either following an independent decision based on its own R&D progress or in anticipation of a similar effort by the Soviet Union. Let us assume, furthermore, as we must, that the Soviets will have fairly complete intelligence regarding the U.S. system's military value.

The Soviets could respond in at least four major ways:

(1) *An extreme option would be a pre-emptive attack.* In other words, if the Soviets concluded that the U.S. system promises to blunt their counterdeterrent capability to the point where the latter would be robbed of all credibility as a shield of Soviet strategy, and that they could look forward to no alternative means of redressing a decisive shift of the global-strategic balance to the West, they might plan deliberately to head off such a decisive shift by launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Without speculating about the rationality of the Soviet leadership, present or future, it is doubtful that even a highly effective U.S. system would provoke such an act of desperation, an act which would be all the more irrational if the countercity option represented the only means of carrying it out. More plausible than a pre-

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planned pre-emptive attack would be the creation of a general climate of wariness which would upgrade the danger of escalation. This would apply especially to the extent that the Soviets, on their part, interpreted the U.S. buildup as a prelude to a pre-emptive attack and found confirmation for this suspicion in U.S. Cold War actions.

(2) In the context of the same Soviet estimate outlined above, i.e., the realization that "the game is up," *the Soviets could decide to sue for an end to the arms race in the form of genuine and substantial concessions in arms control and disarmament,* along with commensurate political accommodations (e.g., Berlin and Germany). No matter how desperate the Soviet predicament might become, however, it is difficult to envisage their taking so drastic a step merely on the basis of a long-term strategic estimate and in the absence of far-reaching political, social and economic changes within the USSR and the communist movement.

(3) *Another alternative would be a passive response.* The Soviets might attempt to persuade the world movement that the U.S. effort was militarily insignificant and represented at best a wasteful expenditure of resources, thus, in fact, weakening the U.S. posture. They could argue specifically that no defense system could guard effectively against Soviet multimegaton warheads and that, therefore, the Soviet deterrent forces were unaffected by the U.S. development. This approach could be taken by the Soviet leadership within the context of a "low-minimum deterrent" decision, coupled with the realization that the Soviet economy could not shoulder a large-scale military counterprogram.

(4) *A final Soviet response to a U.S. ABM deployment could be an accelerated Soviet military buildup,* the scope and direction of which would be dependent upon the Soviet assessment of the implications of the U.S. program for their deterrent strategy, as well as the constraints (particularly the economic ones) noted earlier.

The alternatives outlined above supply a rough probability scale of potential Soviet response to a U.S. ABM deployment. The Soviet choice among these responses would, of course, be influenced by a host of variables, both internal and external to the bloc. However, as was implied in the listing, the most important criterion governing the Kremlin's choice will be its

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estimate of the effectiveness (qualitative and quantitative) of the system deployed by the United States.

The first two Soviet responses listed—a pre-emptive attack or a quasi-surrender in the Cold War—could be prompted only by a U.S. ABM breakthrough of the first magnitude. Barring some quantum leaps in R & D, one may postulate that such a decisive breakthrough is not likely to be achieved in the foreseeable future. If this is true, then the range of logical alternatives for the Soviet Union would be narrowed more or less to one or a combination of the latter two options listed: a stepped-up Soviet arms effort, or a "do-nothing" approach.

We may assume conversely that, even if the system deployed by the United States will not constitute a decisive breakthrough, neither will it be totally devoid of military value. To assume otherwise is to suggest that the United States will undertake the heavy costs of an extensive deployment *purely* for Cold War reasons and in the frail hope that the Soviets will be fooled. If we accept this premise, then we must downgrade the probability of a "do-nothing" response and focus on the fourth alternative: a Soviet acceleration of their own arms effort, commensurate with their estimate of the new situation posed by the U.S. deployment and consistent with the constraints of the Soviet economy.

Thus, for example, a U.S. crash ABM program might prompt the Soviets to respond with an extensive deployment of their own (assuming that such a decision had not already been made prior to the U.S. effort). However, a Soviet counterdeployment to an effective U.S. ABM system would not go far enough toward coping with the Soviet predicament. In other words, the asymmetry in U.S.-Soviet capabilities would continue to favor the United States: while the U.S. action might, in Soviet eyes, seriously degrade the main strategic option open to them, i.e., a counter-city threat, Soviet counterdeployment would not weaken commensurately the U.S. threat to the Soviet Union, namely, a larger U.S. offensive force which could be employed against both Soviet population centers and strategic forces.

It seems likely, therefore, that a fairly extensive U.S. ABM deployment would result in a more comprehensive Soviet military effort. In support of this estimate, it might be pointed out that one of the more pronounced U.S. misconceptions of Soviet weapons development has been the Soviets' alleged "Machiavellian" approach to the arms race—the image of an opponent who

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is constantly probing the weak points of the U.S. program and concentrating his resources upon the decisive breakthrough. The Soviets have strengthened this image in the past by relying on the secrecy of their society in order to magnify both the significance of specific achievements and their share in the allocation of Soviet resources. Nevertheless, a backward glance at Soviet arms policy since World War II shows that, generally, Soviet military spending has been parceled out along a fairly wide and diversified range of programs and systems. True, the Soviets did manage a short-cut to the missile age, bypassing, to a large extent, the epoch of intercontinental bomber forces. Yet, this move could be characterized retrospectively as a quest for the minimum plateau of deterrence, prodded by the stark asymmetry of power and geography favoring the West in the bomber age. In any event, even if a concentration for breakthrough was theoretically possible in the past, improved Western intelligence places this option in increasing doubt, and the Soviets are well aware of this fact. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the Soviets would—or could—make a highly selective procurement response to an intensive U.S. ABM program.

In short, a more logical (logical in terms of both their predicament in the event of a U.S. deployment and of their past procurement policies) Soviet response to a highly effective ABM deployment by the United States would be an acceleration of the broad Soviet strategic development effort, offensive as well as defensive. They would probably expand their own ABM program, at the same time funneling new resources into intercontinental delivery systems. The latter would probably include both quantitative and qualitative increases in offensive power (greater numbers of missiles as well as more powerful warheads), as well as improvements in the survivability of their delivery systems against U.S. counterforce capabilities.

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A STUDY IN MILITARY STRENGTH AND DIPLOMATIC WEAKNESS

by Pierre M. Gallois

IN matters of foreign policy, President Lyndon Johnson based his 1964 electoral campaign on a theme of "peaceful coexistence." He stated that survival was the major issue. "Some people have more guts than brains . . . today the hand that pushes the button is the hand that could destroy the world. . . ."[1] He charged that Barry Goldwater offered "a policy of brinkmanship with nuclear power."[2] His political adversary, holding forth on a few unpalatable truths, certainly facilitated his task. But in the end, it was the promise of peace, and peace without risk, which swayed the American public and gave victory to President Johnson.

The Nature of Nuclear Deterrence

Is it true that, in the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, the word "risk" has the same meaning as it has for the rest of the world? For the United States and the Soviet Union to go to war would surely mean mutual extinction. Is this fact not self-evident, and does in fact a substitute for "peaceful coexistence" exist for them? What is powerful America afraid of? How is it that the American people have come to believe that such massive threats weigh on them that they must, above all else, worry about their "survival?" Surely Americans realize that the Soviet Union cannot lay claim to U.S. territory without risking self-destruction, that this has always been so, and that no one can say now that it will not be so in the future. For a number of years, the reverse of this has also been true, and the Soviet Union has operated on the same premises.

In trying to demonstrate the benefits of the partial nuclear test ban, Drs. York and Wiesner, scientific advisers to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, deprecated the effectiveness of defense and stressed the worth of a pure policy of nuclear dissuasion:

In the early 1950's the USSR, on the basis of its own unilateral decision

[1] *New York Times*, October 29, 1964.
[2] *Ibid.*, October 27, 1964.

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and determination to accept the inevitable retaliation, could have launched an attack against the U.S. with bombers carrying fission bombs. . . . In the later 1950's, again on its own sole decision and determination to accept the inevitable massive retaliation, the USSR could have launched an attack against the U.S. using more and better bombers, this time carrying thermonuclear bombs. . . . Today the USSR, again on the basis of its own decision and determination to accept the inevitable retaliation, could launch an attack on the U.S. using intercontinental missiles and bombers carrying thermonuclear weapons. . . . From the Soviet point of view the picture is similar but much worse.[3]

Thus, these two renowned scientists estimate that if one of the protagonists did not fear death, he could annihilate the other. But it so happens that each does fear death. This is reassuring. Unfortunately, public opinion focuses on the possibility of physical annihilation without remembering that the same condition obtains, though in different degrees, for both sides.

York and Wiesner are caught in the same psychological trap when, forgetting their own preliminary statement, they write that with the passing of the years "both sides in the arms race are thus confronted by the dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security."[4] Their argument is based on the rising destructive potential on both sides. What they are saying in effect is that, if, shortly after 1950, the Soviet Union had attacked the United States, Soviet bombers would have inflicted losses in the millions. By 1960 the introduction of missiles meant that losses would have to be calculated in the tens of millions. Today, with the combination of both missile and bomber and increased megatonnage, we must think in terms of losses in the hundreds of millions.

In fact, this increased destructive power does *not* lessen the security of the United States (or that of the USSR), because of the very fact which Wiesner and York pointed out, namely, the exposure of both protagonists to inevitable reprisals. By basing their thinking on past history and paying lip service to the "war psychosis" which characterizes the present time, they equate the rising destructive potential of nuclear weapons to the eventual utilization of this potential. They worry over some of its least probable results and forget to face the real problems before us. They consider carefully all the likely effects of the use of this new arsenal except those which prohibit its use.

[3]Jerome B. Wiesner and Herbert F. York, "National Security and the Nuclear-Test Ban," *Scientific American,* October 1964, p. 35.
[4]*Ibid.*

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Professor Szilard's realism outweighs the narrowly theoretical views of York and Wiesner:

> If Russia retained twelve rockets and bombs of one to three megatons each which could reach their target, then Russia's counterblow could demolish twelve of our largest cities totalling over 25 million inhabitants. Clearly this would be unacceptable damage, since in none of the conflicts which may be expected to arise in the foreseeable future would we be willing to pay such a price for the sake of attaining the political objects involved.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> In the situation in which we find ourselves at present . . . threatening a massive strategic strike against [Soviet] cities . . . would come very close to being a threat of murder and suicide, and clearly a threat of this sort would not be believable in any conflict in which American interests might be at stake, but not America's existence as a nation.[5]

It is hard to see what could threaten "America's existence as a nation," when we realize that an attacker would also be annihilated. As long as the destructive potential is fairly evenly distributed and closely controlled, it can be increased without lessening the security of either of the protagonists.

Another reassuring factor is that the distribution need not be even. The respective arsenals which the Soviet Union and the United States possess—and have possessed for some time—bear testimony to this. In 1962 the Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that the USSR had 75 ICBM's and something less than 200 bombers capable of reaching U.S. territory. At that time, the United States had 1,500 bombers, 450 missiles, both medium- and long-range, and at least 3,000 tactical aircraft strategically deployed to reach Soviet territory.[6] Thus the ratio of forces directly opposable to one another was about 1:20. In addition, this was the year of the Cuban crisis: politically—if not militarily—Moscow was negotiating on an equal footing. Public opinion ignored the disparity of forces, while the two governments came to the realization that, above a certain level, the total number of weapons no longer was significant.

In November 1964 the Institute for Strategic Studies credited the Soviets with 390 rockets, missiles and bombers capable of reaching the New World, while the U.S. arsenal was made up of at least 2,300 strategic and more than 3,000 tactical weapons[7] so

[5]Leo Szilard, " 'Minimal Deterrent' vs. Saturation Parity," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1964, p. 7.
[6]*The Military Balance, 1962-1963* (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1962).
[7]*The Military Balance, 1964-1965.*

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deployed that, should the need arise, they could be used to zero in on Soviet territory. The disparity existing between these two weapons deployments has diminished a little since late 1964 but the quality of U.S. weapons is greater, especially as far as mobility is concerned. The margin of numerical superiority remains substantial.

Nevertheless, everyone believes that a stable balance exists. This strategic balance is presumed by many to be based on a numerical parity of forces—a parity which, in fact, does not exist. Strangely enough, there are some writers who adhere to contradictory positions. On the one hand, since they do not wish to admit that nuclear dissuasion can be based on a pronounced imbalance (both quantitative and qualitative) of confronting arsenals, they protest against the growing size of the already formidable U.S. forces. On the other hand, they declare that the "arms race" between the two great powers has reached "parity." They ignore the fact that, in reality, the balance existing between them is based on a disparity of nuclear weapons. Nuclear risk—i.e., the risk of incurring what Szilard has called "unacceptable damage"—provides the compensating element.

Potsdam

At the Potsdam Conference, on July 16, 1945, Mr. Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Secretary of War, received the following message from Washington:

> Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations. Local press release necessary as interest extends great distance. Dr. Groves pleased. He returns tomorrow, I will keep you posted.[8]

In coded language, the message referred to the experimental explosion at Alamogordo. A few days later, a detailed report of the test and its results arrived in Germany. President Truman was informed that atomic weapons could be used against Japan some time after the first week of August. Churchill immediately grasped the importance of the successful atomic test, although his entourage had reservations. Field Marshal Alanbrooke described the Prime Minister's reaction thus:

> At 1:30 P.M., we went round to lunch with the Prime Minister. He had seen the American reports of results of the new "tube alloys" secret explosive which had been carried out in the States. He had absorbed all

[8]Potsdam Papers, Document 1303, quoted from Herbert Feis, *Between War & Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 164.

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the minor American exaggerations and, as a result, was completely carried away. It was now no longer necessary for the Russians to come into the Japanese war; the new explosive alone was sufficient to settle the matter. Furthermore, we now had something in our hands which would redress the balance with the Russians. The secret of this explosive and the power to use it would completely alter the diplomatic equilibrium which was adrift since the defeat of Germany.[9]

The members of the U.S. delegation did not fully grasp the implications of their country's formidable monopoly. It is true that the U.S. government decided to hide the full extent of the tests from the Soviets and, consequently, to deprive itself of the trump card that the atom bomb could have represented in negotiations. Mr. Stimson had drafted a memorandum, the gist of which recommended that the communication of nuclear secrets be made dependent upon the democratization of the Soviet Union. Stalin should be forced to pay this price for a secret which all American physicists knew, even then, could not remain a secret for long.

"Upon the successful control of that energy depends the future successful development or destruction of the modern civilized world," wrote Mr. Stimson. . . . "After careful reflection I am of the belief that *no* world organization containing as one of its dominant members a nation whose people are not possessed of free speech but whose governmental action is controlled by the autocratic machinery of a secret political police, [can] give effective control of this new agency with its devastating possibilities. I therefore believe that before we share our new discovery with Russia we should consider carefully whether we can do so safely under any system of control until Russia puts into effective action the proposed Constitution which I have mentioned.[10]

President Truman, following the same naive train of thought as his Secretary of War, decided to play down the first atomic explosion. "On July 24th I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusually destructive force. The Russian premier showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make 'good use of it against the Japanese.' "[11] Churchill added, "I was sure that he had no idea of the significance of what he was being told."[12]

Nothing was done, of course, to make Stalin aware of the significance, so the momentous news did not influence negotiations;

[9]Extract from the diary of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, July 23, 1945, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 172.
[10]Potsdam Papers, Document 1157, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 176.
[11]Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, *Year of Decisions,* Vol. I (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 416.
[12]Winston Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy,* Vol. VI of his History of the Second World War (Boston: Houghton, 1953), p. 670.

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instead, it was played down by those individuals who could have used it as a bargaining tool. They did not understand the power of the atom. Potsdam reinforced Yalta, and the destiny of Europe was shaped by Moscow despite the powerful trump card which the Americans had just acquired.

Korea

On November 30, 1950, President Truman hinted that, if necessary, the atom bomb would be used in Korea. Communist China had just entered the Korean conflict and had launched a "massive attack" on UN forces. The U.S. President's statement was followed by a press conference in the course of which he answered a number of related questions:

Q. Mr. President, will attacks in Manchuria depend on action in the United Nations?
A. (Truman) Yes, entirely.
Q. In other words, if the United Nations resolution should authorize General MacArthur to go further than he has, he will. . . .
A. (President Truman interposing) All necessary steps to meet the military situation would be taken just as we always have.
Q. Will that include the atomic bomb?
A. That would include every weapon that we have.
Q. Mr. President, you said every weapon that we have. Does that mean there is active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb?
A. Always there has been active consideration of its use, but I do not want to see it used. . . .
Q. Mr. President, I wonder if we could retrace that reference to the atomic bomb. Did we understand you clearly that the use of the atomic bomb is under consideration?
A. It always has been—it is one of our weapons.
Q. Does that mean, Mr. President, use against military objectives or civilian. . . .
A. (President Truman interrupting) The choice of targets is a military decision. . . .
Q. Mr. President, you said this depends on a United Nations action. Does that mean that we would not use the atomic bomb except on a United Nations authorization?
A. No, it did not mean that at all. The action against Communist China does depend on the action of the United Nations. The military commander in the field would have the choice of the use of weapons, as always.[13]

Three hours after the press conference, the White House released a statement designed to correct President Truman's answer in the press conference: ". . . by law, only the President can authorize

[13] *New York Times,* December 1, 1950.

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the use of the atom bomb and no such authorization has been given."

Despite Truman's retraction, the announcement caused a great stir. Truman's words "caused consternation in London and the other European capitals," wrote the *Daily Mail* on December 1. The Dutch government allowed that they were "shocked"; the Vatican learned the news with the "greatest regret." In Paris, where the National Assembly was busy trying to overthrow the government, Truman's words had an immediate effect. The *New York Times* remarked that the government was probably saved by the U.S. President's announcement, for the Far East crisis deflected attention from internal squabbles and enabled the French government to emerge with a vote of confidence. "It is for the UN to decide on the bombing of Manchuria," said a spokesman of the French government, adding that "existing objectives in Korea were not important enough to warrant the use of nuclear weapons."[14]

In London, feelings ran as high as on the Continent. The Labour Party announced that "it was time for the British people to insist that their Government follow policies independent of the U.S. Government." The *New York Times* reported: "The *Times* of London said that the question asked of the President and his reply touched upon the most sensitive fears and doubts of this age."[15]

Americans themselves were anything but reassured. Arthur W. Wollander, Director of New York City Civil Defense, announced that he would recruit 310,000 volunteers. Crowds, hearing that the Soviets would launch a nuclear attack on the city, besieged the Civil Defense offices. A *New York Times* editorial of December 2, 1950, remarked that "the very mention of the atom bomb sent an electric shock around the world." Columbia University students "feared that a Third World War would force them to don uniforms before they had completed their studies."

On December 2, 1950, the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain left for Washington to communicate the feelings of these two close allies. Referring to their trip, the *Daily Mail* reported that "they have adopted a joint Anglo-French position against the use of the A-Bomb without UN authorization and against war with Communist China at any price." In France, at the conclusion of a cabinet meeting, the following announcement was made:

[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.*

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"It is clear that the French and British governments have reached —on the Far East situation—complete agreement. Maximum efforts must be made at once to instigate negotiations between the U.S., China, Great Britain and France . . . ."[16]

For the West, it was full circle—from Potsdam to Korea. More than five years had elapsed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet the West was still unaware of the atom's power to intimidate.

In December 1950 the Soviet nuclear arsenal was, to all intents and purposes, nonexistent. Their first atomic device had been exploded only one year before. When Americans deride the size of the French nuclear arsenal, they forget that in 1950 they themselves were terrorized by an even more rudimentary nuclear threat. At that time, despite the nuclear disparity between the protagonists, Americans feared another world war. Through fear of this nonexistent threat, the Allies, led by the United States, waged war thousands of miles from their own bases, ravaged territory they claimed to be protecting, and called for negotiations—without realizing that this expressed desire to talk precluded obtaining terms favorable to the West. We know today (and some realized it then) that the imbalance—the United States had new weapons which its adversary did not possess—could have been exploited to force the adversary to disperse his forces and, consequently, to lose advantages accruing from a massed concentration of armies in the field.

As the *Daily Mail* had predicted, the members of the British Parliament vigorously endorsed Prime Minister Atlee's "no" to President Truman's pronouncements. And everybody in the West agreed, feeling certain that time would prove the wisdom of this restraint.

The same counsel prevailed when the U.S. commander asked to be allowed to hit the enemy's supply lines on the other side of the Yalu River. Dismissed by President Truman, General MacArthur gave his opinion of U.S. Far Eastern policy before Congress in these words:

> The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.[17]

Peking, afraid that the United States would grow impatient with

[16] *The Daily Mail,* December 2, 1950.
[17] *New York Times,* April 20, 1951.

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the war and thus would change tactics and embrace a more aggressive policy, acceded to the long negotiations of Panmunjom which ended by re-establishing the *status quo ante*.

But Korea was devastated and the war had cost her nine million dead—84 per cent of whom were civilians.[18] The United States had increased its military budget, produced a large amount of matériel which was useless outside Korea, and abandoned some advanced research and development which contributed to the Soviet lead in missilery and the race for space.

The French journalist, Jean Jacques Servan-Schrieber, writing in the *New York Herald Tribune* of November 20, 1950, offered the following explanation for the increasing aversion to using the atomic bomb in Korea or elsewhere.

The paramount aim of the Soviets, and almost the only foreign policy platform of the Communist parties, has been to outlaw the atomic bomb in the minds of the European people.

For that purpose they have built remarkable political machines, such as the famous "Committees of the Partisans of Peace," with branches in every little village of every European nation, and huge conventions in one capital after another.

The amount of money they have spent in two years for that campaign is about equivalent, in rubles, to the amount of Marshall aid Europe has received in dollars for the same period. The final stage started some months ago with the launching of the "Stockholm Appeal" outlawing the A-bomb. Since then they have received millions of signatures in Germany, Italy, France and all other European countries.

The pressure has been so great that the Protestant and Catholic Churches even had to give their moral backing to part of the Stockholm manifesto. And even among the people who did not accept the manifesto, hundreds of thousands have agreed, however, to consider as a criminal the first one who would make use of the bomb.

That fantastic high-pressure campaign has yielded considerable results for obvious reasons. The terrain in Europe is, of course, very fertile. Europe has been ruined by two wars, while the United States has grown in strength. Europeans, also, are convinced that the general war would start, whatever the circumstances, with the loss of continental Europe to Stalin. For these two reasons, the European view of any decision that involves the risk of general war is not at all identical to the American one. Starting from there, the Soviet campaign had a very good opening.

Three months ago a greatly publicized incident showed, in Europe, what the results are. A European committee known as the "International Committee for the Study of European Policies" published a report on the prospects of war in Asia, after the Korean crisis had started.

Among the members of the committee we have several leading states-

[18]See Max Born, "What is Left to Hope For?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 1964, p. 4.

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men such as Paul Reynaud of France, Lord Vansittart of England, Van Zeeland of Belgium, and others. One conclusion of the report was that if the West had to face Asiatic ground forces in constantly greater numbers, the only way to survival might eventually be the A-bomb—merely a factual exposé and the logical conclusion on the face of it.

Then things started to happen. The public reaction, in the press and in meetings, was so outraged that one after the other, the leading members of the committee, to save their political lives, had to pretend they had not known of the report and resigned from the board. Since then the moral outlawing of the A-bomb has been unofficially considered an accepted political fact in Europe.

The effective neutralization of atomic weapons was the goal of a successful propaganda campaign to deprive the West of its strongest bargaining tool.

The containment of communism in the Korean War owed more to America's spirit of sacrifice than to her farsightedness. Addressing the UN Assembly on October 24, 1952, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared:

In 1946 the training of the North Korean Army proper began in North Korea. By 1948 this force numbered some 50,000 to 60,000 men, and it was equipped with weapons given to the Army by the Soviet Union government.

In 1949 the military force in North Korea was doubled in strength. This was done by adding to it between 30,000 and 40,000 conscripts. There were returned from the Soviet Union the 10,000 trainees referred to a moment ago who had now been equipped and trained to handle tanks and aircraft. At this time also there were moved from Communist China two divisions of former Korean volunteer groups—that is persons of Korean origin who were organized into divisions and were in the Chinese Army and were moved at this time into North Korea. . . .

In the late Summer of 1949, obviously in preparation for something, the North Korean Labor Party—that is the Communist Party—was purged and secretly absorbed the South Korean Labor Party, which was the South Korean Communist Party, and finally, at the end of 1949, divisional training was undertaken in North Korea.

In the early months of 1950 steps were taken to bring about the mobilization of North Korea.[19]

The man who thus described the military preparations of North Korea is the same man who recommended the evacuation of South Korea by U.S. troops by June 29, 1949, and who, in January 1950, omitted Korea from the list of necessary outposts which should be held in order to safeguard U.S. interests in the Pacific.

Dienbienphu, Quemoy-Matsu and Brinkmanship

The *Journal Officiel* (Paris) of June 9, 1954, summed up the

[19] *New York Times,* October 25, 1952, p. 4.

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position of the government in Washington at the height of the battle for Dienbienphu:

> At our behest, a project for possible American intervention is not only in the planning phase but also close to completion. The American press, better informed about such things than the French Parliament itself, disclosed that American intervention at Dienbienphu would take place on April 28, that the ships were on their way, loaded with nuclear weapons, and that President Eisenhower would ask Congress for the necessary authorization on April 26.

One month earlier, referring to the Franco-American negotiations aimed at relieving the French garrison at Dienbienphu, M. Pineau, a leader of the Socialist Party, had announced to the Chamber of Deputies: "Do not let us be misled by the myth of an intervention which might not save the garrison of Dienbienphu but which might fan the embers of the war and risk involving the whole world."[20]

The speaker certainly voiced the wishes of the majority of the French people. The average Frenchman did not question how U.S. intervention might "risk involving the whole world." Reasoning by historical analogy, he concluded that, when Great Powers face one another under crisis conditions, world wars can be started by incidents. *A fortiori,* the war in Indochina seemed likely to detonate a world war. But should government policy be cued to poorly informed public opinion or, on the contrary, should it seek to clarify the issue and pursue whatever policy best serves the national interest?

In 1954 who would have dared stand up to U.S. nuclear superiority? Then, the ratio of nuclear power did favor the United States. In weighing the stakes and the risks, what communist government would then have dared a nuclear riposte against the United States?

Four years later, on the issue of Quemoy and Matsu, John Foster Dulles, defending the national interests of the U.S. and confronting indirectly a Soviet Union grown more powerful in the interval, succeeded in his endeavors without either "fanning the embers of the war or involving the whole world." Braving public opinion, the Secretary of State took the risk—admittedly a minor one—of reinforcing the defenses of Taiwan and threatening Communist China with retaliatory attacks. His "brinkmanship" disquieted both the allies and the adversaries of the United States. The thought that a third world war might be touched off by

[20] *Journal Officiel,* May 7, 1954, p. 2152.

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the confrontation in the China Sea was foremost in everyone's mind.

This timidity justified Mr. Dulles' unilateral initiative. If, before taking action, he had sought to reassure the European powers which were only moderately interested in the issues of the Far East, his intransigent posture would not have been credible to the Chinese. As soon as the use of the atomic bomb became feasible there was no place for "multilateralism." As soon as the strategy of deterrence is based on the calculation of the ratio between the value of the object to be defended and the risks to be taken to defend it, the need for unity of action becomes paramount—for the process of evaluating stakes and risks will depend on the interests of the individual nations concerned.

Today it is even less likely that the United States will defer to the divergent interests of its allies who are even more solicitous of their respective national interests than they were at the time of the Formosa Straits crisis. Faced with a single adversary capable of defining a realistic relationship between the value assigned to the stakes and the risk that he is willing to take to safeguard them, a coalition of governments which differ about the worth to each of them of these stakes and are profoundly aware of the immensity of the risk that they would be running will lose ground. This is the case of the Atlantic Alliance.

To base international relations on an accurate evaluation of the ratio between stake and risk is hardly soul-satisfying. People would like to find some nobler standard by which to abide. Brinkmanship seems fraught with dangers for the West. The experience of the last few years shows that, when crisis engulfs one or the other part of the world, the major powers have no recourse other than backing down or brinkmanship. The abyss separating these two alternatives is familiar from history, but, in earlier times, it was not as bottomless as it seems to be today.

A coalition cannot practice brinkmanship. To poll public opinion in order to lend credibility to the resolution of a people, not to speak of several peoples, would not be conducive to effective decision-making in a crisis charged with nuclear risks. In this sphere, totalitarian countries have the upper hand. This was Secretary Dulles' feeling when he decided to intervene, if necessary atomically, to defend the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The views and counsels of Paris, London, Rome or Ankara would only have weakened his position and placed him on the defensive vis-à-vis an adversary who had only to think of his own individual

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interest. This was also Kennedy's position when, within an even more favorable political and strategic context, he stepped in to resolve the Cuban crisis.

Suez

Two years before the question of the offshore islands brought home the possibilities and limitations of brinkmanship, the Suez affair had illustrated the deterrent power of nuclear weapons. It is likely that Khrushchev did not expect his words about rocket attacks on London and Paris to be taken as an ultimatum. Prior to Suez, Moscow had often used verbal threats as a means of intimidation. The threats fell flat. But on this occasion, public opinion in both France and Great Britain, troubled by an uneasy conscience, recoiled before the Soviet menace. Soviet blackmail seemed to have succeeded.

The causes of the British-French breakdown, in reality, stemmed from entirely different reasons. The crisis of conscience brought on by the allies' divergent interests stands for much in the balance sheet of the Suez crisis. At Suez, Great Britain thought about the Canal, France about Algeria, and the United States about the Arab world as well as about the respect due certain rules of international conduct. The conflict is obvious. A few weeks later, the French Assembly acknowledged that it had learned a lesson from the failure of the Egyptian campaign. "NATO, as originally conceived, is obsolete," declared M. Monteil, leader of the Catholic Party (MRP), "because it is outflanked in the South. By using Nasser and exploiting the starving masses of Islam, the Soviet Union has developed a strategy which enables it to circumvent the Turkish barrier and turn the front in Central Europe." Another Deputy, M. Crouzier, stated that "only those nations are respected which possess nuclear weapons. Among nuclear powers, the threat of massive destruction suffices to prevent total war. When it comes to countries like our own, which do not possess this weapon, nuclear blackmail is enough to make us consider total surrender. We now know something about this."[21]

These words sum up the theory of nuclear deterrence and, implicitly, the theory of proportional deterrence—proportionate to the size and status of the nation involved. It is true that the French Assembly could have been told that Great Britain, though

[21]These remarks by M. Monteil and M. Crouzier were made during the debate on the military budget of 1957; see *Le Monde,* December 8, 1956.

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armed with some nuclear power, had backed down too. But that argument would not have been valid, for Great Britain had not backed down before the spurious Soviet ultimatum, but rather under U.S. pressure. It follows logically that nuclear weapons, if they are usable only for the defense of the vital interests of the country possessing them, have no part to play in so "marginal" an affair as Suez. It is no less true that all the public remembers of the Suez crisis in 1956 is the fortunes of a punitive expedition halted by an ultimatum. The truth, however, is infinitely more complex than that popular conceit.

Cuba

In matters of national security, the Kennedy Administration adopted a new policy dictated by the rapid evolution of new weapons systems. The folly of brinkmanship, the fallacy of the doctrine of massive reprisals, the risks of involuntary confrontations and escalation, the virtues of *détente* and arms control and disarmament, figured among the principal topics examined by the experts who had gathered around the new President. The ideas of General Maxwell Taylor bestowed upon the new administration's policies the aura of professional military caution. The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for more "flexibility" in defense policies and the enlargement of conventional forces, and advised reserving the use of nuclear arms for the protection of U.S. territory.

> Having recognized the limitations of our atomic deterrent forces we should, in consequence, redefine general war as being synonymous with a nuclear exchange between the United States and the USSR. Limited war would then be left to cover all other forms of military operations. The question of using atomic weapons in limited wars would be met by accepting the fact that primary dependence must be placed on conventional weapons while retaining readiness to use tactical atomic weapons in the comparatively rare cases where their use would be to our national interest.[22]

Because of the new threat constituted by long-range missiles, the defense of Europe lost its unconditional character. The new President refused to accept the choice between either surrender or a world war. He wanted to have the "time to reflect and the choice of methods" for conducting the defense of Europe.

Thus, new ideas emerged, creating a new climate of strategic and political discussion. The most advanced U.S. thinkers devoted

[22]Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper, 1960), pp. 145-146.

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their energies to the elaboration of disarmament schemes and recommended that conventional forces should guarantee the defense of Western Europe.[23] At NATO headquarters in Paris, U.S. representatives endeavored to convince their European colleagues that the strategic concepts which had been agreed upon in common should now be abandoned.

This evolution of U.S. military doctrine, the cautious line taken by the U.S. President in his speech of March 1961 regarding the Laotian crisis, and the pitiful setback at the Bay of Pigs, were undoubtedly interpreted by Moscow as signs of weakness and a lack of determination on the part of Washington. As in the Korean case, this was, to some extent, an erroneous interpretation. Whatever the reason, Chairman Khrushchev felt safe in taking the staggering risk of installing nuclear missiles on territory less than 100 miles from the U.S. mainland. The Soviet leaders seemed to abandon the historic doctrine of exploiting the vast expanse of Russian territory by giving ground to gain time and to weaken the aggressor—a doctrine which, until then, had been supposed to inform Soviet strategy. The Soviets jumped in to exploit the vulnerabilities which they believed had been engendered by the shift in U.S. defense policy, and they maneuvered their forces on the world chess-board just as other major powers have done in the past.

In addressing the House of Commons on October 30, 1962, Prime Minister Macmillan declared that the Cuban affair could well have led to "the collapse of the defense of the Free World . . . . The world has had a shock. We have been very near the edge."[24] Protesting against President Kennedy's failure to consult his allies before taking the initiative, Mr. Gaitskell, then leader of the Opposition, commented that "the decisions which he took could have had the very gravest consequences to Europe and it is not satisfactory that such decisions should be taken without the governments at least principally concerned in NATO having an opportunity to give their views on what should be done."[25] Thus, Mr. Gaitskell revealed the unilateral character of the Atlantic system. President Kennedy, in fact, informed the NATO

[23]The project for the Multilateral Force and the British proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force conform to the conclusions reached by certain American experts on the obsolescence of NATO's strategic arrangements and the need for a more "flexible" posture in Europe.

[24]Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 666, pp. 41-42.

[25]*Ibid.*, p. 19.

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allies that, when the vital interests of the American people are at stake, he would act first and consult later.

Surely, logic was on his side: Not to seize the initiative would be to ignore the salient factors of conflict in the nuclear age. President Kennedy's conduct in the Cuban crisis did not differ from that of Secretary Dulles in the Formosa Straits crisis. The American press, acknowledging the parallel, emphasized that perhaps the policies of the former Secretary of State had been condemned too rashly, for the force of circumstances compelled statesmen to take such decisions. But logic is not on the side of the Americans when they argue that the very principle which they take for their guide does not apply to the defense of another country's national interests. They insist that in certain cases the allies should consult before taking action in defense of a member country. This is the gist of American proposals, such as that for the multilateral nuclear fleet.

On October 25, 1962, Pope John XXIII issued the following appeal: "We supplicate all rulers not to remain deaf to the cry of mankind. Let them do everything in their power to save peace. By so doing, they will spare the world the horrors of war that would have disastrous consequences, such as nobody can foresee."[26] In Great Britain the University of Aberdeen resolved as follows: "While deploring Russian provocation in Cuba, we urge that Her Majesty's Government dissociate itself from the dangerous action of the United States government, preserve its independence of judgment and do all in its power to promote a peaceful solution through the United Nations."[27]

Joseph Alsop, the columnist, and one of the inventors of the nonexistent "missile gap," explained that the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba was intended to give the Soviets the means for delivering a first strike. "The Soviets were in fact seeking to gain this kind of freedom to strike first by installing large numbers of MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. The President's action has halted them in time, but if they had not been halted, the upset in the nuclear balance would have been drastic indeed."[28] The truth lies elsewhere. The missiles installed in Cuba would have been useless against U.S. submarines and the Soviets would have had to deploy a very large number of missiles—of very long range—to enable them seriously to reduce the effectiveness of the Strategic

[26] *New York Times*, October 26, 1962.
[27] *Ibid.*, November 24, 1962.
[28] *New York Herald Tribune*, October 26, 1962.

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Air Command. Since such a move by the Soviets would probably have unleashed a powerful reaction on the part of the United States, and since, in such a case, a few dozen missiles would have sufficed to eradicate the Soviets' economic achievement of forty years, Mr. Alsop's statement seems somewhat excessive.

President Kennedy, in his celebrated discourse on the Cuban situation, delivered on October 22, 1962, raised some highly debatable points. In effect, he reprimanded the Soviet government for having stated on September 11 that "the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes. There is no need for the Soviet government to shift its weapons for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance, Cuba. The Soviet Union has such powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the borders of the Soviet Union." President Kennedy implied that ballistic missiles are not defensive weapons. Was he correct?

When weapons capable of intercepting ballistic missiles did not exist, what weapon could Khrushchev have installed in Cuba to block the threat which U.S. ballistic missiles constituted for Castro? Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine that U.S. missiles would have been fixed against Cuba; and certainly no one will question President Kennedy's good faith in drawing a distinction between ballistic missiles (offensive) and anti-aircraft missiles (defensive). If Washington had decided to intervene by landing troops in Cuba, such an action would have been only a conventional attack. Yet it is conceivable that Chairman Khrushchev, in his statement of September 11, referred to the only weapons existing today which are capable of playing a *defensive* role against ballistic missiles, i.e., weapons which deter.

The introduction of nuclear weapons systems into the diplomatic and political field generated erroneous notions about their possible utilization. President Kennedy himself was misled when he overlooked the deterrent effect, i.e., the defensive role, of offensive weapons. The state of terror into which the Soviet-American confrontation in the Caribbean plunged the world was excessive. The Cuban affair could not have led to an exchange of nuclear blows against the soil of the two protagonists: geographic and strategic circumstances combined to prevent escalation. Between the U.S. forces operating almost in inland waters and the Soviet forces intervening from thousands of miles away,

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the odds were too uneven to encourage the Soviets to venture upon a conventional confrontation—which would have been the first steps up the ladder. Since the incident could not take on so serious a character as to warrant use of nuclear arms, a negotiated settlement was made easier for both sides.

Paradoxical as this may seem, it is true that, when tensions arise somewhere in the world and each of the protagonists safeguards his retaliatory potential, a global war—in the sense in which the term is usually used—is impossible, at least within the limits of rationality. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed this point in different words:

> If that is so . . . the American people completely failed to understand what happened during that very important period of October. They failed to understand that we had a force of several hundred thousand men ready to invade Cuba. They failed to understand that had we invaded Cuba, we would have been confronted with the Soviets, that had we been confronted with the Soviets we would have killed thousands of them, that had we killed thousands of them the Soviets would probably have had to respond; that they might have had nuclear delivery weapons there [which] might have been operational and they might have been launched; and that in any event Khrushchev knew without any question whatsoever that he faced the full military power of the United States, including its nuclear weapons. That may be difficult to understand for some, but it is not difficult for me to understand, because we faced that night the possibility of launching nuclear weapons and Khrushchev knew it, and that is the reason, and the only reason, why he withdrew those weapons.[29]

But this form of escalation, culminating in the use of nuclear weapons, was even more improbable since the Soviets did not possess *on the spot* the human or material means which would have permitted them to mount the challenge described by the Secretary of Defense.

VIETNAM

Nearly two years ago, in the course of an inspection tour in South Vietnam, Secretary McNamara declared that the military situation permitted him to look forward to the withdrawal of U.S. advisers to the government of Saigon. As far as American domestic politics were concerned, this remark evoked a favorable reaction. In Vietnam, its effects were disastrous. Let us put ourselves in the place of the Vietnamese who have been at war for more than a generation and who suddenly learn that, in the near

[29]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964*, Part 1, pp. 30-31.

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future, they will face their adversary alone—an adversary who, for obvious geographic reasons, is there to stay while the so-called protector withdraws thousands of miles away. The psychological reaction is as simple as it is devastating: During the day, the villagers acclaim the ally who is present; at night they open their doors to the Viet Cong who, tomorrow, will be present as master. There is no better way for abetting subversion and infiltration of guerrillas.

From the U.S. point of view, there are only three solutions to the Vietnamese dilemma, all of which are unsatisfactory. The first would be to carry the battle into the enemy's territory. This extension of hostility would probably be without danger. It is, however, morally and politically impossible, and the enemy knows that it is. The U.S. government itself declared that it cannot envisage having recourse to such measures. The allies of the United States are even more reluctant to contemplate a spreading of the Vietnamese war. The British government does not disguise its opposition to any action against the North. For Malaya the British were ready to take risks which they do not wish to take in Vietnam, the U.S. theater of operations.

To state that the United States intends to establish its power firmly and indefinitely in South Vietnam would be another solution. Washington can call this part of the world essential to the security and defense of U.S. interests. To protect the Philippines, Thailand and Australia against possible communist aggression, this could be regarded as a legitimate concern of as powerful a nation as the United States. From the point of view of the South Vietnamese, this approach would at least have the advantage of giving them peace. It would discourage those who speculate on the retreat of the U.S. forces and who are counting on the ultimate victory of the Viet Cong. However, it is as difficult to carry out such a policy as the one suggested earlier. To pursue it would be tantamount to pleading guilty to the charge of neo-colonialism.

There is a third solution: The United States, desirous to re-establish peace, can install a friendly government—and then pull out. But, such a "friendly government" would bear the stigma of being a U.S. puppet, no matter how honest and patriotic its purpose. Who could believe that, in Vietnam, the men thus placed in power could resist internal opponents, not to speak of subversive incursions which can be launched from bases a few miles away?

In the first case, the United States would have to step up the

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war, incur the wrath of world opinion, deny its avowed ethical principles, and thus damage its cherished image. In the second case, Washington would have to bear the burden and the opprobrium of a colonial power. In the third case, the United States would have to pull back from a commitment solemnly given to a Free World ally and acknowledge a breach in the wall of "containment."

If one compares the Vietnam affair with the Cuban transaction, one cannot fail to notice that the Kremlin, when it commits itself to an ally like Castro, insures the inviolability of that ally's territory, whereas Washington, when it supports the successors of the late Diem, does not furnish as categoric a guarantee.

The West's leading nation handles awkwardly the weapons which it designed and developed with so much inventiveness and at such great expense. The advance of military technology has been breathtaking: its political meaning has not been understood. Today, the works of science engender in the minds of men as much disorder as did the superstitions of ignorance 1,000 years ago.

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ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

ALLIANCES, like other political arrangements, are creatures of the contemporary political environment. Seldom does an alliance outlive the conditions which prompted its formation. The diplomatic history of the nation-state system abounds with examples of shifting coalitions—*les renversements des alliances*. Erstwhile allies may find themselves, after the passage of several years —or several months—members of opposing alliance systems. An alliance system created to meet, at a given moment in history, the security requirements of its member states is soon beset with centrifugal tendencies, for the relationships among its members are unlikely to remain stable.

NATO differs from preceding alliance systems in several ways —in the size of its membership, in the great disparities between member states, and in the integration of its command structure and supply facilities. Moreover, NATO was created as a defensive alliance "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization" of its member nations. Signatories undertook, in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded and by promoting conditions of stability and well being," and to "seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." Thus NATO was designed to be more than a multilateral military alliance.

The founders of NATO presumed that the security of North America and Western Europe was indivisible. NATO represented the Western response to the felt needs of the early postwar period. Fear of Soviet aggression in Europe and elsewhere led the United States, in a departure from its historic refusal to join military alliances, to support the creation of the Atlantic Alliance. NATO was designed to provide for the defense of a war-torn Europe

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against the threat of Soviet expansion and thus to meet the security needs of the West.

The Atlantic Alliance has enabled its members to achieve many of the objectives set by its founders. Soviet expansion in Europe, since 1949, has been blocked. The nations of Western Europe have not only rebuilt their economies, but have attained a level of economic growth and a degree of integration unimaginable in the early postwar period. European powers have experienced a phenomenal recovery in economic and political influence; in fact, it has become commonplace to speak of the "new Europe."

The failures of NATO, however, have been the object of greater concern among its members than the achievements of the alliance. Problems of communication have beset NATO in the years since its founding. The efforts of the United States to communicate to the Soviet Union its interest in building a more peaceful world by reducing tensions have served, on occasion, to make more difficult the problem of communicating to NATO allies the U.S. dedication to the Atlantic Alliance. To be sure, the process of policy formulation in a Western democracy is necessarily complex. Political leaders are understandably reluctant to add to the problems of developing consensus at the national level the additional burdens of achieving agreement among allies. Other NATO members appear equally reluctant to submit major policies to intra-alliance debate with its rigors and perhaps inevitable delays.

Ever since 1949, and especially since the Suez Crisis, the Atlantic Alliance has been taken to task by its critics for its inability to provide the institutional machinery for the coordination of its members' policies toward regions beyond the North Atlantic area. It may prove impossible in the decade ahead to achieve, even in Europe, the level of agreement necessary for the formulation of common policies in foreign relations. Because of the formidable problems likely to confront North Atlantic countries in their relations with governments from Saigon to Havana, machinery for closer collaboration on extra-Atlantic problems will undoubtedly remain one of the urgent needs of the alliance. The failure of the Atlantic Alliance to maximize the common interest of its members through appropriate institutions can be expected to reduce its value in the minds of at least some of the members.

NATO, since it was designed to deal with the immediate and specific threat of a Soviet attack, will retain its vitality as long as

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its member nations discern the reality of the threat and are agreed upon the means to be chosen in response to an attack. It is a truism that nations join alliance systems in order to obtain concrete advantages. From time to time, every government reassesses the advantages resulting from an alliance, weighing the criteria of incremental security, prestige and influence against disadvantages such as diminished freedom of unilateral action, dependence upon other members, and internal political constraints.

The Changed Environment

It would be unusual indeed if, more than fifteen years after the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, the conditions which obtained in 1949 still prevailed. The transformation of European economies from dependence upon U.S. aid to a position of comparative wealth and high growth rates has been paced by renewed feelings of political assurance and independence. This change lies at the root of many of the problems which have beset the Atlantic Alliance in the last decade. The early postwar relationship between the United States and Western Europe has given way to a new relationship, the result also of perceived changes in U.S.-Soviet relations, to which neither Europeans nor Americans have adjusted themselves. The United States has yet to understand the potential—and the limitations—of the "new Europe," and Europeans often have not understood the meaning of the U.S. commitment to defend Europe in the nuclear age. Europe has developed feelings of independence from the United States, sometimes reinforced in European minds by the notion that the Soviets have forgone, for the moment at least, any thought of launching an attack against Western Europe. Such a notion is itself in large part the product of the guarantee provided by the U.S. commitment to NATO.

The advent and spread of nuclear weapons have aggravated the ancient problem of achieving in foreign policy a balance between interest and risk, between the objective of a given course of action and the cost of achieving it. This development has enhanced the importance of nonmilitary instruments of statecraft and of such forms of conflict as insurgency warfare. Even in instances in which U.S. policymakers believe themselves determined to respond with nuclear weapons if necessary to a broad spectrum of challenges, they find it difficult to communicate such determination to friend and foe alike. It is this problem which must be resolved if alliance

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systems are to remain credible means for achieving national security in the nuclear age. To be sure, European opinion is divided on questions of nuclear strategy. Only few Europeans believe that Europe can deter a Soviet attack by its own efforts; others question the willingness of the United States to fight the Soviets with nuclear weapons over European stakes. At the time of its founding the North Atlantic Alliance provided for all of its members a feeling of security sufficient for the world of 1949. To what extent, it may be asked, is NATO relevant to the security needs of all of its members in the third decade of the nuclear age?

Other changes have altered the world environment since 1949. At the founding of the Atlantic Alliance, nationalism, it appeared, was rapidly in decline in the North Atlantic area. European countries, having experienced the nationalistic excesses of fascism and nazism, seemed to have rejected the extreme nationalism of the past and to have manifested an interest in various forms of integration at the international level. In the last decade, however, a reassertion and reintensification of nationalism have occurred in some North Atlantic countries.[1]

President de Gaulle has stressed France's independent destiny and her power and personality. He has held up France as an example to other countries throughout the world and especially in the less developed areas which wish to escape "foreign hegemonies," i.e., that of the United States or the Soviet Union. In Italy, tensions between the Italians and the German-speaking South Tyroleans who feel themselves to be Austrians, have led to outbursts of violence. In Belgium the French-speaking Walloons and Dutch-speaking Flemish face each other in a hostile atmosphere. In Canada, the nationalism of the French-speaking population of Quebec, galvanized at least in part by the reassertion of nationalism in the Fifth Republic, has led to movements for autonomy in the Canadian Confederation and even for separation from English-speaking Canada. The growth of nationalism in the North Atlantic area has weakened the forces of European integration and Atlanticism. A continued growth of nationalism could affect adversely the prospects for NATO in the next decade.

It has become fashionable to speak of the end of bipolarity in international politics. Bipolarity is said to have given way to an

[1]For an examination of recent trends in nationalism in the North Atlantic area, see Hans Kohn, *Nationalism in the Atlantic Community,* Foreign Policy Research Institute Monograph No. 3, 1965.

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international environment in which several new centers of power have come into existence. Europe, it is suggested, possesses the potential of great power status. New nations have emerged in Asia and Africa. Polycentrism is said to characterize relations among communist countries. Communist China, in particular, having grown restive in a monolithic Soviet bloc, has asserted its independence in a polycentric communist system. Similar tendencies have made themselves felt in the West since the founding of NATO. President de Gaulle represents the challenge of a resurgent Europe to U.S. hegemony in the Atlantic Alliance. The leaders of countries such as Communist China and France, chafing under the restraints imposed by bipolarity, strive for increased autonomy respectively from the Soviet Union and the United States.

Because of these centrifugal tendencies, it has been suggested that NATO may no longer meet the needs of Europe or the United States. In fact, tensions between the Northern and Southern hemispheres can be expected to increase in the next decade, while relations between East and West may undergo a marked improvement.[2]

Nevertheless, the national capabilities of the so-called challengers of bipolarity are still meager by comparison with the United States and the Soviet Union. The Gross National Product of the Federal German Republic, the highest in Western Europe, is little more than one-sixth that of the United States. The combined GNP of the Common Market countries is approximately one-half that of the United States. Most analyses of the "new Europe" assume the continuation over the foreseeable future of relatively high rates of economic growth. However, the extent of Europe's future economic expansion is difficult to predict. Communist China, as well as other non-Western countries which might form a counterpoise to the superpowers, is beset with complex problems which may prove insoluble for decades. Nuclear supremacy remains indisputably in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union. For some time to come, only the United States and the Soviet Union will possess the scientific, technolog-

[2]See, for example, Amitai Etzioni, *Winning Without War* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964), especially Chapters 2 and 3; Ronald Steel, *The End of Alliance: America and the Future of Europe* (New York: The Viking Press, 1964), especially Chapters 1, 2 and 6; and Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin, *After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe* (New York: Random House, 1965).

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ical and industrial resources necessary to the conduct of a global policy. In brief, ambition appears to have outpaced power in many parts of the world.[3]

The New Europe

Europe, of all potential challengers of bipolarity, possesses many of the capabilities for great power status in the nuclear age. A Europe of the Six, with common economic, political and military institutions, would rival the United States and the Soviet Union in population, industrial production, economic growth, and potentially in technological innovation. Such a power would conduct a major proportion of the world's trade and provide much of the capital and aid to less developed countries. Many of the discussions in the United States about Atlantic partnership have assumed the imminent creation of an integrated Europe as the counterpart of the United States. Thus the United States, it appears, has wavered between an acceptance of equally unrealistic assessments of Europe. On the one hand, U.S. thinking seems to have been guided by the assumption that Europe might soon become integrated around the core area of the Six. On the other hand, especially in questions of nuclear strategy, the United States has continued to accord its European allies treatment more appropriate at the founding of NATO than in the 1960's.

It was the assumption of proponents of Atlantic partnership that the United States might have a more harmonious relationship with an integrated Europe than was possible in a Europe of nation-states. The federalist conception of Europe—perhaps because the policies of such European spokesmen as Monnet, Spaak and Adenauer had found favor with successive U.S. administrations—was the form of European integration preferred by U.S. policymakers. It is difficult, nevertheless, to foresee the shape of an integrated Europe, or even to discern with clarity the time necessary for the creation of such a Europe. Its institutions might differ profoundly from those envisaged either by federalists or the proponents of a *Europe des patries*. Moreover, the foreign policy of an integrated Europe might differ in many ways from that of the United States, just as the foreign policies of individual European states have not always accorded with those of the United States. The United States and its European allies have disagreed not

[3]Theo Sommer, "For an Atlantic Future," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1964, p. 113.

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only on policies vis-à-vis regions outside the North Atlantic area, but on questions which fall legally within the scope of the alliance. A reorganized Atlantic Alliance might provide new machinery for speedy consultation, and an integrated Europe would presumably reduce the number of parties with whom accord must be reached. Nevertheless, important divisions on questions of foreign policy and nuclear strategy might continue to plague an Atlantic Alliance which rested upon a partnership between an integrated Europe and the United States.

Common to many European criticisms of the Atlantic Alliance has been the contention that NATO provides a means by which the United States has asserted its technological supremacy. The call for standardization in weapons, it has been asserted, is synonymous with Washington's efforts to assure U.S. industry a major share of military contracts. In the efforts to achieve standardization of weapons within the alliance, U.S. firms have obtained orders which, in European minds, should have gone to industry in Europe. The United States, because of its vast economy, the size of its industrial units and its ability to apply rapidly technological innovation to mass production, has aroused the fears of not a few European competitors. Illustrative of this tendency is the history of the British aircraft industry, but other European manufacturers as well have felt the pressure of American competition.

For some in Europe the development of larger economic units in the Common Market, trans-national industrial collaboration in research (as in the case of Anglo-French joint development of the *Concorde* supersonic airliner), and agreements for international specialization may make possible European competition on equal terms with U.S. counterparts. Even in the "new Europe," industrial units remain smaller than their competitors in the United States. For example, General Motors produces at least four times as many vehicles as Volkswagen and six times more than Fiat; Chrysler, the third largest U.S. producer of vehicles, produces more automobiles than all French manufacturers together. At peak production the output of United States Steel, the leading U.S. producer, is about equal to that of all its German competitors. General Motors boasts an annual volume of business equal to that of the seventeen largest German firms. If U.S. and Common Market firms are ranked by annual volume of business for 1963, the largest German corporation would be in 27th place,

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while the largest Italian and French companies would be 33rd and 57th respectively.[4] Such figures indicate the disparity between the U.S. and European industries and lend credibility to European fears about American economic pre-eminence.

By comparison with Western Europe, U.S. industry spends a substantially greater amount on research and development—an important factor in assuring continued industrial predominance. European expenditures are well below their American counterparts not only in absolute terms, but also as a percentage of GNP.

EUROPEAN AND U.S. EXPENDITURES ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 1959

Country	*Total in Million $*	*Percentage of GNP*	*Per Capita Expenditures*
United States	11,850	2.5	66.70
United Kingdom	1,400	2.2	28.00
Federal German Republic	755	1.2	13.70
France	450	0.9	10.00
Belgium	45	0.6	7.50
Italy	88	0.3	1.80

Source: *Rapport du Conseiller Commercial de France aux États-Unis.*

Perhaps because NATO is a military alliance, the trans-Atlantic debate among its members has been conducted for the most part in military terms. Behind much of the debate about nuclear sharing lurks the question of the future of European technology. Continued U.S. pre-eminence in NATO nuclear strategy is tantamount, in many European minds, to continued U.S. predominance in nuclear technology, and thus to the relegation of Europe to a secondary role in basic scientific research and the exploitation of new technologies. For not a few Europeans the question of nuclear sharing is related closely to the part the "new Europe" is to play as an industrial power over the next generation. A reallocation of the tasks of research and production in the field of nucleonics might help to resolve the problem of nuclear sharing. Moreover, European industry would be given a greater opportunity to participate in the development and exploitation of ad-

[4]See *Face a la concurrence américaine les entreprises européenes devront souvent concentrer leurs moyens.* Patronat Francais, 1965.

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vanced technology. Were Europeans to be granted a greater role in the design and production of weapons systems, they might feel less uneasy about their place, militarily and technologically, in the Atlantic Alliance.

The members of NATO have experienced change in yet another respect since the founding of the Atlantic Alliance. Some signatories of the Atlantic Treaty have developed closer links with each other, while others have pulled apart. Since the formation of NATO the six Common Market countries have linked themselves in the European Communities and thus have strengthened their ties with each other. The United States and Germany have developed patterns of collaboration which are unprecedented in their relations with each other. Although Britain and the United States have found themselves in recent years in agreement upon policies in Southeast Asia and Africa, relations between London and Washington have been strained at various times since the founding of NATO by such crises as Suez and Cuba. Important links remain between the two major English-speaking powers, even though the rapport between their leaders which existed during the Second World War is diminished. France, on the one hand, and the United States and Britain, on the other, have sometimes been unable to reach accord, not only on questions of immediate concern to NATO, but on problems outside the North Atlantic area. De Gaulle has become so dissatisfied with the role accorded France in alliance councils that he has reduced the French commitment to NATO. France and the Federal Republic, after having concluded the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, have been at odds on policy questions regarding NATO, European integration and relations with states outside the North Atlantic area.

Canada has sought in the last decade, but with little success, to lessen what allegedly is that country's cultural saturation and economic domination by the United States. On NATO's southeastern flank, Greece and Turkey have been poised on the brink of armed conflict because of the Cyprus issue. Portugal, because of dissatisfaction with the lack of support in the alliance for its efforts to repress rebellion in overseas territories, has threatened to withdraw rights accorded to the United States in the Azores.

Restructuring NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty provides in Article 12 that members may engage in consultations for the purpose of revising the

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treaty after the passage of ten years. The founders of the Atlantic Alliance agreed in Article 13 that members could give one year's notice of withdrawal after twenty years.[5] By 1969, when NATO will mark its twentieth anniversary, member governments will have begun to review their commitments to the alliance. A systematic examination of the options available to NATO members in the restructuring of the alliance is needed well in advance of 1969. There is, to be sure, no automaticity in this date. The Atlantic Alliance will enter the second generation of its existence unless its members choose to exercise their right of review or withdrawal.

Even without formal changes, it is apparent that the NATO of the 1960's differs markedly from the Atlantic Alliance of 1949. NATO, as founded, was designed to give formal notice of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Europe. The Atlantic Alliance by the end of the first decade of its existence had developed an integrated command structure and supply infrastructure, which served to differentiate NATO from preceding alliance systems.

NATO, at the time of its founding, had twelve members. In 1952, with the admission of Greece and Turkey, the alliance was extended to the eastern Mediterranean and the borders of the Middle East. With the accession of the Federal German Republic to sovereignty and membership in NATO in 1955, the Atlantic Alliance was again revised. Germany became formally a member of the alliance, although the territory of the Federal Republic, because of the presence of allied occupation forces, was already included in the commitment to resist an "armed attack" contained in the North Atlantic Treaty.[6]

Such changes have occurred in response to the changing de-

[5]Article 12 of the North Atlantic Treaty specifies: "After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security."

Article 13 of the Treaty specifies: "After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation."

[6]According to Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, "an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties."

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mands placed upon the alliance. Other changes have been attempted. Numerous proposals have been offered for nuclear sharing. The United States sought, against the wishes of many of its European allies, to develop the Multilateral Force. The U.S. drive for the creation of the MLF may be viewed as an effort to alter the Atlantic Alliance without formally amending the North Atlantic Treaty.[7] Similarly, France's proposals for the formation of a three-power directorate and the plan for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, set forth by the British government in the autumn of 1964, may be seen as attempts to make changes in the alliance without reference to the procedure contained in Articles 12 and 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty and without securing the agreement of all members of the alliance.

It has become apparent, even several years before 1969, that minor changes, and probably substantial ones, must be made if the Atlantic Alliance is to serve the security needs of its members over the next decade. The United States and France have developed divergent strategic doctrines; the revitalization of the Atlantic Alliance is in no small measure dependent upon the reconciliation of these doctrines. Conceivably, France or another member government may call for a special meeting, under Article 12, to make changes in NATO well in advance of 1969. French proposals, inspired by Gaullist views on international integration, could take the form of an abolition of the existing system of integrated commands.[8] If the question of strategic doctrine and organization goes unresolved, or the United States succeeds in setting up a Multilateral Force, France might cease by 1969 even to be a member of NATO.

The preference which U.S. policymakers have expressed for an Atlantic partnership, linking North America and an integrated Western Europe, should not preclude consideration of a series of alternative, if less desirable, substitutes for, or successors to, NATO. The spectrum ranges from the loosest to the most

[7]Discussing the U.S. proposal for the MLF, NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio, in his address to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in Paris on November 16, 1964, called for fundamental changes in the alliance only by unanimous agreement. "[W]e have built up over the years a complex and effective structure for mutual defense. We could not dismantle that organization or impair its effectiveness without violating the commitments we have made and weakening the alliance. But equally, we cannot expand that structure or make changes to it which would profoundly modify its structure, whether in the direction of more or of less integration, without the full and unanimous consent of all concerned. Such changes must be the result of free discussion and free agreement."

[8]See, for example, the *New York Times*, April 17, 1965, p. 2.

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tightly knit—from *ad hoc* to formal arrangements. For example, if North Atlantic peoples wish to maintain at least a minimum of cooperation for their common defense, they would need, at the very least, to conclude a multilateral treaty of alliance, or conceivably a series of bilateral treaties. Under such arrangements, a permanent secretariat, military headquarters, and provisions for regular meetings of government delegates—all features to be found in NATO as presently constituted—would probably be lacking. Another group of solutions provides for an alliance composed of two or more categories of members, some of whom might agree to pool military forces and other resources, while others might participate only in a cooperative and advisory capacity.[9] The number and variety of possible substitutes for NATO is limited only by considerations of practicality and political feasibility.

A re-evaluation of NATO must take account of the question of membership. Should Spain now be considered for membership or less formal association? The question of Spain's relationship to NATO should be explored anew, for the bilateral defense arrangements between the United States and Spain were concluded after the founding of the Atlantic Alliance. To what extent should the alliance be reconstituted to enable such states as Australia, New Zealand, and even Japan to participate in some fashion? Which countries presently members of NATO should be excluded from, or given a status of association with, rather than full membership in, a reorganized Atlantic Alliance?

In addition to changes in NATO's organizational structure, consideration should be given to such questions as the geographical area to be covered by the treaty. Certain changes are necessary in the treaty as framed in 1949. For instance, the Algerian departments of France, originally covered by the treaty (Article 6), no longer exist[10] nor is it correct to speak—as does the treaty—of the occupation forces of any contracting party in Europe, except in Berlin. In fact, West Berlin might be mentioned specifically in a revised treaty as falling within the defense perimeter of the Atlantic Alliance. Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty provides in Article 5 for defense against an attack on "Europe and North America." Presumably Hawaii, which achieved statehood after the formation of NATO, falls within the defense per-

[9]See, for example, Ferdinand Otto Miksche, "NATO-Reform oder neues Vertragswerk?," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), January 17, 1965.

[10]On January 16, 1963, Algeria ceased to fall within the geographical limits of NATO.

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imeter of the alliance, thus extending its geographic bounds well beyond those of 1949. A revised treaty might make specific mention of this feature of the defense commitment of member states.

A major issue before NATO is how far the scope of consultation, if not of joint defense, should extend outside the North Atlantic area. Beyond the aforementioned extra-Atlantic interests of some alliance members, the introduction of missile technology and the prospect of military satellites and space exploration may make it advisable to consider a redefinition geographically of the functions of the alliance in order to promote a broader sharing of responsibility for the security of regions outside the North Atlantic area. Perhaps a restricted alliance should give recognition to the continuing necessity for unilateral action outside the North Atlantic area if NATO members are unable to achieve agreement on their common interests and to develop machinery for collaboration outside the existing geographic limits of the alliance.

The North Atlantic Treaty stipulates in Article 5 that "an armed attack against one or more of [the NATO members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." Since 1949 the world has witnessed many types of attack by communist powers, including subversion, insurgency, arms deliveries, propaganda and political warfare. Such forms of "indirect aggression" are likely to continue into the 1970's, perhaps under headings such as "just wars of national liberation," which may require the collective response of the United States and its allies. Those charged with redrafting the North Atlantic Treaty—if NATO is to be restructured to meet the needs of the next decade—should attempt to develop new definitions of "armed attack."

Alternatives to NATO

Although the immediate task confronting NATO members is to review the alliance in order to develop and assess proposals for its restructuring, it is necessary also to consider alternative schemes should the restructuring of the existing alliance prove politically infeasible. An examination of alternatives may point up the danger of tampering with the one and only organization for Western military and political collaboration established thus far. Moreover, an evaluation of alternatives to NATO is vital in order to anticipate a radical revision which might be thrust upon us by sudden changes in the policies of one or more NATO members.

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ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Historically, alliances have either evolved toward more permanent forms of integration or have given way to new coalitions and constellations. One form of political community toward which the peoples of Western Europe and North America might advance is an Atlantic political community characterized by a community outlook, feelings of mutual trust, and a willingness to collaborate on a wide range of issues for the common good. Such a community might become either a federal union or a confederation. Ultimately, an Atlantic political community would undoubtedly develop institutions for decision-making, an Atlantic general staff, unified armed forces, an executive, a parliament, and a court. The process by which such a community developed might be similar to that in which the European Communities have evolved. However, if the experience of the European Communities in resolving the difficult problems confronting the building of an economic union is illustrative, the question of the merits and demerits of gradual or speedy political integration must be examined before we can devise a workable strategy for building an Atlantic political community.

Given the opposition within France to existing military integration within NATO, the alliance members might consider the impact of the substitution of a loose military alliance upon the defense of the North Atlantic area. Such an alliance would provide for mutual defense in case of attack or other situations as predetermined in the treaty. In such an arrangement steps might be taken to revise the definition of "armed attack" contained in the existing North Atlantic Treaty. This form of alliance would approximate NATO without the NATO Council and other organs of consultation, without SACEUR and other commands, and conceivably without the degree of standardization in weapons and the supply infrastructure achieved by NATO. In sum, such an arrangement would represent a return, in organization, to the alliance systems of the pre-World War I period.

It is possible, either as an alternative to NATO or as an extension of collaborative efforts within the existing alliance structure, to envisage a greater degree of technological exchange among the countries of the North Atlantic area. The United States, for example, might offer to sell to European allies certain technologies which the Soviets have themselves already developed. Under such a program the United States might agree to assist European allies in the development of advanced weapons sys-

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tems, while making a greater effort to assure that military procurement for the alliance is more broadly based than has hitherto been the case. European firms would thus be given a greater proportion of contracts for advanced weapons systems. Scientific collaboration and exchanges between European and North American research centers might be expanded.

NATO member governments might give consideration to yet another alternative to existing alliance arrangements. Should NATO be disbanded, most if not all of its existing members might choose to develop an informal alliance. Under such an arrangement there might be frequent visits and liaison of a political and military nature between heads of government and their chief political and military advisers. This, in practice, is characteristic of the "special relationship," the unwritten alliance, between the United States and Britain. This feature of Anglo-American collaboration, so distasteful to President de Gaulle because France is excluded, might be more satisfactory to the French and other European powers if it were extended to them as well. An alliance revised in this fashion might be given temporary institutions during times of crisis such as the Combined Chiefs of Staff and other "combined" agencies which existed between the United States and Britain during World War II.

It is conceivable that, in the absence of a multilateral defense organization, governments which are now members of NATO might opt for bilateral military arrangements, similar to those now in operation between the United States and Canada, the United States and Japan, the United States and the Philippines, the United States and Spain, France and Germany. The United States might enter into formal alliances with some North Atlantic countries, tailored to the requirements, capabilities, commitments and interests of each power. Other North Atlantic countries might wish to make their own bilateral defense arrangements with each other. Thus France, for example, could enter into bilateral relationships with such countries as the United States and Britain as well as Germany. The United States, in return for a bilateral pact with France, might obtain concessions from Paris about facilities on French soil presently under NATO command.

In a variant of the Atlantic partnership proposed by the Kennedy Administration, North Atlantic governments might give consideration to the formation of an Anglo-Saxon grouping in

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partnership with an integrated Europe. Such an arrangement might become feasible if the Six, over the next decade, having achieved the economic objectives of the Rome Treaty, progress toward a political union without British participation. The Channel, rather than the Atlantic, would separate the two groups. Within the Anglo-Saxon grouping might be included not only Britain and the United States, but Australia, Canada and New Zealand, with whom Britain maintains intimate collaboration in the Commonwealth and with whom the United States has concluded military agreements. In fact, a broader grouping might be envisaged, which would include some countries in Latin America and perhaps Japan.

Given the prevailing division between official French attitudes and those of other NATO countries toward alliance strategy and structure, attention might be turned to the implications of an Atlantic Alliance which excluded France, but included the Benelux countries, Britain, Germany, Italy, the United States and perhaps other members of NATO. Such an alliance would be deprived of the supply infrastructure and other military installations which are located on French soil. Depending on the measure of collaboration between France and such an alliance, the North Atlantic area would be deprived of the defense-in-depth which NATO as presently constituted provides. Such an arrangement is not easy to conceive, and would represent one of the least desirable alternatives. Should the United States and certain NATO countries choose such an alternative, the Soviet Union could be expected to attempt to strengthen Moscow's links with Paris and thus to undertake to deepen the cleavage between France and other North Atlantic countries. It nevertheless represents another variation to be considered in certain contingencies.

Various combinations of these alternative arrangements might be developed in place of NATO. For example, the United States might establish bilateral relationships with selected North Atlantic countries and enter multilateral alliances with others. Certain forms of technological collaboration could be worked out among some European countries, to the exclusion of others. A multiplicity of alliances and other collaborative arrangements might replace NATO. Those countries which desired to strengthen their links with the United States could enter formal or informal agreements for that purpose. Governments wishing to lessen their ties with the United States would be granted the

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opportunity to establish new arrangements on mutually satisfactory terms.

The United States should not shrink from a thorough re-evaluation of the importance of alliance systems for U.S. and Free World security. In fact, the United States has acted in many situations as though her policies were determined by "solistic" considerations.[11] The decision to intervene in Korea, President Kennedy's management of the 1962 Cuban crisis, U.S. actions in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic provide examples of solism. They represent decisions which preceded consultations with, and did not depend primarily upon support from, allies. President de Gaulle appears to have embraced solism in many of his major foreign policies.

There are fundamental differences between isolationism and solism in foreign policy. Isolationism is based on the assumption that a power such as the United States can abstain from positive action in foreign relations without endangering its vital interests, or that indeed its interest may best be served by a policy of nonparticipation and nonintervention in a given region of the world. Solism, however, does not necessarily limit the geographical or political scope of a state's action, except that it deliberately minimizes the need for consultative or diplomatic cooperation with other nations. It is possible to accept a solistic posture in some part of the world, as has the United States in Southeast Asia, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Dominican coup, and to reject solism elsewhere, for instance in Cyprus, the Congo and our trans-Atlantic relationships. A policy of solism would not even require or presume fundamental changes in U.S. policy—only the admission that at times the United States acts through alliances and other combinations but prefers, in certain instances, to take action unilaterally. A policy of solism does not preclude *ad hoc* or even regular contacts and consultations with the representatives of other powers.

Criteria for Evaluating Alternative Proposals

The primary question to be asked in examining alternatives to NATO is whether the integrity of the defense of the North Atlantic area still obtains. Have events in the years since 1949

[11]See Frank Munk, "Solism and U.S. Policy," Discussion Paper, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 1965, for an examination of solism as an alternative to membership in alliance systems.

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rendered obsolete the notion that the security of Europe is as vital as, say, the defense of California to the security of the United States? If the premise which inspired the founders of NATO remains valid, we must seek to determine whether any of the proposals for restructuring NATO, as well as any of the alternatives to NATO as it presently exists, can assist the North Atlantic peoples to achieve the original purpose of the alliance. A tentative answer to this question may be found by examining proposals for change in NATO by reference to criteria such as the following:

(1) *Ability to make decisions.* Schemes for reorganizing NATO should be pre-tested as to their suitability for making quick and effective decisions—and communicating and executing these decisions—in time of crisis, or of impending crisis, or at other times when the basic security of the United States and the West is endangered.

(2) *Cohesiveness.* Any new organization or structure will have as one of its primary purposes the coordination of national policies in order to enable member states to concert certain categories of actions in their foreign relations. Proposals for reorganizing the alliance must take account, for example, of the necessity, as perceived by member governments, to collaborate on problems of common concern within and perhaps beyond the North Atlantic area.

(3) *Feasibility.* Each alternative concept should be analyzed in terms of its political, military and organizational effects, together with its compatibility with governmental structures and policies which may be expected to prevail in the 1970's. To what extent, for example, are alternative proposals likely to elicit support from governments and the various nongovernmental elites of member states? Will North Atlantic countries become more or less willing to embrace institutions which include supranational features?

(4) *Compatibility with Trends in Military Technology.* Many of the problems which have beset the Atlantic Alliance can be traced, at least in part, to changes in technology. Alliances, in the estimation of General Pierre Gallois, have become obsolete as means for enhancing national security. No nation, he contends, can be expected to come to the assistance of an alliance partner, if to do so might result in its own destruction.[12] Technological

[12]See his book, *The Balance of Terror* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), especially Chapters 1 and 2.

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developments over the next generation may alter fundamentally existing conceptions of international collaboration. Thus proposals for restructuring the Atlantic Alliance should be assessed in the light of potential technological developments. To what extent will changes in technology and innovations in weapons systems alter the security needs of North Atlantic countries over the next decade? Conceivably, Europe might acquire the capability for its own defense. Alternatively, it may be suggested, technological developments could render Europe and perhaps the United States ever more vulnerable to destruction. Hence, any assessment of the Atlantic Alliance's future depends to a large extent on unpredictable technological developments over the next decade.

(5) *Economic Considerations.* Each proposal for restructuring the Atlantic Alliance should be assessed in the light of its economic implications. Special attention should be given to the kinds of resources it makes available to member states. To what extent would a specific grouping be dependent upon external economic resources for its defense and livelihood? What is the balance between industry and agriculture and changing relationships in foreign trade? In particular, each proposal should be examined in terms of the fiscal and monetary problems created or solved by its adoption, as well as political and economic relationships between member states and the rest of the world.

(6) *East-West Confrontation.* A test of the utility of alternative arrangements is to be found in an assessment of their likely effect upon the course of the East-West confrontation. Specifically, which arrangements are most likely to produce, over time, a basic "mellowing" of Soviet attitudes? Which arrangements are most vulnerable to Soviet exploitation of the "inherent contradictions of imperialism?" It must be asked whether one or another of the proposals for restructuring the Atlantic Alliance would increase or reduce the vulnerability of individual European nations to communist pressure.

(7) *Compatibility with the Goals and Policies of North Atlantic Countries.* Each proposal for restructuring the Atlantic Alliance is likely to elicit the support of NATO members to the extent that it corresponds with their evaluation of major security interests. The United States occupies a special position in the alliance by virtue of its size, economic power, location, military technology and industrial capacity. However, European nations

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themselves occupy a place in world politics which differs from that of 1949, and have retained and developed interests some of which accord with, while others depart from, those of the United States. An assessment of alternative proposals must take account of changes in the position of the United States and European countries, vis-à-vis each other and the rest of the world, as well as an evaluation of the extent to which models for restructuring the alliance might serve to advance or hinder the achievement of separate and common goals of North Atlantic nations.

The governments of the North Atlantic area have before them a range of options. Some proposals will prove more suited to the security needs of North Atlantic countries than others; some will find greater acceptance because of their military, political and economic feasibility than others. However, the United States, because of the vast technological, industrial and military resources which lie within its command, retains considerable latitude for influencing the decision as to which proposal for the alliance is adopted, and thus for shaping the course of events in the North Atlantic area for many years to come.

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PROPOSALS FOR INTEGRATING THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

by Gerhard Mally

THE history of the last fifty years points up the strength of the ties linking Europe and America. Twice the New World was compelled to intervene in the affairs of the Old to defend the values upon which all of Western civilization is based. On both occasions the United States withdrew the bulk of its forces from the European continent after the end of hostilities. However, the rise of the Soviet Union as a global power brought about a fundamental change in American attitudes and policy toward Western Europe. In the postwar period, under the threat of communist expansion, the United States assumed leadership of the Atlantic world, and the historic bonds between Europe and America were translated into the first Atlantic institution, NATO. Although the Soviet military threat served as a decisive factor in drawing the Western democracies together, the founders of NATO were able to construct the Atlantic Alliance upon the commonly-shared values of Western civilization. Moreover, the North Atlantic Treaty provides evidence that NATO's founders envisaged an organization in which military partners might eventually build a political community at the international level.

In this paper, we will briefly review the progress the North Atlantic peoples have made toward building this political community; examine the obstacles that block the path toward this goal; and offer proposals for a new U.S. initiative and for a variety of Atlantic institutions which might enhance the prospects for Atlantic unity.

Progress and Setbacks on the Road toward European Unity

Both in Europe and the United States, since the Second World War, there has developed a general consensus that European political unity is a desirable long-term objective. Despite many obstacles, including nationalism, fear of a German resurgence, communist strategy, disagreement about Britain's place in the new Europe, and discord about the form which European politi-

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cal unity should assume, important steps have been taken toward integration. European statesmen such as Schuman and Adenauer, Monnet and De Gasperi, Spaak and Van Zeeland, urged upon their peoples new and imaginative approaches to the problem of economic and political integration at the international level. These leaders shared the conviction that national prerogatives must be limited in favor of a higher objective, namely, the building of a united Europe based upon the federal principle. But they never conceived as their objective the building of a new European nationalism or the creation of a united Europe for the sake of building a "third force." Instead, a Europe united on the federal principle was viewed both as a means of transcending narrow nationalism and as a model for similar groupings in other parts of the world.[1]

Moreover, the founders of the European Community looked upon the construction of a united Europe as a necessary first move toward redressing the unequal balance between the Old and New Worlds; as a prerequisite for the eventual establishment of a genuine partnership between Europe and America. As Henri Brugmans, himself a proponent of the federalist principle, has suggested:

> If . . . the United States would find in our part of the world [Europe] not a group of quarreling, powerless satellites, but a federation speaking with one voice, the whole picture would change . . . we would be freed from that kind of morbid anti-Americanism which is one of the consequences, as well as one of the causes of our decay. In short, European federation would bring about the shock we need, it would make possible a lucid, common policy between equal partners, replacing the merely technical alliance. . . .[2]

Two outside forces served also as powerful catalysts of European unification: the Soviet threat against Western Europe and the pressure which the United States exerted upon European governments for close cooperation in OEEC. In his Declaration of May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman pro-

[1]In fact, many European federalists are "federalists" first and "Europeans" second. They consider a European federation not as the ultimate goal, but as a means to achieve a world federation toward which an Atlantic federation would serve as a possible intermediary step. In the words of Alexandre Marc: "Europe is not a goal in itself; it is but a means. The means to solve the tangible, real and serious problems which humanity faces in the twentieth century. . . ." Alexandre Marc, *Europe Terre Decisive* (Paris: La Colombe, 1959), p. 24.

[2]Henri Brugmans, "The Dynamics of European Integration," in Grove C. Haines, editor, *European Integration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), pp. 169-170.

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posed the pooling of French and German steel production under a common authority as a first concrete step toward a European federation. Within a year—on April 18, 1951—the Treaty establishing ECSC was signed in Paris.

The subsequent success of this supranational organization generated other, more ambitious plans for integration. The Draft Treaty for the European Defense Community, designed to promote the establishment of an integrated European army, was signed by the Six on May 27, 1952. The EDC Treaty provided in Article 38 that the ECSC Assembly should also become the parliament of the European Defense Community. On March 10, 1953, a "Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community," which was to comprise ECSC and EDC, was submitted to the governments of the Six. This "federalist manifesto" called for an "indissoluble, supranational European Community," composed of "the peoples" (not of "states"), for a bicameral parliament, and for elections by direct, universal suffrage, as well as for a European Executive Council. Since the EDC Treaty never came into operation, however, because of the refusal of the French National Assembly to consider it, this "federalist manifesto" was not officially discussed thereafter.

The failure to establish the European Defense Community turned out to be only a temporary setback on the road to closer political cooperation. The developments of the next four years, 1955-1958, are at the heart of the now familiar success story of European integration: the entrance of West Germany into NATO and the negotiations leading to the creation of the European Economic Community and Euratom through the Treaties of Rome.

With General de Gaulle's return to power in 1958, the movement toward European political unity underwent a fundamental change. The French President, who has always been hostile to the concepts of integration and supranationalism, has sought to promote his scheme of a "Europe of States," based upon a design which he outlined more than twenty years ago.[3] The Gaullist

[3]"I intended to assure France primacy in western Europe by preventing the rise of a new Reich that might again threaten its safety; to cooperate with East and West and, if need be, contract the necessary alliances on one side or the other without ever accepting any kind of dependency; . . . to persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic and strategic bloc; to establish this organization as one of the three world powers and, should it become necessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-American camps." Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs: Salvation, 1944-1946.* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 24.

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doctrine of "cooperation between sovereign States" within an alliance system was officially advanced in the so-called Fouchet Plan of 1961 and modified by the Cattani Commission in 1962. This French plan was based upon the idea of intergovernmental cooperation and the rule of unanimity in a political authority to be called the Council of Ministers. In view of the clash between the respective proponents of confederation and federation within the European Community, discussion of the Fouchet Plan was suspended *sine die* in April 1962.

The only tangible application of the Gaullist confederal scheme is to be found in the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship of January 22, 1963. This treaty has not enabled Bonn and Paris to resolve their differences concerning the future of Europe and the Atlantic Community. The French philosophy of an independent "Europe of States" has clashed head-on with the German design for an integrated Europe within an Atlantic Community as outlined in the Preamble of the Franco-German Treaty at the insistence of the Bundestag. In his press conference of July 23, 1964, President de Gaulle himself expressed disappointment with the treaty, which, it had been anticipated, might serve as the basis for a common Franco-German policy.

The Atlantic Dialogue

Although negotiations on European political unity ended in deadlock in April 1962, a new phase in trans-Atlantic relations began in June of that year. On June 26, the Action Committee for the United States of Europe issued the following Declaration:

> While the economic unity of Europe is being consolidated and a start made on its political unification, the cooperation that has already grown up between the United States and European countries should gradually be transformed into a partnership between a united Europe and the United States. . . . The partnership between America and united Europe must be a relationship of two separate but equally powerful entities, each bearing its share of common responsibilities in the world. . . . The partnership . . . must not be merely economic. It is necessary that it should rapidly extend to the military and political spheres.[4]

This statement, issued by Jean Monnet and his associates (who include members of most major European political parties and trade unions) constituted a challenge to the United States as well as a historic opportunity.

[4]Action Committee for the United States of Europe, *Joint Declaration of June 26, 1962*, Paris (pamphlet).

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The U.S. reply to the European proposal came on July 4, 1962. Speaking at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, President Kennedy issued a "Declaration of Interdependence":

> The nations of Western Europe . . . are joining together . . . to find freedom in diversity and unity in strength. The United States looks on this vast new enterprise with hope and admiration. We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. . . . I will say here and now that the United States will be ready for a "Declaration of Interdependence," that we will be prepared to discuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union. . . .[5]

The "grand design" of an Atlantic partnership, conceived under the Kennedy Administration and supported later by President Johnson, found acceptance among many European leaders, as well as officials of the European Communities. Nevertheless, this initiative was blunted in January 1963 when President de Gaulle blocked British entry into the Common Market, spoke out against a "colossal Atlantic community" and called for a "strictly European construction."

Despite President de Gaulle's opposition, the Action Committee for the United States of Europe attempted to give new momentum to the idea of an Atlantic partnership. In a Joint Declaration of June 1, 1964, the Committee restated its official policy, as defined on June 26, 1962:

> The United States and Europe must not wait until Europe has achieved political and military unity before starting to deal with nuclear questions in common accord. The United States and those countries of Europe which are ready to take part in joint efforts must begin to act without delay.[6]

The Committee declared that "the defense of the free world can only be ensured in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance" and that "the project of a Multilateral Force can be the beginning of a joint organization."[7] The Action Committee welcomed the U.S.-sponsored project of a multilateral nuclear force as a transitional solution—until Europe is politically united—in the expectation that the MLF might serve as a catalyst for both military and political integration. Nevertheless, the idea of a multilateral nuclear force immediately became the object of

[5] *Department of State Bulletin,* July 23, 1962, p. 132.
[6] Action Committee for the United States of Europe, *Joint Declaration of June 1, 1964,* Paris, p. 11.
[7] *Ibid.,* p. 12.

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criticisms by the French and Soviet governments. Paris saw in the MLF a new means toward the integration it opposes and a device for the preservation of U.S. hegemony in NATO, while Moscow issued strong protests against any German participation in this nuclear force.

A New European Integrative Effort

In order to overcome the deadlock over the question of Europe's political organization, the German and Italian governments offered new proposals for European unity. On November 6, 1964, Germany proposed a "multilateral convention." The convention's purpose would be twofold: to engage the governments of the Six in the drafting of a European political union and to organize periodic consultations among them on matters of foreign affairs, as well as military and cultural policy. A "Consultative Commission" serving the Community as a whole would be empowered to prepare the meetings of national ministers and draft a treaty establishing the political union. By the terms of this proposal, the powers of the European Parliament would be substantially increased.[8]

On November 28, 1964, the Italian government offered a proposal designed to serve as a basis for the conclusion of a treaty on European political union before January 1, 1968. The Italian project included provision for an experimental period of three years in which regular meetings of heads of state and foreign ministers would take place; furthermore, the Italian government called for the creation of a "Political Commission," to be assisted by a Secretariat.[9]

In proposing the temporary adoption of certain features of the Fouchet Plan, the two governments obviously made concessions to France by providing for "regular meetings of national officials" and the creation of a Secretariat. However, both the German and the Italian proposals envisage the building eventually of a federal Europe within the Atlantic Alliance.

The French government, on November 23, 1964, offered its proposals in a speech which President de Gaulle delivered in Strasbourg in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the liberation of that city from Nazi occupation. On this occasion De Gaulle emphasized the importance of the creation of an

[8] *Le Monde* (Paris), November 7, 1964, p. 3.
[9] *Ibid.*, December 1, 1964, p. 24.

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independent "European Europe" with its "own objectives and means . . . especially for its defense." While acknowledging the necessity for an alliance with the United States, the French President stated that the New World has "a different destiny by nature and history, which cannot be identified with that of Europe."[10] De Gaulle did not explain who would provide for the defense of this "European Europe," although he implied that France, with her *force de dissuasion,* might perform such a role. Yet no West European country is likely to exchange the powerful American nuclear "umbrella" for the uncertain protection afforded by a national European deterrent.

On the other hand, a *European* nuclear deterrent might be feasible. One American specialist on European affairs has observed that

> it is in the logic of the present historical situation that Europe will, sooner or later, develop an indigenous deterrent. The crucial issue is whether it will be built with U.S. assistance and in such a way as will reinforce the trend toward a genuine NATO confederation, or whether it will be built in defiance of the United States, in which case it will not augur well for the future of the Alliance.[11]

The only realistic long-term solution to the problem of a "credible" European deterrent would consist in the pooling of the French and British nuclear forces under a European authority. This supranational organ would have to coordinate the targeting and deployment of the European force with the U.S. strategic command in order to maintain the unity of the defense of the Atlantic world. Such an arrangement would require France and Britain to renounce absolute control over their respective national deterrents. The Western European Union might serve as the vehicle for raising Europe to the status of a nuclear power and an equal partner of the United States within the NATO framework.

European Elite Attitudes

An analysis of the official statements and writings of European cabinet members, including foreign ministers, of international civil servants, such as officials of the institutions of the European Community, and of members of political parties, parliaments and interest groups, since 1958, reveals that a majority prefer a federal to a confederal Europe, and that, by and large,

[10] *Ibid.*, November 24, 1964, p. 2.
[11] James E. Dougherty, "European Deterrence and Atlantic Unity," Orbis, Fall 1962, p. 421.

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they conceive of a future European federation as the partner of the United States.[12] The writings of European intellectuals and political analysts who have expressed themselves on the issues of European organization and Atlantic relations yield similar conclusions. The opinions voiced by delegates to the European Parliament and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe give evidence of support for a federal Europe as part of an Atlantic partnership. To be sure, the present influence of "European" delegates in their respective national parliaments is not great, for they are still a minority. However, the transnational consensus which has developed among the parliamentarians in the European assemblies may eventually be communicated to other members of the national parliaments of Europe and gradually influence their attitudes.[13]

Although the vast majority of delegates to the European assemblies appear to favor a federation as the ultimate objective of the process of European integration and express themselves in favor of an Atlantic partnership, the great dissenters are the representatives of the French Gaullist Party (UNR/UDT), whose statements usually reflect the policies of President de Gaulle. Outside of France there exists a small group of politicians, namely the German "Gaullist faction" in the Bundestag, who often express agreement with many of the policies favored by the French head of state. While Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals advocate further steps toward the creation of a supranational European Community within the Atlantic framework, the Gaullists stress the necessity for cooperation between sovereign states and the achievement for Europe of a status of greater independence from the United States. Such opponents of the Gaullist conception of a "Europe of the Fatherlands" as, for example, MM. Erhard, Spaak, Luns, Colombo, Schroeder, Birren-

[12]In this context the term "Europe" refers to the European Community; the attitudes of British leaders are, therefore, not considered.

For direct quotes and a more detailed analysis of elite attitudes see Gerhard Mally, "United Europe and the Atlantic Community: A Study of Contemporary Trends toward Political Integration in Western Europe and their Significance for Future Trans-Atlantic Relations" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in International Relations, University of Pennsylvania, 1964), Chapter III. See also Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, "European Public Opinion and the Atlantic Community," a survey conducted by Gerhard Mally (mimeo).

[13]The importance of an effective liaison between Strasbourg and the six national parliaments has been recognized by the creation of a "Permanent Working Party on Parliamentary and Public Relations" and other committees in Strasbourg.

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bach, Erler and Mollet advocate unqualifiedly the establishment of both a federal Europe and an Atlantic partnership.

A survey of opinions expressed by the officials of the European Community indicates that international civil servants such as Dr. Hallstein and Dr. Mansholt strongly favor a European federation. Of greater importance is their belief in the compatibility between progress toward European unity and the creation of an Atlantic partnership. Finally, such European political commentators as Raymond Aron, Claude Delmas, Andre Francois-Poncet, Alexandre Marc, Altiero Spinelli and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber reject the Gaullist conception of European unity.[14]

Obstacles to a United Europe

This consensus on European and Atlantic goals is based upon a recognition of the necessity for gradual progress toward political unity and the strengthening of trans-Atlantic collaboration. Yet the building of a European federation is hindered by several negative forces. First, there is disagreement on means if not on ends and, more important still, on timing. This discord makes for trivial debate about appropriate approaches to integration, rather than emphasis upon concrete steps for the building of a united Europe. Many in Western Europe perceive a diminution of the Soviet threat and consequently no urgent need for integrative measures. Moreover, a period of economic prosperity and material abundance has produced in many European countries an air of complacency and satisfaction with the status quo.

Western Europe still lacks an integrative force sufficiently powerful to achieve the objectives set by the proponents of the federal principle. This deficiency can be explained by the fact that the major European powers—France, Germany and Great Britain—are almost equal in power and none of the three, therefore, is able to assume the role of federator. While the *animus integrandi* is relatively strong in Italy and the Benelux countries, none of these countries is qualified to assume European leadership.

National bureaucracies, many of whose members are still

[14]Daniel Lerner, commenting on the results of elite panel surveys made by the Institute of European Studies in the years 1955, 1956, 1959 and 1961, stated that "there was majority support when we gave them the choice in our questionnaire for the 'United States of Europe'—that is, they opted for stricter federal bonds over a looser confederation of nations." Daniel Lerner, "Will European Union Bring About Merged National Goals," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* July 1963, p. 36.

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strongly attached to the concept of national sovereignty and naturally have certain vested interests in the preservation of the status quo, as well as convinced nationalists in Western Europe have found their most eloquent spokesman and powerful supporter in President de Gaulle. The French President believes that nation-states are the "sole viable and legitimate" political units. He encourages the resurgence of nationalism by exalting French *grandeur,* an example which may serve to revive latent nationalisms elsewhere in Europe. Moreover, De Gaulle champions a "Europe of States" extending "from the Atlantic to the Urals." President de Gaulle may see in such a European confederation the prospect that France will eventually assume a position of hegemony. Yet even were European Russia to be detached somehow from territories east of the Urals, France might find her aspirations to leadership challenged by a reunified Germany and a Russia each far superior to her in population and industrial resources. Whatever the pros and cons of President de Gaulle's position, Western Europe is not likely to achieve political unity while he remains in power.

The Need for U.S. Leadership

The concept of Atlantic partnership espoused by many European political leaders, parliamentarians and writers has at least one serious deficiency: the creation of an Atlantic partnership is predicated on the building of a united Western Europe. Yet, even in the absence of a united Western Europe, the United States might undertake the difficult task of forging an Atlantic partnership. There is no reason why progress toward Atlantic solidarity should be dependent upon European unity, so long as measures designed to advance the first objective do not conflict with the attainment, at a later stage, of the second. Indeed, determined American leadership may well enhance the prospects for both European integration and Atlantic unity. The final objective of U.S. policy might remain the creation of an Atlantic partnership based upon a united Europe linked politically, militarily and economically with North America.

Such a U.S. initiative would give new momentum to discussions about the future of NATO and might prevent Europe and North America from drifting further apart. Proposals should continue to be put forward for future Atlantic institutions in which Europe would be represented as a single unit. The advent

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of a united Europe should be anticipated and the European Community should be treated wherever possible as a potential federation. Such a tactic would serve to reduce the effectiveness of those who criticize the United States for attempting to submerge Europe in a "colossal Atlantic community." If schemes for a future Atlantic configuration are presented within this context, the prospects for Atlantic unity may be greatly enhanced without imperiling the formation of a united Europe.

Institutions for the North Atlantic Area

Article 12 of the North Atlantic Treaty calls upon the NATO governments to "consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty" after it has been in force for at least ten years. Article 9 stipulates that the North Atlantic Council may "set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary" for the organization. Consequently, the North Atlantic Council could make use of this competence to set up a "Special Commission," charged with submitting proposals for the reorganization of the Atlantic Alliance. Such a "Special Commission" might consider proposals such as the following:

(1) The creation of an *Atlantic Commission,* composed of five eminent European and American personalities, to be chosen by the North Atlantic Council. The Commission would have advisory status and its members would be independent of national governments. It would be concerned exclusively with the promotion of the general interests of the Atlantic Community and with submitting policy recommendations to an Atlantic executive. By anticipating possible objections and pondering the different viewpoints of national governments, the Commission could play an important role as a mediator among the member states. Moreover, by initiating and formulating compromise solutions, the Commission might enhance the prospects for the adoption of common policies acceptable to all governments. Members of the Commission would reach decisions upon recommendations at least initially by unanimous agreement.

(2) The establishment of an *Atlantic Executive Council* to act as the decision-making authority in which national viewpoints might find expression. Questions which fall within the competence of NATO and OECD would be considered. The Council would be composed of national ministers. The fusion of the two existing "Atlantic" executives (the North Atlantic

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Council and the OECD Council) would contribute to greater efficiency in decision making and might result in greater cohesion within the Atlantic world. This *modus procedendi* would be all the more logical since the principal mission of OECD consists in the promotion of economic cooperation among its members, an objective set forth also in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.[15] Furthermore, the fact that membership in NATO and OECD overlaps argues for greater collaboration between these two organizations. The new Atlantic Executive Council would consequently be composed of the representatives of those twenty Western nations which hold membership either in NATO or OECD.[16]

The Council would be convened at the ministerial level, according to the topics under scrutiny. The defense ministers would meet in one session to discuss military-strategic problems. Their decisions would be binding upon the fifteen states which are presently members of NATO. The economic and finance ministers would meet in a different session to discuss problems of trade, tariffs, aid and monetary policy.[17] Provisions for the gradual adoption of decisions by weighted, qualified majority vote might be envisaged after an initial transitional period. The areas of application could be determined by the Council itself. A precedent for such a procedure exists already at the European and Atlantic levels.[18] After an initial period of five or ten years, proposals of the Atlantic Commission might be accepted as binding upon members in the absence of a decision by the Council to reject them.

[15]Article 2 of the NATO Treaty stipulates that the Parties "will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." Provisions for a concerted aid program of Atlantic nations to developing countries (another aim of OECD) would become an item of priority.

[16]These twenty countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, United Kingdom. Japan might have an observer status or even associate membership.

[17]In its *Joint Declaration of June 1, 1964, op. cit.*, the Monnet Committee urged: "The establishment of a Committee of Entente between Europe and the United States in those fields where Europe has begun to exist, i.e., in the domain of the Economic Community. The task of the Committee of Entente would be to prepare joint positions on problems as they call for action, thus making easier the decisions to be taken by the European institutions and the American government both in their mutual economic relations and in their respective negotiations with the rest of the world. The Community would be represented on a basis of parity with the United States."

[18]See Treaty of Rome (establishing the European Economic Community), Article 148, and OECD Convention, Article 6.

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Voting formulas might eventually be based on the factors of population, military power and economic potential. The votes could be weighted so that North America and the EEC countries plus Britain would have 37 each: the United States 32 and Canada 5; the EEC 29 (France, Germany, Italy 8 each; Belgium and Netherlands 2 each, Luxembourg 1); Great Britain 8. Spain and Turkey would have 5 each; Greece, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, 2 each; and Iceland and Ireland, 1 each. In this scheme there would be a total of 100 weighted votes. The concurrent vote of the United States and the European Community would be required for any decision by qualified majority (61 votes).

(3) Creation of an *Atlantic Assembly,* composed of delegates from the twenty national parliaments, as an advisory and consultative body.[19] The Assembly would be authorized to submit recommendations to the Atlantic Council on political, military, economic and cultural matters. The nucleus of such an assembly exists already in the form of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, an unofficial body with no statutory powers. While neither the OECD Convention nor the North Atlantic Treaty provides for parliamentary assemblies, representatives of both NATO and OECD have repeatedly declared themselves in favor of an Atlantic Assembly.[20] Considering the almost unanimous opposition of Western parliamentarians to any further proliferation of assemblies (such as the creation of an OECD assembly), the establishment of an Atlantic Assembly, including representatives from countries which are members either of OECD or NATO, seems to be the only practical alternative. The apparent difficulty of having neutral countries represented in such an assembly could be overcome by the creation of a committee structure in which delegates from neutral countries would be placed

[19]For a detailed analysis of the project "Atlantic Assembly" and all relevant documents on this subject see: Joseph Harned and Gerhard Mally, *Atlantic Assembly: Proposals and Prospects* (London: The Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government, 1965), a pamphlet published in English and French; and Gerhard Mally, *The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference: 1960-1964* (Paris: NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, 1965), a pamphlet published in English and French.

[20]During the years 1963-64, a Special Sub-Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference charged with the task of submitting proposals for the institutionalization of the Conference examined the possibilities for the creation of an Atlantic Assembly. For this purpose close contacts between the Committee and the authorities of OECD and the Council of Europe have been established. Moreover, exploratory talks between members of the United States Congress and members of European national assemblies were held on an informal basis in the Council of Europe at Strasbourg in the spring of 1965.

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on all committees (Political, Economic, Cultural and Scientific) except the Military Committee. Each delegate would have one vote and recommendations would require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast.

National quotas would be assigned according to population. An allocation of delegates similar to the following illustrative pattern could be envisaged: the United States 45, Canada 5 (North America 50); France, Germany, Italy, 10 each; Belgium and the Netherlands, 4 each; Luxembourg 2 (European Community 40); Great Britain 10; Turkey and Spain, 5 each; Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland, 4 each; Iceland 2. Thus, the Atlantic Assembly would be composed of a total of 144 delegates, to be chosen from the national parliaments of the twenty "Atlantic" countries.[21]

Once this Atlantic Assembly has been operating successfully for several years in an advisory capacity, a step could be envisaged which would lead to a marked increase of the Assembly's power, namely the "negative resolution procedure." Recommendations emanating from the Assembly would be considered as binding on the Council unless national parliaments decide otherwise. Initially, all twenty national parliaments would have to ratify the recommendations submitted by the Atlantic Assembly. Subsequently, only a veto either by the U.S. Congress or the European Parliament could block the adoption by the Council of recommendations from the Atlantic Assembly.

(4) Creation of an *Atlantic High Court of Justice,* to be composed of ten judges selected from high national courts for their professional excellence and impartiality. The Court would arrive at its decisions by a majority of six votes. It would ensure that the other Atlantic organs, namely, the Commission, Council and Assembly, function in accordance with the treaty superseding or modifying the existing North Atlantic Treaty and the OECD Convention. As an international court, it would hear cases brought by one member state against another.

Provision could be made so that members of the Atlantic Court would agree to accept eventually its compulsory jurisdic-

[21]Japan would be invited to send delegates with observer status. Provision could also be made for the European Community to be represented by 40 delegates selected from the European Parliament. Several neutral countries have already indicated that they might wish to participate in such an Atlantic Assembly.

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tion in all major fields. In other words, provisions similar to the so-called optional clause contained in Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (which stipulates that the Parties may opt for or against the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction), would be omitted. Such a step might enhance the prospects for the gradual development of an Atlantic system of law based on a synthesis of the Continental Roman law and the Anglo-Saxon common law. In fact, the early creation of an Atlantic system of law is a necessary corollary of closer economic, political and military collaboration within the North Atlantic area.

Nothing less than an institutionalized Atlantic Community is capable of meeting the challenges of the nuclear era. The foregoing recommendations are addressed to the task of rationalizing Western institutions by means of creating new "Atlantic" organizations which would assume the tasks currently within the purview of NATO and OECD.[22] Secondly, they anticipate the creation of a federal Europe without linking progress in Atlantic integration to the prior achievement of European political unity.

Conclusion

The designs for European unity and Atlantic partnership are not only compatible but complementary, for a united Europe would reinforce trans-Atlantic bonds by providing an equal, viable partner for the United States. While gradual progress toward European political unity appears possible—even likely—there is no guarantee that integration in the economic sphere will automatically and inexorably "spill over" into foreign affairs and defense. The successful institutionalization of this Atlantic Community according to the principle of "unity in diversity" would attest to the realism and inventiveness of Western political leaders and demonstrate to the entire world how free men unite.

[22]For example, the Economic Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference has stressed repeatedly the need for closer collaboration with OECD in the implementation of its resolutions.

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FRENCH CANADA'S NEW LEFT

by George A. Kelly

AMERICANS in Canada are not far from the hearth of home. They vacation, sightsee, and do business with the feeling that their own environment has been extended but not left behind. Without hint of chauvinistic malice, the border of 1818 seems ludicrous.

The average Quebecan does not have to change money or clear customs to miss this felicity; he has only to leave his province. If the mass media have prepared him superficially for the "North American way of life," English Canada nonetheless administers a rebuff. It refuses him full "Canadianness" and treats his language and culture with condescension or irritation. It thrusts him back on his parochial vigil ("notre maître, le passé")[1] or expects him to come to terms with Anglo-Saxon reality. It offers him a theory of liberty without concrete resonance, a cosmos where all particularity aside from "mass culture" is alien, a community he cannot share. Since he must survive, he stokes himself with patience or frustration; since he must live, he learns English or one of the dialectal versions of "joual-franglais."[2] A *mélange,* often too "pidgin" and amorphous for linguistic classification, becomes the mother tongue for his unspoken thoughts: he sits at home in a "chaise" but goes to a "djobbe" every morning. His experience has ill-equipped him to escape into the cheerful border cosmopolitanism of a Swiss or a Dutchman. Rather, it has counselled endurance and psychic withdrawal.

When the Quebecan travels south to the United States he is in no worse a predicament. If he visits, he is simply a foreigner; if he stays, he submits to rapid and remorseless assimilation. According to a recent poll by *MacLean's Magazine,* one-third of the Quebecans would favor joining the United States (with its promise of a better economic life), a greater proportion than in

[1]For accounts of this elusive and complex past, see Canon Lionel Groulx, *Notre maître le Passé* (Montreal, 1944); Gustave Lanctot, *Une nouvelle France inconnue* (Montreal, 1955); and Arthur R. M. Lower, *Canadians in the Making* (Toronto, 1958), pp. 1-92.

[2]"Joual" is French-Canadian for "cheval" and the word is used to designate local patois; "franglais" is the expression coined by Etiemble to describe the assault on French of English loan-words and constructions. Combined, this is the language spoken by many Quebecans, especially the workers.

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any other part of English Canada and a clear measure of the fragility of the Confederation.[3]

I

Transformed amid a thirty-year ferment from agricultural to urban, seigneurial to bourgeois, theocratic to secular, Quebecan society has also seen its traditions ground to folklore and its isolation abolished.[4] Poignantly, the local radio stations blare quiz and variety programs, soap operas, and commercial jingles ("Nous allons magasiner, magasiner chez Greenberg") reminiscent of the American prewar period. Pessimistic sociology discovers the inconsolable and the unemployed killing their pain with the opiate of the tavern or drowning aggressions in the thrill of the hockey game. The mass age descended upon a Quebec almost without defenses—a people without skepticism.

At first glance this mixed potion of surviving provincialism and gentle Americanization might seem irresistible. A worthy but historically condemned people was being put quietly to sleep. But the antithesis was being generated with the thesis. After all, the lyric bards of mass culture did teach French syntax while they sold shampoo. Dislocation and proletarianization of the agrarian poor, transformation of the *petite bourgeoisie* into middle classes with new wealth, secularization and nationalization of the elites—all posed barriers to the effects of the sedation.

The result has been a community wrenched apart: an upper intellectual stratum (monopolized within memory by the Church), in which a tiny but growing dogmatism of the Left, inspired from Paris, hurls its revolutionary barbs against all "Canadian" and "federalist" compromise; and a lower level, where people simply attempt under radically new conditions to adjust, as Péguy once put it, to "this hell of a life, this bitch of a modern society"—with the help of TV and Westerns. Meanwhile, in the traditional gulf between these classes, a new middle class has surged upward. Finding the obstacle of vested Anglo-Saxon capital in its way, it was bound to unfurl the banners of nationalism and, after 1960, to use a "modernizing" provincial government as the vehicle for its aspirations.

[3] *MacLean's Magazine*, November 1964. A previous poll found 13 per cent of Quebecans favoring independence.

[4] The pioneer description of this ferment is Everett C. Hughes, *French Canada in Transition* (Chicago, 1943), now reissued with a new preface but badly out of date. For various Canadian trends, including Quebec, see B. L. Blishen and others, editors, *Canadian Society: Sociological Perspectives* (New York, 1961).

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This description can hardly pretend to define the complexities of Quebecan history or sociology. Hopefully, it is an adequate preface for the understanding of contemporary radical stresses in Quebec. At this stage, it is useful to isolate four points for special attention.

1. The "classes" of French Canada are still polymorphous and in a state of vital transformation. However, there is still meager contact between the stable elites and the masses except through the paternalistic agency of the Church and, periodically, through the political machines. What the French call *encadrement* has not occurred.

2. The social spectrum of the province is distorted by the presence of a long-dominant English-speaking minority, centered in Montreal, and the preponderance of non-French industrial and financial empires, e.g., Aluminium of Canada.[5]

3. The Quebecan working class, where organized, is divided about three to one between locals with U.S. affiliations and those which are French and Catholic in spirit.[6] By and large, unionism is apolitical and oriented toward U.S. patterns, i.e., the Marxist heresy of "economism."

4. Social and physical transformation of the society appears to have created a particularly wide cleavage of attitude between the generation born since the depression and their elders.

In sum, present Quebecan nationalism, in various forms, receives maximum impetus from four groups: a part of the intellectual elite, the new *bourgeoisie,* certain segments of the *petite bourgeoisie* disadvantaged by modernization and unable to rise, and the urban youth, especially the students. The workers and farmers are as yet more preoccupied with economic questions and are little disposed to rush to the barricades for *Québec libre.*

II

It is possible to limit our investigation to Quebec, but a cursory glance will show that the entire country is involved. Though the Canadian confederation was formed in 1867, Canada did not receive its real release from the Empire until World War II. Even today, the "repatriation of the Constitution" remains an

[5]External control of the economy is a sore spot with virtually all Quebecans; it comes out even in the moderate discussion by Marcel Faribault, "Can French Canada Stand Alone?", *The Atlantic,* November 1964, pp. 135-139.

[6]See the brief description of labor history in Quebec by Jacques-Victor Morin, "Quelques points de repère historiques," *Parti Pris,* February 1965, pp. 7-12.

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issue. Consequently, burdened with vast distances, with a cumbersome federal structure designed initially to digest the French, and with residual Tory loyalties, the Anglo-Canadians have had only a generation to rationalize their own state—Quebec aside. Today, the Canadian polity is a fragile latticework of crisscrossing problems (federalism, party government, relations with the United States, relations with the Commonwealth), and the problem of the "State of Quebec" and French culture is only one of these. But it is at the core of the cruel dilemma that frustrates our northern neighbor in her search for a real image, a real vocation, and a real center of consciousness. To the Quebecan anguish of the stateless nation is added the Canadian malaise of the nationless state. What has not been solved in a hundred years is not likely to be solved overnight, even when time presses.

The gravity of the Quebec issue calls into question all that has been done or not been done since the joining of Upper and Lower Canada. Ostensibly, this issue is still political and negotiable, moderated by a precarious but growing fund of understanding on both sides and by the mediation of Lester Pearson's Liberal government. But in a very basic sense, as we have seen, it is an economic question posed by Quebec's explosion into the modern world and by the ambitions of her new middle classes. At its core, however, this is a moral problem involving instinctive dichotomies of affront and respect, denigration and dignity, alienation and community. It is conspicuously on the moral plane that the revolutionary leaven has begun to work. If cultural relations cannot be deftly handled, simple destruction of dialogue could sink the Confederation and launch Quebec impulsively into the uncertainties of new nationhood. Sensing this, the radical *indépendantiste* Left has made its most savage attacks on the wobbly bridges of citizenship that join the two communities. It has postulated the absolute dualism of "Canadian" and "Canadien," remembering perhaps that thousands of Christians in Asia Minor once slaughtered each other over the substitution of a vowel.

At the national level, Quebec has been more or less firmly tied to the Liberal Party since 1896. This party, in turn, depended heavily on its near-monopoly of Quebecan constituencies for its hegemonic possession of the federal government in the period 1921-1957.[7] Both tactically and doctrinally the Liberals made a

[7]With the exception of Mr. Bennett's Conservative government of 1930-1935.

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vocation of mediating between the two Canadas and between the new country and Westminster. This mutuality collapsed in 1958 when Quebec joined the English provinces in John Diefenbaker's landslide victory. But support for the Conservatives was tactical and transient, largely at the pleasure of the indigenous Union Nationale. Quebec could not be expected to stay in the camp of the party that was simultaneously most Tory and most Western. In the succeeding elections of 1962 and 1963 the Liberals recovered some of their votes, but many others went to M. Réal Caouette and his homegrown branch of the Social Credit Party (Socred), a movement of rural and right-wing discontent resembling French Poujadism.[8] Socred was not a constructive movement; it sent its mainly ill-equipped M.P.'s to Ottawa "simply to say no." The future of *créditisme* among the French was, to say the least, problematic—especially after Caouette split the party in 1963. Few would be willing to predict what the next election might bring.

Provincial politics in Canada has been designed to defy national trends (observers have noted that the real separation of powers occurs here), and Quebec is no exception. In Quebec the Liberals were decisively in the minority from the mid-thirties until recently,[9] and the Conservatives had disappeared. The czar of Quebec was Maurice Duplessis. He had forged a potent local party called the Union Nationale, cemented his reign with practical patronage of the most sordid variety, and confected an ideology of ruralism, isolationism, posturings against Ottawa, and petit-bourgeois values.[10] But in 1959 the master died, and no *patron* could be found to service the sputtering machine of his party. A rejuvenated Liberal Party led by "new men" like Jean Lesage, René Lévesque, and Eric Kierans came to power in 1960, and substantially increased its mandate in 1962. This new leadership was progressive, autonomist and "statist" in program; it represented the ideals of the rising French-Canadian business class which wanted to "repatriate the economy." Its most significant act was the nationalization of electric power; it campaigned with the slogan *Maîtres chez nous*. This dynamism, as well as a variety

[8]Concerning Caouette, Gérard Pelletier's description is apposite: "Réal Caouette makes his appeal to a remarkably wide-spread folk culture. He knows the popular imagery of Quebec to its depths . . . and moves in a narrow cosmos, the world of those Quebecans who populate our small towns." "Profil d'un démagogue," *Cité libre*, January 1963, p. 2.

[9]With the exception of a Liberal majority in 1939-1944.

[10]The Duplessis regime is well described in Herbert Furlong Quinn, *The Union Nationale: A Study in Quebec Nationalism* (Toronto, 1963).

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of flanking pressures, drove the Quebecan Liberals steadily closer to the ideology, if not the fact, of political separatism. The era of the "quiet revolution" was assured.

In Ottawa, the national Liberals were precariously back in power, promising a new flag and cultural commissions. But it is the exception rather than the rule that federal and provincial party leaders get on well with each other. These last years have been a trial for both Mr. Pearson and M. Lesage, the Premier of Quebec. Though they obviously cannot afford the luxury of capricious hostility, they are virtually prisoners of circumstance. Mr. Pearson leads a minority government which depends on Quebec for its life. M. Lesage must constantly show his constituents what he can extract from *les Canadians,* and he is challenged on the left of his own group by the more nationalist Lévesque.[11] The only provincial regime that Quebec will tolerate today is one which is, in the deepest sense, an opposition government. Consequently, there are Liberals and *Libéraux* in Canada.

In Quebec there is a third level of politics: the politics of separatism and independence. Scarcely visible to anyone looking at Canada broadly, the *indépendantistes* are nevertheless much more than a passing sociological curiosity. They are probably there to stay, and they *might* win. In the remainder of this essay we shall turn our attention to the genesis, progress and prospects of this movement.

III

At the outset, Quebecan "nationalism" was closely involved with the drastic social change taking place in the province—the rush to the cities, the breakup of static and confessional patterns of authority, and the shattering of isolation. In particular, there was the growth of a new secular elite, Catholic but anti-authoritarian. In 1950, in the glum depths of Duplessism, a segment of this new elite founded the monthly review *Cité libre* as a forum from which to attack the provincial regime. It gave battle to priestcraft, the static society, and the sedation of American mass culture, while reasserting the values of democracy and a modernized French-Canadian ethos. Inspired by the "personalism" of

[11]René Lévesque, the dynamic provincial Minister of Natural Resources, has won great popularity by his onslaughts on external capital and his dark threats of separatism. He is quoted as saying, "there must be a new Canada within five years or Quebec will quit Confederation. . . . First and foremost I am a Quebecan and second—with a rather growing doubt—a Canadian." In John Saywell, editor, *Canadian Annual Review for 1963* (Toronto, 1964), p. 59.

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the French philosopher and publicist Emmanuel Mounier, *Cité libre* became the conscience of progressivism in Quebec. It was joined in these efforts by the Montreal daily paper *LeDevoir.* Ten years passed before the democrats could savor their victory. By that time a nationalism much more strident and positive than the venal Arcadia of Duplessis had taken form.

The *Citélibristes* were never nationalists; their conception was to urge biculturalism on the English and democracy on the French. Today, men like Gérard Pelletier, presently director of the large daily *La Presse,* and Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, a professor and political writer, are among the most fervent disciples of "Canadian understanding" and have become favorite targets for the abuse of the radicals. Nevertheless, this is really where the intellectual ferment started. It is not the first time that progressivism has parted company with prudence.

The first avowedly separatist association in modern Quebec was Raymond Barbeau's Alliance Laurentienne, founded in 1957. As the name implies, it arose on the political Right, its scheme of action was corporatist as opposed to Anglo-Saxon individualism, and its utopia was a mystical, rurally-inspired "Laurentie," where the French could save their souls together. Though the events of 1960 outpaced the AL, its demise fed other, more aggressive movements.

The Liberal victory of June 1960, in effect, set in motion a whole train of nationalist activity. In August the veteran socialist Raoul Roy created his Action Socialiste pour l'Indépendance du Québec, moderate-Left and separatist in tendency, now defunct. A rather broad-based and heterogeneous organization, the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN) came to life in the following month. Its leader was the *petit bourgeois* firebrand Marcel Chaput, whose voluntary fasts and pressure-group tactics attracted considerable publicity. After a disordered career of over a year, the RIN split between its leftist and rightist elements, the former keeping the name of the movement and orienting themselves slightly to the left of Lesage's program, the latter following Chaput into the Parti Républicain du Québec (PRQ). It was among the leadership of the RIN that the word "revolution" was apparently pronounced for the first time.

Most Quebecans were shocked when in March 1963 the first bombs went off in mail boxes and revolution became a momentary reality. These violent militants belonged to a Front

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de Libération du Québec (FLQ), obviously modeled after the Algerian revolutionaries. Though the terrorists were apprehended and sentenced to heavy prison terms, the movement regrouped itself, adding a "liberation army" (ALQ) and, inevitably, a journal, *La Cognée* (Quebecans love most of all the war of words). Other separatist groups rebuked the tactic of terrorism.

Up to this point the most notable development was the radicalization of the independence movement: it is a long way from the cooperatives of "Laurentie" to the socialist anti-colonialism of Castro and Ben Bella. Yet this was perhaps a natural evolution in a world where nationalism is found predominantly on the Left. The separatist pressure now welled up in the urban milieu, especially Montreal, where the symbols of Anglo-Saxon dominance leaped before the eye: the advertising, the employment structure, the painful disparity between the wealthy "Anglo" districts of the west of the city and the crowded "Franco" slum areas of the east. But it was not the journeyman who joined hands with his oppressed brothers of the underdeveloped world; it was the angry intellectuals who were determined to forge this *fraternité de la misère* for him. Coteries and journals sprang up like mushrooms, including the extraordinary *Parti Pris,* founded in the autumn of 1963.

At the turn of 1964 Chaput's PRQ disintegrated and many of its members joined the Front Républicain pour l'Indépendance (FRI), which itself was moving to the Left. The RIN now announced its intention of becoming a pro-separatist electoral party, which disappointed the revolutionary aspirations of some radical well-wishers. Meanwhile, in July 1963, a new Parti Socialist Québécois (PSQ), with chiefly labor support, had formed an electoral entente with the traditional socialist movement of Canada, the New Democratic Party (formerly the CCF). The PSQ was to be free to go its own way at the provincial level while supporting the NDP in federal elections; this harmony implied a rejection of separatism by the French and an endorsement of equal recognition for the two cultures by the English. The precarious arrangement broke down in 1964, when the English unionists could provide no more than lip service to the ideal, thereby inspiring radical hopes that labor might finally be won for the Marxist-nationalist cause.[12] But for

[12]Concerning the PSQ, see Jean-Marc Piotte, Paul Chamberland, Roger Nantel, "Chronique du PSQ," in *Parti Pris,* March 1964, pp. 45-50.

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the time being, labor preferred to temporize with Lesage and the provincial Liberals.

Middle-class separatism was also on the rise in 1964. Well-implanted groups like the Organisation de la Jeunesse Chrétienne and the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste—where crosscurrents of the *nouvelle bourgeoisie* and *Notre maître le passé* meet with some confusion—moved close to the positions of state sovereignty and unilingualism for Quebec. Their members participated in the show of hostility that greeted Elizabeth II during her visit to Quebec city in October 1964. Moreover, the two groups issued manifestoes endorsing Canadian binationality which the Lesage government could not ignore, even as it struggled to keep the "peaceful revolution" on the track.

At the beginning of 1965, then, the virulence of Quebecan nationalism had increased markedly in all sectors despite the Pearson government's sincere efforts to find political solutions acceptable to both English and French constituencies. Movements and journals, some revolutionary and others merely separatist, multiplied in the intellectual demimonde of Montreal. In good Gallic fashion much of their energy was spent in doctrinal quarrel and tendentious name-calling; but if, for the present, this betokened a deep gulf between thought and action, it also revealed a rich lode of pent-up fury.

IV

By far the most interesting of these ventures is the review *Parti Pris,* now in its second year of publication.[13] Deductive, ideological, abstract almost to distraction, *Parti Pris* is both the measure of the chasm between the Left intellectuals and the masses of Quebec and, at the same time, the spearhead of the province's first self-consciously revolutionary generation.[14] These men are young, they carry a staggering amount of reading in their head, and they seethe with the vituperation of the socialist and anti-colonialist message. *Quoi de plus beau que d'être jeunes et de lutter pour une cause!* Jean-Marie Domenach writes sympathetically of this magazine's pages of "belle sincérité";[15] I must confess to finding its *saeva indignatio* no less impressive.

[13]"A monthly political and cultural review," 3374 rue Saint-Denis, Montreal.

[14]"Some have taken us to task for our philosophical language . . . but our review is not primarily addressed to the urban and rural workers—because it is a review." J.-M. Piotte, "Autocritique de parti pris," *Parti Pris,* September 1964, p. 40.

[15]Domenach has sensitively treated the Quebecan New Left in his "Le Canada français: controverse sur un nationalisme," *Esprit,* February 1965, pp. 290-328.

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We are able to know a good deal about the *partiprisistes,* as well as what they stand for, because they are insatiably driven to share the confidences of their life and political formation. According to the "autocriticism" of one author, Jean-Marc Piotte:

> We were, on the average, twenty-four years old. We had been brought up in bourgeois or working-class families and had studied in our Catho-Cana-French institutions: secondary school, *collège, école normale,* university. We had a year or two of work under our belt and, for some of us, a couple of years of marriage. Not a very original experience, I admit. We hadn't lived. . . .[16]

Piotte goes on to explain that the academic backgrounds are mostly in philosophy and literature ("We have tried to get scientifically trained people into our group, but without success.") and that "some of the fellows remain essentially novelists and poets." All of this *shows*—whether in tortuously reasoned Hegelian analyses of politics or in staccato outbursts from the heart. Paul Chamberland is a good instance of both. In his outpourings the verbal bullets fly:

> je suis cubain je suis nègre-blanc québécois fleur-de-lys et conseil-des-arts je suis colère dans toutes les tavernes dans toutes les vomissures depuis 200 ans je n'écoute plus les sermons des curés les pastorales-annales-valeurs-éternelles.[17]

Then he rushes into intellectual pirouettes that would make any proletarian jaw drop:

> The contribution of scientific analyses of reality is incontestable because it creates the instrumentality necessary for our gradual mastery over reality. It is thus *operational knowledge*: by its nature it demands to be subordinated to a superior knowledge which obeys completely different finality from that of objectivity.[18]

This is simply Chamberland's manner of saying that technicity *à l'américaine* is degrading and sterile; that man—especially exploited, "pre-rational" man—is the source of ideas that affirm his dignity, and that he, not the instruments, projects and creates his finality: a Hegelian gloss upon Marx.

In fact the shadow of Hegel lurks decisively in the background of *Parti Pris'* Quebecan ideology, especially in the form of three scenarios developed from the *Phenomenology of Mind.* The first is simply that of the primary socially conscious act of homicide: the Canadian majority is "pursuing the death of the minority."[19]

[16]Piotte, *op. cit.,* p. 39.
[17]"Extracts from *L'Afficheur hurle," Parti Pris,* December 1964, p. 53.
[18]De la damnation à la liberté," *ibid.,* Summer 1964, p. 53.
[19]*Ibid.,* p. 62.

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Of more consequence are the incessant images of "lordship and bondage" and of the "unhappy consciousness."[20] Hegel ascribes to the bondsman a more fruitful humanity than to the master, and these young French-Canadians are delighted to receive the confirmation of their own feelings. As for the "unhappy consciousness," which Hegel associated with the early development of Christianity, the *Parti Pris* writers see here the vision of their own maimed society, quiescent, priest-ridden, hoping for otherworldly redemption.

In the dogmatics of *Parti Pris,* the ontology of Hegel is stirred into a Marxian-existentialist-Freudian stew. Words like "alienation," "ambiguity," "Manicheeanism," "the Other," "absurdity" abound. So do metaphorical or literal applications of the symbols of Mother (the Church, federalism, repressed sexuality) and Father (God, Duplessis, Ottawa),[21] as well as an invective as rich as Lenin's but going far beyond his Victorian vocabulary. Opponents are invariably branded with sexually perverse labels: federalists are "fédérastes" practicing "onanisme politique," and M. Maurice Lamontagne, a Liberal federalist and author of an excellent work on the subject, is guilty of discovering the "32 positions du fédéralisme coopératif."[22] It is sometimes quite humorous, though enveloped in deadly serious outer wrappings.

Other favorite targets are Claude Ryan, director of *Le Devoir,* Pelletier and Trudeau ("Peter Elliott" or "Troudo")—all miscreant bourgeois, capitalist lackeys, cosmopolitans and traitors.[23] Just as the English Canadian is "le Canadian" (when he is not "l'Autre"), so the system of government is "la democracy":[24] the French language must not be soiled by any contact with such a monumental deceit.

Evidently, *Parti Pris* inhales the intellectualism that has been at times fashionable in Paris, and it is not surprising that these collegians should have found comfort in Sartre, the Marxist classics, texts of modern psychology and manifestoes of decoloniza-

[20]See J. B. Baillie's translation of G. W. F. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* (London, 1931), pp. 234-240, 251-267.

[21]See especially Hubert Aquin. "Le corps mystique," *Parti Pris,* February 1964, pp. 30-36; and Pierre Lefebvre, "Psychisme et valeurs nationales," *ibid.,* Summer 1964, pp. 6-18.

[22]Lefebvre, "Les 32 positions du fédéralisme coopératif on le kâmasoûtra de l'Hon. Lamontagne," *ibid.,* Summer 1964, pp. 168-173.

[23]Treated roughly in *ibid.,* pp. 161-173, *passim.* Trudeau is especially fair game because of his Franco-Irish descent.

[24]See especially Pierre Maheu, "Leur democracy," *ibid.,* March 1964, pp. 5-24.

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tion—works that must surely have enjoyed the status of "forbidden books" until very recently in Quebec. They are now molding Quebec to fit this reality that they have been deducing. How near to success can they come?

Are the collaborators in *Parti Pris* the fledgling Lenins and Trotskys of their culture? Is their utopia of revolution wildly romantic and unrealistic? According to a recent interpreter of this problem, utopia and revolution work at cross-purposes, the one representing solipsistic failure and the other collective triumph: ". . . the myth of the Ideal City gets 'frozen' in utopia through auto-conceptualization and auto-intellectualization, while it becomes 'heated up' in the collective consciousness."[25] At *Parti Pris* there is something of both attitudes. There is auto-intellectualism in abundance and small commerce with the collective consciousness; on the other hand, there is a resolution not to become entangled in utopian fussiness of detail—a kind of mythic Sorelian confidence in the transformations that must inevitably accompany (1) independence and (2) the revolution. The questions must remain suspended, then, until we examine these theories more closely.

The young intellectuals of *Parti Pris,* if abstract, are also deeply self-critical and open-minded concerning the relation of their theorizing to social reality. The "autocriticisms" mentioned above appeared for the most part in their September 1964 "manifesto" number, undoubtedly as a consequence of suggestions by more practical comrades of the separatist Left. Hereafter, *Parti Pris* resolved to gather statistics as well as ideas, to go among the people, and insofar as possible to establish the base of a popular movement for revolutionary education and agitation. In reply to M. Domenach's "sweet-sour" analysis of their ambitions, they apprised the readers of *Esprit* that M. Piotte had been at work organizing in the countryside.[26] They have also set in motion a "Club Parti Pris" with weekly study groups and have at least sketched the outlines of a broader "Mouvement Parti Pris"; they have published such practical information as helpful tips for demonstrators ("take children if you are fairly sure it won't get rough" and "don't get trapped between two parked cars")[27] and

[25]Roger Mucchiélli, *Le Mythe de la Cité idéale* (Paris, 1960), p. 35.

[26]See *PP's* rejoinder to Domenach in *Esprit,* February 1965, p. 330. Also, Jacques Poisson in *Parti Pris,* April 1965, pp. 49-53.

[27]Pierre Charbonneau, "Conseils pratiques aux manifestants," *Parti Pris,* January 1965, pp. 77-78.

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a series of not-very-statistical studies on the Church, the media, education, and the like. Somehow, though, they are more impressive in dogma than in social science, and their issues have recently grown a trifle duller as a result.

V

How can one describe the world that MM. Piotte, Chamberland, Maheu, Lefebvre, and the other *partiprisistes* perceive?

Canada is a false entity, imposed originally by conquest, perpetuated in Quebec by the complacency of the "clerico-petite-bourgeoisie" and from the exterior by the combined domination of Toronto and Wall Street. Though better fed, better educated, better satisfied than other colonized peoples, the Quebecan is also better duped—duped by his own traitors of Church and State and by the meaningless falsehood of justice and democracy which the Anglo-Saxons and federalist well-wishers use to enslave him.[28]

The French-Canadian is an alienated man—in the Marxist sense—trapped in a political culture which makes no show of respecting his dignity and could not, by the nature of things, even if it wished to.[29] He is also alienated from his creative and collective capacities to the extent that he cleaves to quaint mythologies of the past and refuses to recognize himself as belonging to the industrial and socialist future. Moreover, the whole of Quebec is a "proletarianized nation" by comparison with the vast English-speaking populations surrounding it.[30] Consequently, independence and revolution, socialism and nationalism are inseparable. Independence without revolution is neo-colonialism. Socialism without nationalism is utopia. The Quebecan people, because of their collective economic and psychological suffering, have an aptitude to become the unique socialist nation of North America.[31]

[28]E.g., Paul Chamberland, "Les contradictions de la révolution tranquille," *ibid.*, February 1964, p. 7: "The consciousness of the average Quebecan is steeped in the lukewarm vapor of the North American aquarium, encouraging that *ambiguity* which, by dissolving all radical action, permits the well-off to disguise the manipulation of their interests with the most disinterested protestations."

[29]See, in general, Lefebvre's "Psychisme," *op. cit.*

[30]Chamberland, "Contradictions," *op. cit.*, p. 16: "The French-Canadian group seems integrally 'proletarianized' in contrast to a capitalism (Canadian and Yankee) that is basically foreign."

[31]Chamberland, "De la damnation," *op. cit.*, p. 85: "Only the social and economic liberation of the popular classes can bring about national emancipation and the construction of a new, authentically Quebecan society."

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The worldwide anti-colonial revolution is a vast and inexorable pattern to which Quebec is closely linked.[32] The concepts of "dispossession" and "depersonalization," borrowed from the French ethnologist Jacques Berque, are crucial links with the experience of the underdeveloped world. Moreover, events like the Algerian and Cuban revolutions are noble struggles in themselves, instances of man's enduring capacity to will his destiny against the arid technological power of Western exploitation. Still, one must deal with the local facts and not be tempted into blind imitation of other experiences.[33] Quebec has much to learn from Ben Bella and Castro; but she has much to learn about herself, too. She is "underdeveloped" with regard to self-knowledge.

Although it might seem at first glance that the various exploiters of Quebec had little in common—Yankee money vs. Ontarian money, Duplessis vs. Ottawa, *Citélibristes* vs. Diefenbakerites—the truth is that their objectives have been the same and their differences are merely illustrations of capitalist contradiction. The rise of Lesage's *nouvelle bourgeoisie* to provincial power has been a major fact. Since it is expected that the dynamism of this group may drive Quebec to virtual or literal independence, socialists should collaborate tactically with this powerful force and urge it leftward. In essence, however, the new middle class is an enemy which will seek to carry through only the "quiet revolution" and then renew the traditional subjugation of the urban and rural proletariat.[34] A stimulation of class consciousness among the latter can produce the objective conditions for seizing the revolution when the time is ripe.

Though rightist and petit-bourgeois in mentality, the movements of Caouette and Chaput demonstrate a progressive sentiment of revolt among the Quebecan masses.[35] The danger to

[32]"Editorial: De l'homopoliticus à nous," *Parti Pris*, Summer 1964, p. 3: "We live still in the age of nations, and perhaps at the most decisive moment of that age. . . ." If there is any subject that *PP* shuns like the plague, it is the matter of proletarian contacts with English Canada.

[33]See Michel van Schendel, "La maladie infantile du Québec," *ibid.*, March 1964, p. 30: "Quebec's case is very different. . . . It is just capitalist enough to forget it is colonized and just colonized enough to forget it is a victim of capitalism."

[34]Chamberland, "Contradictions," *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15: "The nationalism of the Lesage government is a *bourgeois nationalism*. . . . In the long run this nationalism is the enemy of the nation as a whole."

[35]Van Schendel, "Maladie," *op. cit.*, p. 39: ". . . Social Credit, far from being reactionary, is instead the first intuitive and integral expression of mass revolutionary sentiment."

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the revolution in Quebec is not on the radical Right; it is rather from the bourgeois progressives.

The procedures of the socialist revolution depend greatly on the evolution of the new *bourgeoisie*. Whereas it was first hoped that the masses could rise and achieve independence for themselves, it is now clear that wishful spontaneity is no substitute for organization. "Our role," writes Pierre Maheu, "must be active, and I think that three words can define it: demand, denounce, and radicalize."[36] Farther on, the author remarks: "A revolutionary Party would be . . . formed of militants and structured into cells where each man would have a precise role to play."[37] Two possibilities then are suggested. Either the Lesages and Lévesques will carry Quebec forward into independence, in which case the radicals, properly prepared, will have only to perform the socialist part of the revolution; or the *bourgeoisie* will hang back uncertainly on the brink as opinion grows tense and polarized, in which case their leading role will collapse and fall to the radicals.[38]

Controlled violence can advance the revolution by forcing people to take sides. Electoral competition is, however, a vain technique, for it accepts the rules of the game written by the adversaries, whose campaign treasuries are glutted:[39] anyway, "the revolution is not made with alms."[40] The terrorism of the FLQ was, however, unpopular and premature; the expected mass support never materialized. Guevara and other sophisticated revolutionaries had already counselled against this tactic.[41]

The content, like the timing, of the revolution is difficult to describe. It will probably be neither apocalyptic nor entirely pacific. Violence is to be valued only as a last resort, but it cannot be shunned.[42] Quebec will not come into its revolutionary maturity by way of parliamentary evolution, because the new middle class will not allow it. A radical disruption of political forms is required.

Once the revolution is secure, Quebec has the possibility of

[36]Pierre Maheu, "Notes pour une politisation," *Parti Pris,* September 1964, p. 51.
[37]*Ibid.,* p. 53.
[38]Chamberland, "De la damnation," *op. cit.,* p. 30, in practically the same words. More explicitly, in "Manifeste 64-65," *Parti Pris,* September 1964, p. 10: "The struggle against the national bourgeoisie cannot really begin until that bourgeoisie itself gets sovereign power in the state which is its incarnation."
[39] Chamberland, "Bilan pour un combat," *ibid.,* September 1964, p. 33.
[40]André Major, "Une situation révolutionnaire," *ibid.,* March 1964, p. 52.
[41]Chamberland, "Bilan," *op. cit.,* p. 27.
[42]See Maheu, "Notes," *op. cit.,* p. 54.

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evolving into socialism without the merciless and dictatorial rigor of other countries, because of her already high standard of living. Foreign capital will, of course, be expropriated. If independent Quebec cannot negotiate equitable commercial arrangements with her natural markets, she will turn her efforts toward the East and the ex-colonial world. This is where her friends are likely to be, in any case. She will roll up her sleeves and practice as much autarky as is necessary; the area is rich in untapped resources and viable with or without help from the outside, given the benefits of dedicated citizenship and a socialist economy.[43]

VI

The foregoing is as close to an honest presentation of the doctrines of *Parti Pris* as I can achieve. Many specifics—about laicity, formal education, worker participation—have gone unmentioned. But the basic core of the program has been set down. Again we must raise the question: is this reverie or realism? It is, as one might suspect, pure reverie at the moment; even the *partiprisistes,* in their autocritical mood, do not deny this. "Nothing," an editorial of February 1964 tells us, "is more problematic than a Quebecan revolution, nothing is more fragile and vulnerable than its premises."[44] In September the progress report stated: "The results will take a long time to be felt; the task is immense and our means are next to nothing. Above all, we must have perseverance, and probably also a kind of madness."[45] This particular review, again by its own admission, prints 4000 copies a month and has 800 subscribers; the population of French Canada is about five and a half million, many of whom are watching John Wayne and drinking Coca-Cola, working for English-speaking bosses and demanding American wages. One million of them read Gérard Pelletier's *La Presse.*

To be sure, *Parti Pris* is not alone. It is supplemented by *Révolution Québécoise, Socialisme* 64/65, and other journals.[46] It inhabits a spectrum where organized movements like FRI, PSQ

[43]*Ibid.,* pp. 48-49, for all these points.
[44]Editorial, "Nous avons choisi la révolution," *Parti Pris,* February 1964, p. 3.
[45]"Manifeste 64-65," *op. cit.,* p. 17.
[46]Regarding *Socialisme 64/65,* a *partiprisiste* (Piotte, in "Autocritique," *op. cit.,* p. 37) has written: "I've been somewhat disappointed by the new review . . . [but] I have confidence in the men who run it." The editors are described as "professors and labor leaders," and the journal is, indeed, tame by comparison. For its general tone, see Emile Boudreau, Jacques Dofny, Roland Martel, Marcel Rioux, "Matériaux pour la théorie et la pratique d'un socialisme québécois," *Socialisme 64,* Spring 1964, pp. 5-23.

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and RIN operate, however precariously. Underground, there is the FLQ. There are the bourgeois "binationalist" organizations like OJC and SSJB and the frustrated *créditistes* of the hinterlands, some of whom lean toward autonomy. There is the prudent autonomism, the "quiet revolutionism" of the Lesage government itself, now manifesting itself in the demand of M. Paul Gérin-Lajoie to sign foreign treaties. Spread out in full array, the separatist army, broadly described, is considerable and more likely to grow than wane as self-consciousness buffets Quebec.

The same cannot be said for the revolution so cherished by *Parti Pris*. While it is likely that the French-speaking worker may more and more abandon his ties with American unionism and seek structures more in conformity with political trends in his province, he has probably long since passed the stage where the colonial uprisings hold any meaning for him. His specific demands are likely to continue to be more economic than nationalist, and he is probably not to be won by any movement preaching austerity and autarky. Because the economic structures of North America are so incredibly complementary it is unlikely that the Quebecan labor leadership could contemplate their disintegration with much equanimity. In the agricultural sector similar conditions obtain; marches on Quebec could be a prelude to *jacquerie,* but not to guerrilla warfare. And nothing will make the bombings popular, even in tempestuous Montreal. The young radicals have, indeed, "an immense task." A secularized Quebec can afford, and indeed needs, intellectuals of the Left, if only to restore a part of its cultural heritage that has been long in limbo. There is no reason why Montreal should not be a Paris, even if it will probably not become Havana.

Gérard Pelletier, in an article intended for American consumption,[47] has described the reasons why Quebec's situation is not "colonial"; (1) Quebec controls the educational system of the province; (2) Quebec enjoys political and civil liberties comparable to those of the most advanced countries, and could even secede from Confederation if she desired; (3) Quebec is highly industrialized; and (4) Quebec enjoys a high standard of living. These points are subject to attack only on a certain plane of relativity, for example, when compared with Ontario; by and large they are convincing. Even M. Domenach, whose breast is

[47]Gerard Pelletier, "The Trouble with Quebec," *The Atlantic,* November 1964, pp. 115-118. For *Cité libre's* rebuttal of *Parti Pris,* see Charles Taylor, "La révolution futile," August-September 1964, pp. 10-22.

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torn by two souls, finds them so.[48] Nevertheless, even though these advantages exist, they do not and cannot solve Quebec's moral problems. North American abundance and civil liberty are precious: Quebec deserves its share of the first, and it is thanks to men like Pelletier and Trudeau that the second is becoming a reality. But the Chamberlands and Maheus—if we, for the moment, dismiss their revolutionary dreams—have helped to teach us that French Canada, partly through our fault, is indignant and effervescent, that it now possesses a culture that can shock, amaze and enrich us,[49] and that it neither can nor should be bought off. The negotiations should be between equals.

M. Domenach finds the tortuous nationalism of *Parti Pris* basically undemocratic because it utterly rejects a preformed society that is, despite faults, regulated by the values of human dignity. He has indeed gone deftly to the heart of one of the dilemmas of radical socialism in Quebec. It is difficult to know whether the *partiprisistes* have fallen into this pit, as Domenach suggests in his very lucid essay; I do believe that they have tried to avoid it. Give us our community now, they have argued, not a soulless cosmopolitanism void of content, and we will show you how well we can hold up our end when it comes time for the nations to agree. Today it is the nations, in their miracle of self-discovery, that can best resist the depredations of the machine, of technique, of human alienation. This argument is impressive, but one is reminded of Fichte's *Closed Commercial State* where justice reigned but the richness of the world was suspended until the day of universal equity—until utopia. Domenach may have been thinking of this example.

Perhaps this essay has been unfair to *Parti Pris*. If they are young, they are above board. If they are abstract, they wish they were more practical. If they want the revolution, they also want the attention of M. Domenach, and they admit it; in the words of Piotte: ". . . I think we were unconsciously wishing to be recognized by the intellectuals of the Left."[50] MM. Lamontagne and Trudeau can probably survive their taunts, Quebec can probably survive their revolution, Canada can probably survive their sedition; and it is good to feel that, amid infantile maladies, an old culture is finally coming of age.

[48]Domenach, *op. cit.*, p. 315.
[49]For a recent study of this culture, see Edmund Wilson's *O Canada: An American's Notes on Canadian Culture* (New York, 1965).
[50]Piotte, "Autocritique," *op. cit.*, p. 40.

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MILITARY PROSPECTS IN VIETNAM

by Bryce F. Denno

IF and when opposing sides in Vietnam negotiate, they will bring to the conference table different assessments of a military situation which—unless things change drastically from the present*—should be difficult to evaluate.

The war in Vietnam lacks almost all the ordinary criteria used to judge success or failure in conventional war. There are no front lines marking advance or retreat. Comparison of casualties is suspect because estimates of enemy casualties stem usually from rough approximation. The Viet Cong habitually carry off their dead, as well as wounded, probably to conceal losses as much as to maintain morale. Prisoners and defectors are surprisingly few on either side. Despite the headlines, there has been nothing in a decade resembling a major battle to dramatize a trend in military fortunes. Everyone agrees that popular support is the most valid indicator of success in a war of insurgency. But it is difficult to measure such support in Vietnam.

I

Yet appraisals of the military situation must and are being made as a basis for future action, be it negotiation or further fighting. Their variety reflects the uncertainties on which they are based.

One appraisal holds that the Saigon government faces imminent military defeat. It finds expression in assertions such as: "Time is running out in Vietnam" and "Of course North Vietnam and China spurn negotiation, except on their terms, because they see victory within their grasp." Articulating the view of many, both here and abroad, Walter Lippmann asked recently "whether the military miracle can be worked, whether the Saigon government, on the verge of defeat in a civil war, can win over and pacify the village people of South Vietnam?" Some even go so far as to compare the situation in Vietnam today with that on the eve of Dienbienphu.

How valid is this comparison? In the spring of 1954, when Viet Minh forces were massing ominously around beleaguered Dienbienphu, the French military forces in Vietnam—including loyal Vietnamese units fighting under the tricolor—outnumbered

*EDITOR'S NOTE: This article was written in April 1965.

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their enemy by a ratio of about 1.3 to 1. The French Air Forces in the Far East consisted of less than 450 planes of all types. This air force did not permit the French to move large forces rapidly to threatened areas, to supply adequately large, isolated forces, such as those in Dienbienphu, or to provide sustained close air support to ground units at critical times.

By contrast, the ratio today between the government's armed forces and the Viet Cong is 4 to 1. The influx of U.S. combat forces, Marine and Army, is freeing substantial numbers of Vietnamese guarding U.S. installations for action against the Viet Cong. Further, the government has at its disposal about as many helicopters as the French had total aircraft in 1954. With available airlift and airfields, large government ground forces can be moved to threatened areas almost any place in the Delta or the coastal regions of the Central Highlands in a matter of hours, or at most, days. Fighter aircraft of the U.S. Navy and Air Force, as well as the Vietnamese Air Force, are adding a dimension to the current war that the French only dreamed of exploiting.

More significant than the numerical superiority of government forces over the Viet Cong is their decided advantage in combat capability, especially in the case of regular units. Viet Cong full-time, "hard core" regulars are organized primarily in battalions. They have a few regimental headquarters with rudimentary communication, medical, supply and transport units which, on occasion, coordinate and support two or more battalions in operations. According to Secretary McNamara, Viet Cong regulars number from 38,000 to 46,000 men. Occasionally, one hears reports of Viet Cong artillery. However, present evidence suggests the enemy is armed almost entirely with weapons that men can carry—rifles, pistols, machine guns, mortars and recoilless rifles. This is not the case in regular Army units of the Republic of Vietnam which are organized in four corps and nine divisions. The divisions, comparable to U. S. divisions in many ways, are equipped with modern artillery and can be supported by armored personnel carriers and tanks. They were originally designed to counter a Korea-style attack across the 17th Parallel in a conventional war.

The marked asymmetry between the lightly-armed regular battalions and regiments of the Viet Cong and the heavily-armed government divisions gives the Vietnamese war its distinctive character. The French authority, Galula, describes it as a contest between a fly and a lion in which "the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow

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and the lion cannot fly." It is the familiar tale of power against dexterity—the stag against the wolf pack, the cobra against the mongoose, the bull against the bull fighter. Time and again, irresistible government ground units, supported by artillery and air, lunge at back-pedaling, side-stepping Viet Cong units. Back come the Viet Cong in counterattack, slashing at the flanks and rear of their opponent, avoiding direct encounter. When taking the initiative, the Viet Cong make sudden, short-lived attacks, often at night and usually in overwhelming strength.

II

This is the familiar pattern of guerrilla warfare which the Viet Minh adopted in 1947 after their abortive attempt to drive the French from Vietnam by conventional military operations had failed. In his writings, General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of the Viet Minh army, discusses the reasons for this decision and emphasizes that the Viet Minh had no choice but to resort to guerrilla warfare. The decision was made because they lacked the strength to engage the French conventionally, *not* because they considered guerrilla action to be a more effective road to military victory.

Mao Tse-tung, as well as Giap, has stressed time and again that warfare conducted exclusively, or mainly, by guerrilla action is an interim phase of a national war of liberation against modern armed forces. It is a period during which the "People's Army" pursues two objectives concurrently: the erosion of enemy strength and the buildup of conventional forces. Companies of full-time soldiers organize into battalions, battalions into regiments and regiments into divisions. When they complete this cycle, the fly has developed the knockout punch needed to win. To achieve victory, communist conventional forces, in conjunction with the continuing guerrilla effort, must seek out the conventional forces of the enemy and defeat them in conventional battles. Only this final effort, says Giap, can achieve decisive results. By way of illustration, he points out that the Viet Minh achieved their first *major* victories only after they had committed divisions against the French.

This is the classic evolution of revolutionary warfare according to the master, Mao Tse-tung, and the pupil, General Giap. Since General Giap undoubtedly directs the current strategy of the

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Viet Cong from Hanoi, the principles he expounds are of more than academic interest today.

III

Of course, there can be exceptions to this "normal" evolution of guerrilla warfare into conventional war for the decisive phase. Under favorable circumstances, guerrillas could achieve victory without recourse to conventional war. Giap concedes this just as he would agree that it is possible for a developing country to skip the capitalist stage in the classic communist formula of political evolution through the stages of pre-capitalism, capitalism, socialism and communism. It is entirely conceivable that the Viet Cong could achieve military victory with their current military forces if the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam were to disintegrate from within—as did the armies of Chiang Kai-shek during the Chinese Civil War. History is full of examples of this phenomenon and the signs of impending disintegration are familiar and clear. Defection of units, especially large units, is one such sign. The defection of the Chinese Nationalist 184th (Yunan) division to the communist side in June of 1946, for instance, was a significant portent of future disaster.

But there have been no such portents in Vietnam. In recent years, not so much as a squad of the regular Army of Vietnam has gone over to the enemy as a unit. Not a single aviator of the Vietnamese Air Force has flown north to desert. True, there have been defections of units up to platoon size among paramilitary forces such as the popular forces, a local militia sponsored by the government. But even these have been rare.

Another sign of deterioration in an army is the defection of high-ranking officers whose positions often afford them the opportunity to recognize impending defeat long before the rank and file. In February 1965 the State Department published a White Paper entitled "Aggression from the North." It described the case of Major Tran Quoc Dan, former Chief of Staff of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment, who defected to government forces on February 11, 1963. When this writer met Dan shortly after his defection, one thing was obvious: a compelling reason for Dan's action was his conviction that the Viet Cong could not win in Vietnam. Can anyone recall the defection of an officer of the rank of major in the Armed Forces of South Vietnam—despite the many coups involving military officers which have placed the losers in physical jeopardy?

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A traditional indicator of military morale since time immemorial, in regular or irregular units, is the desertion rate. Compared to U.S. standards, the desertion rates within the Republic of Vietnam's military establishment have been high—but fairly consistent. There has been no rising trend of the sort one would expect in a force which senses impending defeat. In fact, current desertion rates in the government's paramilitary forces, where standards of discipline are less strict than in the regular military establishment, are lower today than a year ago.

Statistics alone cannot reflect fully the state of morale of the Armed Forces of Vietnam. American visitors to Vietnam and our advisors on the ground continue to praise the attitude of the Vietnamese fighting men in the field who ask only that their will to fight be judged by their performance in battle and not by the output of Saigon rumor mills.

In short, there is no convincing evidence that the Army of Vietnam, supported as it is by a battle-seasoned Air Force and Navy, would collapse internally under the pressure of Viet Cong guerrilla warfare alone. If the Viet Cong are to defeat this force, they must do it the hard way, as the Viet Minh defeated the French—by conventional battle.

IV

But 1965 is not 1954 when the Viet Minh were able to employ four divisions and some 200 artillery pieces against Dienbienphu alone. Today the Viet Cong have no divisions and apparently no artillery, at least not in significant numbers. This does not mean that they lack a capability to conduct conventional warfare. In January 1963, at Ap Bac, a Viet Cong "hard core" battalion ignored the Mao Tse-tung guerrilla dictum: "When the enemy attacks, we retreat." This unit traded savage blows with numerically superior government forces supported by artillery and combat aviation. Defying all attempts to dislodge it from strongly-intrenched positions, the battalion held its ground until it was ready to withdraw, intact, at night. Early in 1965, a Viet Cong regiment invaded Binhgia, a community forty miles southeast of Saigon. It retreated only after a murderous three-day battle. In April, in a circle of hills west of Tam Ky in the central highlands province of Quang Tin, a force, reportedly consisting of three Viet Cong battalions, successfully withstood an attack by government forces in combat reminiscent of World War II and Korea.

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Actions such as these invariably inspire speculation that the Viet Cong are entering the critical phase of insurgency—conventional warfare. This interpretation could be correct. Certainly, the enemy has for several years possessed the ability to wage conventional war with his regular battalions. But is it likely that the outnumbered, outgunned, undersupplied Viet Cong regulars would deliberately engage government forces in a type of combat which places them at a decided disadvantage?

The experience of the Viet Minh in the war against the French suggests otherwise. By early 1951, after four years of essentially guerrilla warfare, General Giap felt that he had developed enough strength to meet the French on conventional battlefields. Accordingly, in January of that year he hurled two of his newly-organized divisions against French regulars in the open countryside near Hanoi. The combination of French firepower and Viet Minh inexperience in handling (and especially supplying) large units in sustained battle proved disastrous for the Viet Minh. After a contest lasting less than two days, they withdrew, leaving 6000 dead behind. Later that year, Giap suffered two more costly, but instructive, defeats in conventional combat before he decided that he did not have the strength, the experience, and especially the logistical capacity, to engage large French units in face-to-face contests. Accordingly, he reverted to guerrilla warfare, avoiding pitched battles, biding his time until he could develop the knockout punch that was to win in later battles, including Dienbienphu.

V

Does General Giap see a parallel between the situation in 1951 and today? We cannot know, any more than we can predict the future course of the war in Vietnam, dependent as it is on what the communists do next. Hanoi's continued introduction of regular army units into South Vietnam, for instance, can accelerate their readiness to wage conventional war. Nonetheless, one prediction seems reasonable. If the Viet Cong regiments, at their present level of strength and experience, were to engage government divisions in conventional war, they would do so under extraordinary disadvantages and their prospects of military success would be extremely remote.

Of course, no one pretends that the government's military effort in Vietnam can retain its vitality if its strength is sapped by chronic political debility. If the Free Vietnamese cannot grow

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out of political adolescence, if they cannot establish a viable government that can communicate with, and gain the trust of, the people, the military contest can be lost. But while recognizing this truism, it is well to remember another: No government can survive if it fails to convince the people that it can perform the most fundamental of its functions, namely, provide physical security.

Wars end when the people of one side—regardless of the military reality—believe they are defeated. We can expect the Viet Cong to do all they can to create the illusion of government military defeat. Thus, perhaps the imminent danger in Vietnam today is not actual military defeat resulting in political defeat but political defeat without military defeat. This was the bitter lot of the French in Algeria where their armed forces were never defeated. If the Viet Cong can attain their political goal without military victory, Mao Tse-tung, Giap and others of the worldwide communist fraternity can add a corollary to their doctrine of revolutionary warfare that bodes us no good in the future.

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THE STRATEGY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE INTRACOMMUNIST CONFLICT

by Franz Michael

IN Vietnam the United States is locked in its first real test of strength against the communist strategy of guerrilla warfare. If we cannot cope with it there, we will confront it again in other parts of Southeast Asia, such as Thailand and the Philippines where communist infiltration and terror in rural areas suggest that these countries may be next in line for communist aggression through "wars of liberation" or "national liberation movements." The communist strategy of guerrilla warfare is not confined to Southeast Asia but can be employed throughout the developing world in Asia, Africa and Latin America. We have experienced already in Africa and the Americas the reality and danger of this strategy.

I

It is essential for the West to understand this threat and to be able to counter it. Communist strategy has been deceptive and ingenious in exploiting in these societies social, political and economic discontent at two levels—the peasants and the elites. This discontent in itself has nothing to do with communism, but the communists have been able to turn it to advantage. In these predominantly agricultural countries, the peasant's desire for ownership of his land, free from crushing burdens and taxes and surtaxes, and his alienation from the traditional elites, who had often more contempt for the peasant than concern for his well-being, have been exploited skillfully by deceptive communist promises. Communist strategy has also made use of the bitterness of the elites in these countries toward various forms of foreign domination. The fight against colonial rule, unequal treaties, or any form of dependence upon the West, waged initially by nationalist elites, has been claimed by the communists as their own.

The communists' exploitation of peasant discontent and national aspirations has promoted communist interests in countries where their program alone could have elicited little support. Behind it remains the ultimate purpose of the communist revo-

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lution, which will be carried out with all ruthlessness once the party is in power.

The communists have had varying degrees of success with this strategy of deception. It has often won for them substantial support among noncommunist elements in target countries; it has also confused Western peoples and governments. We can still remember when many in the West, including some students of Far Eastern affairs, believed that the Chinese communists were not communists at all but were agrarian reformers. Although this interpretation has been discredited by subsequent events, it has so vitally affected our thinking about Chinese communism that we still speak of its special character. Mao Tse-tung's agrarian policy following his seizure of power, and the collectivization and communization measures carried out by Peking and the other communist governments in Asia, have, however, clarified beyond doubt the deceptiveness of earlier communist strategy. Today there is a dispute over whether the communists exploit nationalism in these countries for communist purposes. The belief that communists in Asia are in reality nationalists who pursue national interests and have abandoned communist goals and the concept of world revolution is as mistaken and dangerous as was that regarding the agrarian reformers.

This view, nevertheless, has gained respectability due to the developing conflict between the Soviet and Chinese communist leadership. The conflict is cited as proof of diverging national interests and of the inherent difference in the character and goals of Soviet and Chinese communism. The conclusion has been reached that these alleged basic differences between Soviet and Chinese communism must be taken into account in the formulation of our own policy toward the strategy of guerrilla warfare.

II

What is the origin of communist strategy in exploiting nationalism and peasant discontent in the underdeveloped areas of the world? It is not a Chinese invention. Rather, it is of old vintage. In some of its aspects it goes back to Karl Marx, but in the main it is a product of Lenin's thought and planning. Marx had seen the possibility of utilizing nationalist rebellions for communist purposes. He was, of course, still mainly concerned with Europe: it was the Polish and Irish nationalisms of his time that interested him. The nationalist movements were to be approved, but

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only when they supported the communist purpose. Nationalism, in itself, conflicted with the proletarian revolution.

It was Lenin who, with his theory of imperialism, laid the foundation for communist strategy in Asia. His interpretation of colonialism as a system of economic exploitation of the colonies by the imperialist powers made it possible to enlist the fight against colonial rule as a part of the communist battle against monopoly capitalism. The colonies and the emerging nations lacked the industrial development for a truly proletarian revolution, but communist parties in these lands could, as part of world communism, back local national capitalists and peasants in their pre-communist revolution against world capitalism and eventually lead these revolutions from the democratic into the socialist stage.

Lenin thus really conceived two strategies for communist world revolution. One was the proletarian revolution in the industrial countries, the center of the capitalist world. The other was communist support and use of nationalist revolutions in the colonial and quasi-colonial countries of Asia. The two strategies were complementary. At first it was Lenin's expectation that after the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution in the Soviet Union, Central Europe, i.e., Germany, would be the main staging area for the proletarian revolution. But when the communist hopes for European proletarian uprisings after World War I were disappointed, the Asian strategy took on primary importance. China, in particular, became the test case of the communist strategy of anti-imperialism as devised by Lenin.

Communist strategy in China has been seriously misunderstood. Not only its organization and framework, but also all other ingredients, came from Moscow. Through his Moscow-centered instrument of world revolution, the Communist International (Comintern), Lenin established in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party and directed its policy. He also shaped the strategy of the alliance with Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist Party and the tactic of using communist membership in it to create an ideal opportunity for infiltration and eventual takeover. The failure in 1927 of this first United Front policy was not so much the fault of Lenin or of his successor Stalin as it was the unexpected success of the Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, who against heavy odds foiled the communist plot to seize power in China. Since China became the main theatre of communist operations, the story of this abortive effort and of the years that followed played a major

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part in the infighting among communists. As a major issue in the leadership struggle in Moscow, the Chinese story became distorted by the anti-Stalinist accounts of the Trotskyite opposition.

The greatest amount of confusion surrounds the period after 1927, the period of the strategy of guerrilla warfare in China. The oft-repeated accounts describing how Stalin tried to drive the Chinese into suicidal urban uprisings and how it eventually was Chinese leadership, particularly that of Mao Tse-tung, that developed the new rural strategy, are historically wrong. Not only did Mao assume his role as primary leader at a much later date than is often assumed, but it was also the Soviet Union (Stalin) that issued the directives for the new revolutionary policy once the hope of taking over through infiltration of the Nationalist Party had to be abandoned. These directives were spelled out at the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Comintern in February 1928 and at the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Moscow in June 1928 under the close supervision of Stalin himself. It was then that the strategy of agrarian revolution, rural soviets and guerrilla warfare was prescribed by Moscow. The strategy of guerrilla warfare that was eventually successful in China was therefore no Maoist heresy. It had been made in Moscow.

True, China became a successful example of this strategy and therefore a model for others to copy. But there is no reason to assume that the two strategies of proletarian revolution and of national liberation through guerrilla warfare could not be directed from one headquarters, as they had been in the past.

III

The real cause of the Sino-Soviet conflict does not lie in any basic differences between types of communism, but rather in a power struggle for the control of the movement and its strategy—a struggle of recent origin. Once the conflict sharpened, strategies became the substance of the argument. In Europe, communist conquest after World War II came up against the industrial West. No wars of liberation, no guerrilla warfare could succeed there. When the threat of Soviet military might that hung over Europe was checked in the Cuban confrontation, Chairman Khrushchev was forced to adopt an all-out strategy of "peaceful coexistence" in his relations with the West.

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The strategy of guerrilla warfare, however, continued to produce results, and its propagation strengthened Mao's role in the movement and in the power struggle. The Chinese leading role, or rather Mao Tse-tung's leading role, in masterminding the advance of the communist world revolution was based not on any so-called Maoist heresy or original thought, but rather on his experience in carrying out the most important seizure of power based on the strategy of national liberation and guerrilla warfare in an underdeveloped country. Mao's writings on guerrilla warfare have become the textbook for this strategy wherever it has been applied.

Whether even the details of this strategy, expressed in the homilies of Mao's writings, were original with Mao is rather doubtful. In the battles in the Chinkan mountains in the late 1920's, it was the communist military commander, Chu Teh, rather than his commissar, Mao Tse-tung, who devised communist strategy. But Mao, as the author of treatises on this form of warfare, received the credit. The support which Mao received from this military commander throughout his career provided the basis for the buildup of Mao's power in China—from the original Chu-Mao group to Mao's central role in control of the party and the government.

Mao's guerrilla warfare strategy and his stress on the importance of the guerrilla's good rapport with the population was nothing new. Guerrilla warfare has a long history in all parts of the globe. In China, commanders such as Ch'i Ch'i-kuang in the Ming era or Tseng Kuo-fan in the middle of the nineteenth century fully understood the military rules of the game and the necessity of securing cooperation from the population. Tseng, for instance, had verses and marching songs for his soldiers and rules that remind us of the instructions given by the communists to the People's Liberation Army.

However, the key element of the strategy developed from the Chinese example and applied by communists in Vietnam and elsewhere is not contained in Mao's writings. The first, and most important, political stage of communist guerrilla warfare is not—as they want us to believe—a sympathetic attitude toward the local people. In order to gain control of the local population the insurgents must institute a rule of terror that aims at destroying the existing social unity, depriving the communities of any kind of leadership that might resist the communist advance, and enabling

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the communists to establish the authority of their own functionaries over the disorganized and leaderless communities. In Vietnam this terror, which preceded the military stage of guerrilla warfare, was carried out by an assassination campaign estimated to have taken the lives of about 14,000 local officials, village heads and other community leaders and their relatives.

This kind of assassination campaign, now underway in the Philippines and in Thailand, is the true basis of what has been called, somewhat euphemistically, political warfare. Once such terror grips the countryside, acceptance of communist control and cooperation with the communists is a matter of survival for each individual and his family. There may well be those who actually accept at face value the communist promises, or even the real communist goals, and are willing to fight for them. But the true preference of the majority of the population is demonstrated in Vietnam, for example, by the fact that millions of people have "voted with their feet"—since 1954, about 4.5 million Vietnamese have fled from regions that have fallen under communist domination to the shrinking perimeters of government controlled areas.

The communists excel in this kind of political warfare. Their advances under political and guerrilla warfare have in turn strengthened the position of the Chinese communist leadership in the power struggle within the bloc and the movement. Yet, while it is the Chinese who benefit from the success of this strategy, the Soviets have never denied its importance in promoting communist advance in the underdeveloped areas. In analyzing the nature of war in the age of nuclear weapons and peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev clearly distinguished among three types of conflict. There was hydrogen war, terrible in its consequences and no longer inevitable; local wars, to be avoided because they could escalate into hydrogen wars; and the so-called wars of liberation, a revolutionary warfare that remained a valid strategy of communist advance. Thus, there is no basic disagreement between the communist contenders in Moscow and Peking on this type of warfare; indeed, the Soviets clearly are competing to regain a role in the national liberation movements. They have shown their hand in Vietnam, and the communist effort to take over the Dominican rebellion appears to carry a Moscow, not a Peking, label. Although the Soviets have to keep this strategy related to their overall foreign policy, which includes a different strategy toward the West, they cannot withdraw this weapon from the arsenal of communist warfare.

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IV

What is the conclusion for the West? We obviously cannot count on the support of the Soviets in forcing their communist partners in China or in Vietnam to abandon a strategy that has shown promising results. The negotiations which we desire will occur only if the other side expects such talks to lead to an American surrender, or if we have found an answer to guerrilla warfare that shifts the balance of that conflict in our favor.

So far we have not demonstrated conclusively that we can cope with communist guerrilla warfare. While we have developed counterinsurgency tactics, we have not acted upon our own primary conclusion—that guerrilla warfare is basically political warfare. If the communist advance is based on their destruction through terror and assassination of the social fiber and cohesion of the communities by eliminating the existing leadership, we must seek to eliminate their functionaries who have taken the place of the leaders they have killed. We must learn to answer terror with counterterror.

It has been said that counterterror is against our ethical principles and the concepts of law which we defend. But police action against criminals is carried on in any lawful society with weapons as well as warrants. Communist functionaries in South Vietnam are certainly violators of the legal institutions of that country, and this fact does not even take into account their acts of crime and terror against the intimidated population. There is nothing unlawful or unethical in an organized physical attack against the communist political structure established in South Vietnam. But to be successful this has to be done on as vast a scale as the communist effort itself has been. Counterguerrilla warfare must be as broad as the communist attack. It has to be political and ideological as well as military.

Even in this form our policy will remain defensive in nature. In countering Khrushchev's Cuban missile gambit, the United States forced his retreat by the threat of our own aggressive action. Thus, there is today on the Western front a military truce and stalemate. The strategy of peaceful coexistence has shifted the struggle onto the battlefield of ideas—ideological warfare—where, according to the leaders in the Kremlin, no peaceful coexistence is possible.

On the battleground in Asia, where political action is carried

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on through guerrilla warfare, the West has no reason to remain on the defensive. As long as the communists carry the fight onto our ground, we cannot afford to disregard any opportunity to organize and exploit in similar fashion the latent discontent behind the Iron Curtain. This, too, must be a vast effort. We know of such discontent in almost all of the communist countries of Asia. In some of them, as in Tibet, there is active guerrilla warfare carried on right now against Chinese communist rule. To support such resistance against communist oppression would not only be a strategic move in the kind of warfare that the communists have initiated, it would also be a stand—on a much vaster scale—for those very principles which are behind the social revolution in our own country: the principles of human rights and freedom.

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THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE AND VIETNAM

by Tai Sung An

THERE is little evidence that the sudden removal of Nikita S. Khrushchev from power on October 14, 1964 has contributed to a settlement of the long-standing Sino-Soviet conflict. The new Soviet leaders have reaffirmed the basic Khrushchev policies which Communist China has long denounced. The Chinese communists have retaliated by attacking the new Kremlin leaders as proponents of "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev." Mao Tse-tung's price for a Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* appears to be nothing less than Moscow's wholesale rejection of the Khrushchev line, particularly "peaceful coexistence" with the United States. But Khrushchev's successors have shown no intention of submitting to Peking's demands. Consequently, an early healing of the Sino-Soviet rift is a most unlikely event.

The embittered struggle between Moscow and Peking has become, in the eyes of many Western observers, an important factor in the communist-initiated conflict in Vietnam. Some suggest that recent U.S. military moves in the Vietnam crisis, particularly the sustained and intensified bombing of North Vietnam, have been calculated to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split. Others fear that the continuing U.S. air raids on the North, ever closer to the Chinese communist frontier, may eventually bring the two communist giants closer together.[1] The evidence suggests that, to date, the Sino-Soviet rift has been aggravated rather than reduced as a result of Washington's direct, though measured, retaliation against North Vietnam.

"Peaceful Coexistence" versus "Wars of National Liberation"

The Sino-Soviet dispute over the Vietnam situation stems from (1) disagreements regarding the strategies and tactics which the communists can employ safely against the United States and (2)

[1]For example, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau fears that the continuing U.S. bombing of North Vietnam could well lead to the restoration of "the monolithic character of the Communist camp" and might bring about a direct military confrontation between the United States and the communist bloc in Vietnam. See "Russia, the United States and Vietnam," *The New Republic,* May 1, 1965, pp. 12-13.

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the traditional contest for spheres of influence—in which, according to the communists, only the "imperialists" engage. The central issue is "peaceful coexistence" versus "wars of national liberation." Moscow favors "peaceful coexistence"—a more cautious and devious drive toward world communism—as the proper strategy for the world communist movement in the present era of thermonuclear terror. All other forms of communist expansionism, including "wars of national liberation," must be subordinated to the Soviet line of "peaceful coexistence"—although Moscow does not deny the importance of the former. Peking firmly insists that active support for "wars of national liberation" (the modern cover for guerrilla warfare) in the noncommunist underdeveloped areas is the surest road to world communism, even in the face of the West's nuclear superiority. For Peking, and presumably for Moscow as well, Vietnam has now become a major testing ground for these two seemingly divergent strategies.

Khrushchev, for all his noisy brandishing of rockets and nuclear weapons in the past, realized that the Soviet Union stood to lose all its painfully won political and material gains, as well as tens of millions of lives, should the struggle against capitalism touch off a nuclear conflagration. He and his successors believe that the advance of world communism must now depend less on overt armed aggression and more on skillful political, economic and psychological warfare under cover of the Soviet nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, the Soviets tend to sanction communist military adventures only when they can effectively control the risks.

The Chinese communists maintain that the Khrushchev line of "peaceful coexistence" represents accommodation to "U.S. imperialism" and a shameful betrayal of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist principles. In its role as principal mentor of the Vietnamese communists, Peking has been making every effort to discredit the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" as applied to Vietnam.[2] If South Vietnam should fall to the communists, Mao Tse-tung will be able to use the victory as evidence that "wars of

[2]In its editorial of more than 20,000 words, *Hung Ch'i* (*Red Flag*) of March 22, 1965 launched a bitter attack against Soviet First Secretary Brezhnev and Soviet Premier Kosygin for their betrayal of the Vietnamese communists: "The new leaders of the Soviet Communist Party are now loudly proclaiming their support for the revolutionary struggle of the people of South Vietnam, but in reality they are trying to gain political capital for their dealings with United States imperialists and to carry out plots for 'peace talks' in a futile attempt to extinguish the revolutionary struggle of the South Vietnamese people." It also said that the new Kremlin leaders had merely adopted "more cunning methods of subterfuges in order to better push through and develop Khrushchevism and the general line of modern revisionism."

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national liberation" can safely be supported and even multiplied in other parts of the noncommunist underdeveloped world without danger of courting a nuclear war. More important still, the Chinese communist case against the Soviets would be strengthened in the eyes of many communist party leaders throughout the world. Peking would score heavily in the Sino-Soviet conflict. This is why the Soviets are concerned about the Vietnam crisis.

Contrary to some views widely held in the West, the Chinese communists in their dispute with the Soviet Union have never advocated policies which would deliberately provoke a nuclear war with the United States. Instead, they have insisted on controlled communist "brinkmanship" in order to create favorable conditions for expansion. Edouardo Mora Valverde of the Communist Party of Costa Rica, writing in *Izvestia* of June 18, 1964, quoted Mao Tse-tung as having said to him five years before: "We [the Chinese communists] learned a lot from John Foster Dulles. He is our teacher. His policy of 'brinkmanship' was directed against us [in the Taiwan crisis of 1958], but we learned it. . . ."

Peking has often accused Moscow of failing to run sufficient risks to help China and other communist allies in Asia against the United States. The Chinese communists have argued that, although "U.S. imperialists" might intervene on a limited military basis in Southeast Asia in order to suppress "wars of national liberation," they would not run the risk of escalating these conflicts —*provided* the Soviets had clearly committed themselves to retaliate with whatever weapons were required. In Peking's view, Soviet nuclear strength is sufficient to deter the United States from raising the stakes in any local war and, therefore, "U.S. imperialism" would have to accept local defeats. Hence, communist brinkmanship in "brush-fire" conflicts or local wars would involve a minimal risk of global nuclear war and would permit the communists to press on to new victories in those areas "ripe for revolution."

Moscow is worried about Chinese communist brinkmanship. The Soviets view local conventional wars as part of a continuous spectrum of conflicts leading to general war. They have repeatedly warned against the grave danger of local wars escalating into global nuclear conflict because of mistakes, accidents and miscalculation, and assert that communist expansion must and can be achieved without pushing the United States to the brink of initiating a nuclear war. Moscow, like Washington, contends that the dangers of nuclear escalation in the Cold War remain great, while Peking declares that the dangers are virtually nonexistent—or

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could be minimized if the Soviets knew how to use to advantage their nuclear deterrent. The Chinese seem bent on dragging the Soviet Union into a direct military confrontation with the United States in Vietnam and thus destroying, once and for all, the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States. Such an eventuality would be further proof of the correctness of the Chinese communist line of revolutionary belligerence. The avoidance of such a military showdown has been a cardinal aim of Soviet foreign policy.

The View from Hanoi

The overall strategy of the Viet Cong insurrectionary movement in South Vietnam is directed by the Lao Dong Party (the North Vietnam Communist Party) under the overlordship of the Chinese communists. While Peking has committed itself heavily to the Vietnamese communists, Moscow's influence over Vietnam in recent years has been in sharp decline. The North Vietnamese communist leadership has since early 1963 taken public stands favoring the Chinese communists in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Hanoi has allied itself with Peking because the Chinese communists were willing to support Hanoi's effort to unify all of Vietnam under its hegemony. At the present time, Hanoi and Peking have overlapping interests, the most important of which is to evict U.S. power from Southeast Asia.

The communist insurrection in South Vietnam has not yet entered the third and final phase of guerrilla warfare, i.e., full-scale conventional military operations. Fully aware that they would be no match for regular units of the South Vietnamese and U.S. armed forces in conventional warfare, the Viet Cong have decided to stick to mobile guerrilla operations, hit-and-run raids, terror and disruption—the second stage of the Maoist theory of protracted guerrilla warfare[3]—at which they excel. Their only hope for victory is to produce complete political, social and economic chaos in South Vietnam so that the United States is finally left with nothing to defend, or to rely on worldwide "peace movements" and other pressures to deter the United States from in-

[3]General Vo Nguyen Giap, the master strategist of North Vietnam who now directs the Viet Cong guerrillas, employed the Maoist strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare successfully in the Indochinese war against France. In so doing, he invented his own guerrilla warfare doctrine suitable to the environment of Vietnam. It is obvious that the Giap doctrine owes a great deal to the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, but he has refused to acknowledge this debt to his Chinese mentor. See Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New York: Praeger, 1962). A partial explanation for this is his strong personal vanity accompanied by his anti-Chinese attitude.

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tensifying its military efforts against the Viet Cong. They recognize that total *military* victory is beyond their grasp as long as U.S. air and naval supremacy is maintained in Asia and U.S. ground forces are committed to defend South Vietnam. Victory on the battlefield has become even more elusive since the United States began its air attacks on the "privileged sanctuary" of Viet Cong aggression—the sanctuary which has always proved so vital to communist aggression. A Viet Cong military victory, therefore, would require heavy military assistance and support from both Communist China and the Soviet Union, including the protection of Moscow's nuclear umbrella. The present Sino-Soviet split and Moscow's nuclear "timidness" render unlikely such a combined military effort.

North Vietnam's leaders may not welcome massive Chinese communist troop movements into their territory lest this should lead to Chinese domination. The Vietnamese, both North and South, have for centuries feared and disliked the Chinese.[4] Ho Chi Minh is reportedly opposed to calling for Chinese communist troops and "volunteers" to help the Vietnamese communists—except in the utmost extremity. Many industrial plants and streets of cities in North Vietnam are still named after Vietnamese heroes who won victories in the past over Chinese invaders. A number of powerful Vietnamese communist leaders retain this strong traditional distrust and dislike of the Chinese. One such person is General Vo Nguyen Giap—the hero of Dienbienphu—who now directs the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam.[5] Surely the

[4]The editorial of the December 19, 1964 issue of *Nhan Dang* (*People's Daily*), the official paper of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, related the Dienbienphu victory of 1954 over the French to "the gallant victories of our [Vietnamese] nation" over previous invaders. According to the editorial, the previous invaders included the troops of the Sung Dynasty of Imperial China, the Mongols, the Ming and the Ching Dynasties. The editorial also painted the Viet Cong insurrection as a Vietnamese crusade against foreign invaders (Americans) and not as a war fought by the Vietnamese people on behalf of the Chinese communists.

In a broadcast on April 18, 1965, the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, made a new reference to the centuries-old Chinese invasion of Vietnam. The broadcast said in part: "Like national hero Tran Hung Dao swearing that he would not return to the capital [of Vietnam] if the Chinese invaders were not repulsed, we swear not to lay down our guns if one U.S. aggressor is still present on our beloved territory."

[5]The North Vietnamese leadership is still divided between pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions, despite the fact that Hanoi is now allied with Communist China in the Sino-Soviet conflict. In debate within the Lao Dong (Communist) Party, General Giap has been a powerful member of the pro-Soviet faction, in opposition to the pro-Chinese faction headed by Truong Chinh. General Giap is now Deputy Premier, Minister of National Defense, Commander of the Vietnamese People's Army, and Politburo member. His anti-Chinese sentiment and attitude are notorious and deeply resented by the Chinese communists. It has been reported that General Giap is pressing for a *rapprochement* with Moscow that would yield more military and economic aid. Ho Chi Minh likewise is considered pro-Soviet.

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worst nightmare Ho Chi Minh could have would be of a massive U.S. retaliatory air bombardment followed by a Chinese communist military occupation.

It is probably this ingrained fear of China that prompts Ho Chi Minh to resist Peking's heavy pressure for a complete break with Moscow. He is well aware that the Soviet Union can supply far more military and economic aid than can Communist China. Moreover, he is anxious to keep the door open to Moscow in the event that some day he might have to seek a counterweight to Peking.

Ho Chi Minh has another important reason for wanting to avoid direct Chinese communist military intervention in North Vietnam: He has political ambitions of his own in Indochina. The ultimate aim of the Vietnamese communist leadership is to bring the whole of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia under Hanoi's hegemony. The Chinese communists certainly do not look with favor upon the emergence of an independent-minded communist power center in Southeast Asia. Peking may even want to see North Vietnam considerably weakened and thus inhibited in its political aspirations. This may be one of the reasons the Chinese communists are advising Hanoi to endure U.S. bombing raids while pressing on with the Viet Cong insurrection until the anti-communist regime in South Vietnam collapses and the United States is forced to withdraw. The protraction of the Vietnam conflict would leave two exhausted Vietnams much more susceptible to Chinese communist influence, discredit the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence," trim the influence of the pro-Soviet faction in Hanoi, and strengthen Peking's belligerent revolutionary line.

Peking's Strategy

Despite their continuing vituperative outcries against "U.S. imperialism," the Chinese communists apparently do not want to become involved in a direct military confrontation with the United States in Southeast Asia. In response to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, Peking recently raised the specter of a Korean-type intervention by Chinese communist "volunteers" in Vietnam, but Mao Tse-tung seems unprepared to carry out his threat. Communist China is unlikely to risk another Korean-type military adventure in Vietnam, unless South Vietnamese or U.S. troops cross the 17th Parallel.

This conclusion is based upon several important factors. First,

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the United States has in the Western Pacific an immense concentration of air and naval power which could wreak great punishment on mainland China; and the Chinese communists, given their view of "U.S. imperialism," no doubt fear that U.S. military commanders are just itching for an excuse to employ these weapons and thus to wipe out the memories of frustration remaining from the Korean War. Communist China herself possesses no retaliatory nuclear capability to reach the heart of U.S. power. Chinese leaders must realize that alone they could not win an all-out war with the United States.

Second, Peking probably has no assurance of automatic Soviet military and nuclear support in a confrontation with the United States—although Washington at the same time cannot safely assume that the Sino-Soviet rift has gone so far that Moscow would stand aside in the face of a massive U.S. retaliation against mainland China. But so long as Chinese leaders suspect that the Soviet Union hopes to profit from a Sino-American showdown and thus may not come to their aid, they will be cautious before committing their forces to battle. By and large, the Sino-Soviet conflict is a restraining influence on Communist China.

Third, Communist China can utilize its formidable ground power effectively in contiguous border areas, as it demonstrated in the Korean War as well as in the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962; but it is seriously handicapped in carrying out sustained military operations at long distances. It has limited air and naval strength and severe transport and supply problems. For example, there are only two single-track railway lines from Kunming and Nanning in South China to North Vietnam.

Fourth, the Chinese communists realize that if the Vietnam war is expanded by virtue of Communist China's active military intervention, they will not be permitted to operate from a privileged sanctuary as they did during the Korean War. The escalation of the Vietnam war would invite destruction upon Peking's major industrial installations, including, perhaps, the elementary nuclear complex in Sinkiang Province.

Fifth, Chinese communist leaders are certain that Southeast Asia will eventually fall into their hands, one way or another, without a major war with the United States. They are prepared to wait with great patience for that moment.

Sixth, the Chinese are aware that Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese do not relish the idea of direct and massive military intervention by Chinese soldiers, and they probably prefer to extend their hegemony by more subtle means.

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In the face of increased U.S. military pressures in Vietnam, the Chinese communists have stepped up their threats of military intervention, but they have been careful in describing the conditions under which they would intervene. Their design is to deter the United States from expanding its increasingly destructive bombing and other military pressures against North Vietnam while giving themselves adequate room for maneuver.

South Vietnam is the logical target for Peking's expansionist drive, constituting as it does the weakest link of the non-communist defense perimeter in Asia. Peking feels that the United States does not have vital national interests in Vietnam and thus would not risk national survival in a struggle over this area. The Chinese leaders believe, therefore, that they can safely continue to intensify their expansionist drive in the area at low levels of violence without having to worry about (1) the need for Soviet military and nuclear support, (2) the risk of inviting full-scale U.S. intervention and retaliation, and (3) the necessity of committing their own forces to battle. If they can keep the conflict in Vietnam at a low level of violence, the Chinese might convince the world's communist parties that the Chinese model of "national liberation war" is not as risky as the Soviet Union has contended.

Moscow's Dilemma

Moscow's Vietnam policy has been ambiguous and ambivalent. By withholding effective support from Peking as well as Hanoi, the Soviets have forced North Vietnam to move closer to the Chinese communists in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Officially, the Soviet Union has given political, diplomatic and propaganda support to the Vietnamese communists by condemning the U.S. role in Vietnam. At the same time, it has rebuked Communist China for pursuing its reckless policies in Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Moscow has accused the Chinese of damaging the communist cause in Vietnam by increasing the pace of the war and thus giving the United States a pretext for retaliating in a much more telling manner, and it has warned Ho Chi Minh against actions which might tend to escalate the crisis.

In many ways Moscow, as head of the communist bloc, is in a very uncomfortable position with regard to Vietnam. If the Soviets continue to provide only limited aid to Hanoi, they can be condemned for betraying a member of the communist bloc in order to "save their own skin" and to pursue policies of "accommodation" with the West. Their passivity has already been exploited by Peking as a means of destroying Moscow's leadership in the

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world communist movement. If, on the other hand, the Soviets intervene on an increasing scale, they might exacerbate the situation in Vietnam with the risk that it will get out of control. In doing so, they would have accepted implicitly the Chinese line of militant communism and, more important still, endangered the motherland. To extricate themselves from such a painful dilemma, there seems to be only one solution: to advocate a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam war.

Moscow probably favors a negotiated settlement which would remove the U.S. military presence from South Vietnam without a military triumph for either side, but it is reluctant to put direct pressure on Hanoi to enter into negotiations for fear of triggering fresh Chinese charges of treason. Through a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, Soviet leaders would try to obtain the "neutralization" of South Vietnam (and even of North Vietnam, if necessary). Such a negotiated solution—opposed strongly by Peking—might protect North Vietnam against "satellitization" by the Chinese. It would also greatly enhance Moscow's image as a "peace-loving" nuclear power capable of acting with great restraint in the midst of an international crisis.

To the Soviets, nothing would be more disagreeable than the prospect of becoming entangled in a direct military confrontation with the United States in Vietnam, from which the chief beneficiary would most likely be the Chinese communists. Moscow must view involvement in Vietnam as "the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time." There is no vital Soviet interest in Vietnam which must be secured by a belligerent policy that would cut across Moscow's larger design in world affairs and jeopardize its present *détente* strategy. Major entanglement in Vietnam would be a steep price for the Soviet Union to pay in order to salvage the interests of Communist China, its inconvenient ally and rancorous rival.

There is considerable evidence to support the conclusion that Soviet leaders want a negotiated disengagement in Vietnam. (1) Although the Soviet Union is building surface-to-air missile sites near Hanoi and providing limited amounts of other types of military and economic aid, its commitment does not appear to be any deeper than this.[6] Most observers believe the Soviets are providing

[6]When Soviet surface-to-air missiles recently shot down U.S. jet planes over North Vietnam, Soviet newspapers did not mention the action. In addition, when U.S. planes attacked these antiaircraft missile sites near Hanoi, Moscow buried the news in the back pages of its newspapers. The evidence suggests that the Soviets are reluctant to consider these actions as clear-cut Soviet-American military confrontations.

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this much assistance in order to gain more control over North Vietnamese actions. (2) The Soviet reaction to increased U.S. military pressures, particularly the bombing of North Vietnam, has been relatively mild, confined so far to the usual broad threats. Moscow has spoken of bolstering North Vietnam's defenses and has pledged to send "volunteers" if Hanoi wants them. It is difficult to measure this latter threat. (3) Moscow, by and large, has refrained from its "missile rattling" or nuclear blackmail techniques which have become standard Soviet behavior in tense international situations, such as the Suez and Berlin crises. (4) The Soviets have not given any assurance of military and nuclear backing to Peking and Hanoi. (5) Moscow's belated harsh warnings to the United States so far appear to have been made for the public record, to protect it against the Chinese charge that the Soviets are willing to sacrifice the interests of other communist countries to their policy of "peaceful coexistence" with "U.S. imperialism."

This is not to say that the Soviets are not pleased at the prospect of the United States committing several divisions of its finest troops to Vietnam, suffering a serious blow (deserved or not) to its image as a restrained, "peace-loving" nation, and perhaps absorbing a number of military setbacks in Vietnam. Moscow may even wish to see the war prolonged, provided it can be controlled. In addition, Moscow is fully aware of the danger of allowing Peking to appear as the only staunch champion of communist revolution. The new Kremlin leaders in recent months have stepped up their efforts to regain influence in North Vietnam by adopting a more belligerent line in support of the Vietnamese communists, by claiming that the Soviet Union is the real champion of the "national liberation movements" of Asia and Africa, and also by outdoing the Chinese communists with promises of support for North Vietnam. Illustrative of these efforts are Moscow's statements about "volunteers," promises to take the "necessary measures" to improve North Vietnam's defense capacity, and the recent decision to extend a sort of limited diplomatic recognition to the Viet Cong insurgents.

There is good evidence, on the other hand, that Moscow continues to recommend quietly that Hanoi take a more flexible attitude toward negotiations, so the Vietnamese communists may be able to gain at the conference table what they cannot win on the battlefield. For example, the Soviet Union recently agreed to attend an international conference on Cambodian neutrality with

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the apparent expectation of using it as an informal forum for discussion of the Vietnam crisis.[7] The Chinese communists torpedoed the Cambodian conference and thus succeeded in blocking any Vietnam peace talks that might have developed there.[8] The Soviet Union also seems to be nudging North Vietnam into a neutral stance in the Sino-Soviet conflict, trying to wean it away from Peking although not insisting on Soviet control.[9] While the Soviets seem to have failed so far in both of these efforts, they have not given up hope of eventual success.

Conclusion

The Vietnam crisis is not likely to be the occasion for a restoration of unity between the Soviet Union and Communist China. The Sino-Soviet split appears irreparable, though neither side seeks a complete and final break. Unity could be restored only in the extremely unlikely event that the United States became involved in a general war with the Chinese communists. The Sino-Soviet rift has made it impossible for the two giants of the communist bloc to coordinate their policies and power in a joint offensive against the West. By skillfully using its military superiority in and around Vietnam, the United States can contain communist aggression and force the Chinese and North Vietnamese communists to abandon their designs on Southeast Asia. Such a victory might go far to blunt the Chinese communist strategy of "wars of national liberation" and "protracted guerrilla conflict" and strengthen other Free World nations in Southeast Asia.

[7]In a joint communiqué after a visit to Moscow by a high-level delegation from Hanoi, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam agreed on April 18, 1965 that a conference on Cambodia would be "useful."

[8]An editorial in the official Chinese communist newspaper *Jen Min Jih Pao* of March 17, 1965 flatly rejected any peace talk about the Vietnam crisis. At one point the editorial said in an obvious thrust at Moscow that, "If one is not scared out of one's wits by United States imperialism's war blackmail and is not ready to betray the interests of the Vietnamese people, how can one think it necessary to kowtow to United States imperialism and beg for peace under such circumstances?"

[9]Peking has repeatedly warned Moscow not to interfere in Vietnamese affairs. One of these admonitions was issued on February 5, 1965 on the eve of Kosygin's arrival in the capital of North Vietnam. On that day the Chinese Communist Party sent a cabled message to the North Vietnamese Communist Party which said: ". . . the two parties and two countries will consolidate our unity and friendship by stepping up our campaign against American imperialism, foreign reactionaries and modern revisionism." *New China News Agency*, Peking, February 5, 1965.

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THE M.I.T. POLITICAL-MILITARY GAMING EXPERIENCE*

by Richard E. Barringer with Barton Whaley

IN the series of nine political-military exercises or "games" conducted since 1958 by Professor Lincoln P. Bloomfield and his associates at the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 148 individuals have served as senior participants.[1] In the fall of 1964, shortly before the last of these exercises, a letter was sent to all 130 participants in the first eight of these games, announcing the Center's intention to review this program in terms of its impact upon the participants themselves and inviting their cooperation in this effort. Each participant was asked to indicate his willingness to answer and return a mail questionnaire, as well as his availability for a personal interview. Replies to this letter were received from 106 (81.5%) individuals. Of these, 103 (79.2%) expressed their availability and willingness to participate in the program, and 93 (71.5%) indicated their availability for a personal interview.

Due to the tight schedule of the project, the wide geographic dispersion of the respondents, and the high percentage of those willing to complete mail questionnaires, it was decided that twenty-five personal interviews, conducted both for substantive information and as a pre-test for the mail questionnaire, would suffice for our purposes. The individuals chosen for personal interviews were selected for their diverse professional viewpoints and their representativeness of the entire M.I.T. "gaming population" in terms of their background characteristics, or for their known interest and experience in gaming techniques.

Prior to each hour-long interview, stress was placed on its informality and the anonymity of response. The interview questionnaire, consisting of twenty open-ended and closed multiple-choice questions on the substantive nature of the participant's gaming

[1]For a brief account of this particular non-computerized, multi-team, role-playing type of gaming see Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Barton Whaley, "The Political-Military Exercise: A Progress Report," ORBIS, Winter 1965.

*This study was undertaken in late 1964 in conjunction with the Center for International Studies' most recent series of political-military exercises and experiments on deterrence, sponsored by Project Michelson of the U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California.

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experience and his reactions to it, was deliberately used as an informal "cuesheet" to provide the maximum freedom of reminiscence and comment, while assuring that all the experimenters' preconceived questions were answered.

Upon completion of the personal interviews, a mail questionnaire was devised containing most of the questions asked of the personal interviewees—with appropriate modifications in wording—in addition to several other questions raised by the interviewees themselves or suggested by their comments. (The questions asked in the personal interviews and in the mail questionnaire, together with the quantified responses to these, are contained in TABLE I.)

Appended to this mail questionnaire were thirteen "rating questions" in which the respondent was asked to rate the technique of political-military gaming for various proposed uses, "in comparison to other techniques with which he is familiar." Lastly, a section on "hypothesized international events" was included in which the respondent was asked to indicate, from a list of possible choices, the more or the most likely U.S. policy in such a situation, and its eventual outcome. The purpose and results of these latter two sections will be discussed later.

The "long" mail questionnaire, including all three parts mentioned, was sent to all those game participants who had indicated their willingness to respond and had not been personally interviewed, and to the eighteen additional individuals who participated in the final political-military exercise of the series, conducted subsequent to the issue of the invitational letter. A "supplementary" questionnaire consisting of the "rating questions" and the "hypothesized international events" sections was also mailed at this time to all those who had been personally interviewed.

In all, eighty-two persons responded to the study prior to its conclusion, constituting 55.4% of all game participants.[2] This includes fifty-seven participants who returned the "long" mail questionnaire, twenty-three who were personally interviewed prior to returning the "supplementary" questionnaire, and two interviewees who did not return the supplement.

[2]For various reasons, however, twenty-three of the 148 game participants could not be contacted to participate in the present study. Including nine mail questionnaires returned after the deadline for quantitative analysis, then, the response rate for this study was actually 72.8%, a somewhat more than respectable rate for any study based primarily on mailed questionnaires.

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TABLE I

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO PARTICIPANT'S GAMING EXPERIENCE AND ITS EFFECTS

Part A contains those questions asked only of personal interviewees.

Part B contains those questions asked in the mail questionnaire, including the remainder of the questions asked of the personal interviewees.

Closed, at the end of a question, indicates that the question was posed as a "closed question," with a stipulated multiple-choice response format. *Open,* at the end of a question, indicates that it was posed as an "open-ended" question affording the respondent complete freedom of response. The responses have been categorized and quantified as indicated.

n, the number of respondents, is indicated at the end of each question.

PART A.

A-1. Do you recall any of the specifics of the (last) game in which you participated? (open; n=25)

- 40.0% — Good Recall (i.e., recall of objective, crisis, and outcome)
- 36.0 — Fair Recall (recall of two of above)
- 24.0 — Poor Recall (recall of one or none of above)

A-2. Can you recall any particularly striking thing you learned from that game about *policy?* (open; n=25)

- 72.0% — Yes
- 0.0 — Emphasized previous knowledge
- 28.0 — No

A-3. Have you given any further consideration to the policy problems raised by this game? (open; n=25)

- 40.0% — Yes
- 60.0 — No

A-4. Can you specify any general type of crisis to which you feel this particular gaming experience might well apply? (open; n=25)

- 60.0% — Yes
- 40.0 — No

PART B.

B-1. In your own words, how would you characterize the degree of your own personal involvement in the game(s) in which you have participated? (closed; n=77)

- 64.9% — Extreme, intense
- 29.9 — Moderate, fair
- 5.2 — Low

B-2. What elements or aspects of the game(s), would you say, account for whatever degree of involvement you may have felt? (open; n=76)

- 35.5% — A personal or professional interest in the specific problem gamed, or in the game outcome.
- 28.9 — The quality or realism of the scenario design; and/or aspects of the management of the game by Control.
- 23.7 — The assumption of and commitment to one's assigned role in the game.
- 27.6 — The competitive inter-team pressures of the problem as gamed.
- 26.3 — The demands and/or pressures of problem confrontation and resolution at the intra-team level.
- 22.4 — The calibre, contributions, and/or commitment of one's co-participants in the game.
- 14.5 — The conscious pleasure or "fun" of playing in a formalized "game," as such; and/or, of being isolated from one's everyday concerns at MIT's Endicott House.
- 17.1 — Other

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B-3. Has it been your experience in gaming that there is generally a team that "wins" the game, so to speak? (closed; n=76)
35.5% — Yes
64.5 — No

B-4. How about international politics in general? Would you characterize it as essentially a "zero-sum" game, in which one side's gain generally represents the other's loss? (closed; n=76)
13.2% — Yes
86.8 — No

B-5. In carrying out the role(s) assigned you in the game(s) you have played, did you find that you acted any more or less *aggressively* than you would normally have expected to? (closed; n=79)
31.6% — More
12.7 — Less
55.7 — No more, no less

B-6. Again, did you find in the game situation that you were any more or less *willing to take risks* than you would normally have expected to be? (closed; n=77)
32.5% — More
11.7 — Less
55.8 — No more, no less

B-7a. (no corresponding question on Personal Interview)
Can you cite any particularly striking thing or things which you feel you have learned from your gaming experience about the process of contemporary international relations? (open; n=57)
35.1% — Yes
1.8 — Emphasis of previous knowledge
42.1 — No
21.0 — No Response

B-7b. Can you cite any particularly striking thing or things which you feel you have learned from your gaming experience about the nature and requirements of the foreign policy planning process? (open; n=82)
40.2% — Yes
3.7 — Emphasis of previous knowledge
37.8 — No
18.3 — No Response

B-7c. Can you cite any particularly striking thing or things which you feel you have learned from your gaming experience about the problems of crisis-management and decision-making in crisis situations? (open; n=82)
37.8% — Yes
6.1 — Emphasis of previous knowledge
37.8 — No
18.3 — No Response

B-7d. Can you cite any particularly striking thing or things which you feel you have learned from your gaming experience about the technique of gaming itself? (open; n=82)
37.8% — Yes—positive or neutral effect
1.2 — Yes—negative effect
46.3 — No
14.7 — No Response

B-8a. How do you feel a decision-maker's prior participation in a political-military game might generally tend to affect the *number* of policy alternatives perceived by him, should there arise a *real* crisis situation similar to that hypothesized in the game? (closed; n=73)
76.7% — Increase
19.2 — Leave unaffected
4.1 — Decrease

B-8b. (no corresponding question on Personal Interview)
How do you feel a decision-maker's prior participation in a political-military game might generally tend to affect the *quality* of policy alter-

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natives perceived by him, should there arise a *real* crisis situation similar to that hypothesized in the game? (closed; n=48)

87.5% — Enrich
8.3 — Leave unaffected
4.2 — Impoverish

B-9. What would you say were the major elements of *unreality* of the game(s) in which you have participated? (open; n=74)

20.3% — The assumptions and/or projections of the game scenario, as imposed on the players.
51.4 — The efforts, actions, and/or techniques of Control in guiding the game's development, including its internal time resolution.
16.2 — The selection of participant personnel by the game sponsors; and/or the artificiality or inappropriateness of role assignments.
25.7 — The blurring or simplification of the real world complex, or the absence of the "large picture" of reality.
18.9 — Aspects of the communications process between teams (i.e., nations).
10.8 — Aspects of game intelligence procedures.
23.0 — Aspects of the decision-making process or problem resolution in crisis situation.
13.5 — Other

B-10. Again, what would you say were the particularly *realistic* elements of the game(s) in which you have participated? (open; n=62)

6.5% — The selection of personnel by the game sponsors; and/or their role assignments.
25.8 — The initial game scenario situation.
12.9 — Aspects of the actions of Control in guiding the game's development, including its internal time resolution.
9.7 — The emotional involvement by the individual participants in the game crisis problem, and/or the emotional identification of teams with their real-life counterparts in the face of such a problem.
22.6 — Aspects of the communications process between teams, and/or of intelligence procedures.
29.0 — Aspects of the decision-making process or problem resolution in crisis situations.
32.3 — Aspects of the interplay of "live" strategies in the international arena, including the limits of influence appertaining in foreign policy, and the formulated policies of the nations involved.
3.2 — Other

B-11a. If you are or have been engaged in *research* activities, can you cite any instances in which your gaming experience has been of practical value to you in this field? (open; n=46)

41.3% — Yes
58.7 — No

B-11b. (no corresponding question on Personal Interview)
If you are or have been engaged in *teaching or training* activities, can you cite any instances in which your gaming experience has been of practical value to you in these fields? (open; n=32)

50.0% — Yes
50.0 — No

B-12. If you are or have been engaged in *policy* planning, formulation, or implementation, can you cite any instances in which your gaming experience has been of practical value to you in these activities? (open; n=34)

55.9% — Yes
44.1 — No

B-13. Have you personally ever conducted or sponsored any political-military games of the MIT type? (closed; n=80)

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13.8% — Yes, for teaching
3.5 — Yes, for training
7.5 — Yes, for research
5.0 — Yes, for policy planning
0.0 — Yes, for other purposes
75.0 — No

B-14. Have you ever recommended the use of political-military gaming, or played a part in stimulating its use? (closed; n=79)

29.1% — Yes, for teaching
27.8 — Yes, for training
20.3 — Yes, for research
26.6 — Yes, for policy planning
3.8 — Yes, for other purposes
32.9 — No

Prior to the selection of the personal interviewees, an exhaustive listing was made of all background characteristics which, it was expected, would provide significant differentiation among the game participants. Seven such sets of characteristics were selected, including functional and institutional classification of occupation, number of games played, the basis for invitation to participate, and the team role or roles played. In order to determine the extent to which the eighty-two respondents might be considered representative of the entire gaming population, the percentage distributions of the respondents and of the total population across these seven variables were calculated and compared. The cross-tabulations were then subjected to the chi-square test for significance.[3] The probability that the differences in percentage distributions are *not* significant was found to be .962. Thus, the eighty-two respondents to the study are believed to be highly representative of the entire gaming population of 148; and their responses and the results of this study, to be highly significant (beyond the 4% level) in terms of that population. (See Table II.)

In the analysis of the responses to this study, the raw statistical data was first examined and analyzed for significances and meaningful correlations. The qualitative responses, constituting the greater portion of the data, were then drawn upon to give substantive meaning and narrative illustration to the quantitative findings. In effect, then, it is the respondents themselves who are speaking throughout, except where conclusions are explicitly drawn by the authors.

It may be noted that, at the outset of this study, there existed

[3]The chi-square test is a statistical device for comparing observed frequencies of categorized data with theoretical or expected frequencies and expressing this comparison in terms of a probability that any differences that exist between these frequencies are due to chance or accident and are *not* significant.

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TABLE II

PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE

(The high degree to which the respondents proved representative of the entire group of game participants, in terms of the seven selected characteristics, may be observed by comparing the percentage distributions of the entire *game* population across these seven characteristics in Column 1 with those of the total *responding* population in Column 2. N for each individual column is as listed in the column heading unless otherwise indicated at the bottom of an individual column.)

		1 Percentage of Game Population (N=148)	2 Percentage of Respondents (N=82)
1. Functional Classification of Occupation			
Policy-Staff		35.8%	32.9%
Research-Teaching		64.2	67.1
2. Institutional Classification of Occupation			
Academic		32.4%	36.6%
Academic—student		6.1	4.9
Private		14.9	14.6
Presidential Staff		0.7	0.0
State Department		7.4	4.9
State—Policy Planning Staff		3.4	2.4
State—US Mission to UN		1.4	0.0
Defense Department—Civilian		1.4	1.2
Defense—Army		4.7	4.9
Defense—Navy		13.5	15.9
Defense—Air Force		6.1	7.3
ACDA		4.1	1.2
USIA		1.4	2.4
CIA		2.7	3.7
3. Number of Games Played			
One Game		82.4%	78.0%
Two Games		12.2	13.4
Three Games		2.7	4.9
Four Games		2.0	2.4
Five Games		0.7	1.2
4. Game(s) Played			
POLEX I	(Sep. 1958)	8.6%	9.0%
POLEX II	(Sep. 1960)	11.8	11.7
POLEX-DAIS I	(Nov. 1962)	11.2	13.5
POLEX-DAIS II	(Jan. 1963)	10.7	9.0
POLEX-DAIS III	(Feb. 1963)	12.8	7.2
POLEX DAIS IV	(Mar. 1963)	11.8	15.3
DETEX I	(Nov. 1963)	9.6	8.1
DETEX II	(Feb. 1964)	11.2	12.6
DETEX III	(Nov. 1964)	12.3	13.5
		N=187	N=111
5. Re-Invited to Play After First Game?			
Not Applicable		12.2%	14.7%
Yes		24.3	25.6
No		63.5	59.7

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6. Basis of Invitation to Game(s)		
Generalist	19.6%	18.3%
Area Expert	40.5	41.5
Weapons System Expert	39.9	40.2
7. Team Role(s) Played in Game(s)		
Control	26.9%	25.3%
United States	28.1	31.6
U.S.S.R.	17.4	20.0
Western Europe	0.6	1.1
Great Britain	2.4	2.1
West Germany	3.0	3.2
Scandinavia	0.6	1.1
Yugoslavia	0.6	1.1
Middle East	1.8	2.1
Israel	1.2	1.1
U.A.R.	1.2	1.1
Asia-Africa	0.6	1.1
China	5.4	3.2
Venezuela	1.8	3.2
United Nations	8.4	3.2
	N=167	N=95

some apprehension over the possibility of a pro-gaming respondent bias resulting both from the fact that the game participants had evinced an interest in gaming prior to their participation, and from the possible "halo effect" of their frequently expressed feelings that the M.I.T. games are an enjoyable social experience. However, the respondents' qualitative responses and their remarks about the design of the questionnaire itself indicate that, in general, they assumed a highly critical and responsible posture in forming and expressing their evaluations and opinions.[4]

Gaming As a Learning Experience

Good, bad or indifferent as it may be in terms of one's own professional interests, the fact is that the political-military game is a most intense and vivid experience, seemingly for even the most sophisticated of individuals. Therein lies the basis of both its controversiality and its potential as a heuristic and pedagogical technique. Indeed, almost two-thirds (64.9%) of the respondents characterized their involvement in the games as extreme or intense; and over three-fourths (76%) of those personally interviewed were able to recall at least the research objective and specific crisis, if not the precise outcome, of the game or games in which they had participated, even though the time lag since

[4]Where the terms "game" or "gaming" are used, they refer to the political-military exercise as practiced at the Center for International Studies.

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the respondent's actual game participation had in some cases been up to six years.

Any experience so intense and so vivid is bound to be a learning experience of sorts; and any such experience not perceived as good is apt to be perceived as "dangerous," to use the evaluation of one respondent.[5] Of the eighty-two respondents, 35.1% reported having learned something about the process of contemporary international relations, 40.2% about the foreign policy planning process, 37.8% about crisis management and decision-making in crises, 37.8% about the technique of gaming itself, and 13.4% about *each* of these four areas of interest. In all, fifty-seven or 69.5% of the respondents reported having "learned" from their gaming experience, indicating that the experience does indeed tend to be a learning one, at least as perceived by its participants.

But what is learned? In general, the insights and lessons provided by the gaming experience prove to be dependent largely upon the knowledge and preoccupations brought by the participant to the experience. In other words, what occurs under the stresses of gaming is not so much a process of learning as it is one of sensitizing; not so much something new that is learned as it is a reinforced and heightened awareness of things previously known. By obliging the participant to confront a problem in specifics rather than in generalizations, the gaming experience stretches one's consciousness and imagination, making more salient things already known (though perhaps tucked away in some recess of the mind) and facilitating the establishment of new relations among the isolated bits of data. And because the experience is highly demanding in terms of attention and concentration, as well as being of real interest, these insights do not soon pass out of one's mind. Often, the respondents indicate, these insights are salient enough to arouse new theoretical and substantive interests. Of the personal interviewees, ten (40%) indicated having given further consideration and attention to policy problems raised in the games.

It has been suggested that maximum exploitation of gaming's "sensitizing" function might be achieved by creating a scenario design that is maximally at variance with present reality, thereby

[5]The most often cited "danger" of gaming—the likelihood of its constraining the imagination and flexibility of a policy planner or decision-maker in parallel real-life situations—is discussed in the section on "Gaming for Research and Policy Planning Purposes."

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creating an environment in which present policies and their assumptions are obviously inadequate. Thus the professional game participant might be rid of his conventional notions and free to establish new insights into a concise problem chosen by the Control Team. However, one of the most frequent criticisms of gaming noted by the respondents (20.3%) is the difficulty of grasping a scenario projection several years into the future and embarking on a game with several critical new assumptions amidst an essentially unchanged world. Such jumps are uncomfortable and, more importantly, no scenario can specify all the assumptions that may be implicit in a radically changed reality. Thus, the participant brings to any scenario his own assumptions about contemporary reality, and tends to use them rather than bear the discomfort and constraint of new, unfamiliar ones. The fewer such new assumptions the participant is asked to make and the closer the scenario sticks to present reality, then, the better the participants can concentrate on the problem under consideration in the game.

In short, the problem of maximizing potential insights into any specific subject emerges as one of effectively isolating and stressing the subject within a matrix of familiar reality and assumptions for a group of participants otherwise highly involved. Thus, both the subject of the game and the relevant assumptions of the participants are subjected to stress and to gaming's "sensitizing" function.

It is perhaps because so many respondents felt they had gained fresh insights from gaming that they view the technique as having potential, albeit limited, value in several realms—if properly modified and judiciously applied in terms of its relevant values. As mentioned earlier, the respondents were asked to rate the technique of gaming, in comparison to other techniques familiar to them, for thirteen proposed uses, six of which related to policy planning, four to research, and three to teaching and training.[6] As a whole, they rated gaming first as a teaching and training technique; second, as an adjunct to policy planning; and third as a research tool for exploring international relations and crisis management. More significantly, however, each institutional

[6]These ratings were made by the respondents on the following standard seven-interval scale:

valueless :_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____: uniquely valuable

A score of 0.0 was attributed to "valueless"; 6.0, to "uniquely valuable"; and successive integral values between.

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grouping of respondents except one rated the political-military gaming technique as being of maximum value within the functional focus of its own professional field. And when unfavorable or derogatory assessments of gaming were made by the respondents, these tended to be directed toward uses of gaming outside the respondents' own professional fields. The order in which gaming was ranked for each of its three general areas of utility by the respondents as a whole and by their institutional groupings is given in Table III.

TABLE III

RANK ORDERING OF GAMING FOR ITS THREE GENERAL USES[1]

	Total Response	Academic	Private	State Dept.	Defense Dept.	Indep. Agencies[2]
For Teaching and Training	1 (4.2)	1 (4.2)	1 (4.2)	2 (3.8)	1 (4.23)	2 (4.2)
For Policy Planning	2 (3.8)	2 (3.7)	3 (3.1)	1 (4.4)	2 (4.21)	3 (4.1)
For Research	3 (3.7)	3 (3.5)	2 (3.7)	3 (3.6)	3 (3.8)	1 (4.3)

[1]Actual mean ratings, out of a maximum possible 6.0, are in parentheses.
[2]ACDA, CIA and USIA.

These results tend to confirm that what is learned from gaming depends largely upon the knowledge and preoccupations one brings to the experience. The deviance of the "private" group from the general finding may be explained by the fact that this grouping was less homogeneous in character than any of the others, subsuming individuals with widely varied interests from diverse functional organizations and groups. This category included a clergyman, a lawyer in private practice, officials of private foundations, and members of various private research corporations.

The results also indicate that the technique of gaming affords differing values for different purposes, each demanding modifications, adaptations and refinements of the technique for maximum usefulness. We shall now examine these.

GAMING FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY PLANNING PURPOSES

As practiced at the Center for International Studies, the technique of gaming most readily affords the values of isolating a subject, concept or assumption for intensive study and of sub-

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jecting it to stresses of various kinds. It has provided the participants with often unanticipated and incisive insights into the central problem posed and into peripheral matters, and has given them dramatic illustrations of often crucial (though perhaps established) theoretical and practical notions, thereby increasing the players' awareness of their relevance. On the other hand, the non-reproducibility of the technique as presently practiced deprives it of merit as a systematic device for testing and establishing the general theoretical validity of these insights.

For research and policy planning purposes in general, the respondents rated the value of the technique of gaming in the following descending order (mean ratings, out of a possible 6.0, are in parentheses):

1. for discovering *unanticipated* policy alternatives in international problem situations (4.2);
2. for discovering *unanticipated* possible outcomes of the interaction of conflicting strategies or specific crisis situations (4.1);
3. for *generating* new hypotheses about the nature of crisis management or decision-making in crisis situations (4.0);
4. for increasing the precision and effectiveness of the foreign policy planning process (3.8);
5. for *evaluating* the validity and viability of various existing U.S. policies in international crisis situations (3.8);
6. for *testing* tentative hypotheses about the nature of crisis management or decision-making in crisis situations (3.8);
7. for determining the likely *effects* of various possible U.S. policies in crisis situations (3.7);
8. for *generating* new hypotheses about the structure and process of contemporary international relations (3.6);
9. for *testing* tentative hypotheses about the structure and process of contemporary international relations (3.4);
10. for determining the probable *reactions of other actors* to various possible U.S. policy moves in specific crisis situations (3.4).

What, then, is gaming perceived by its participants as being—and *not* being?

First, as a research tool, it was regarded not so much as a tool for the investigation of the structure and process of international relations, but rather as a technique for illuminating and investigating one aspect of those relations: crisis management and decision making in crisis situations. Given the very structure of the political-military game itself, this could hardly be otherwise. For, strikingly absent from the game situation, by design, is the larger world context of real international behavior; and always present are the intense personal involvement of the participant and the

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heavy pressures to which he is subjected. Beginning with the structured demand of the gaming technique for decisions and actions within specified time limits, these pressures build up in both the competitive intra-team exchange of assumptions and proposals and in the inter-team competitive zeal to "win," producing a fine laboratory for the illustration and study of crisis management techniques. The competitive pressures at both levels tend to create very real, though subjective, sanctions. As one interviewee observed: "You're looking at live people who are your peers coping with genuine problems as they might arise, and doing so under strong competitive and professional pressure to perform well. It is often a real test of oneself as a result." And while no objective sanctions in terms of threats to the status or job of the participants are applied, very few respondents indicated that lack of such sanctions had in any way detracted from the real crisis atmosphere of the game. This would suggest that, at least for interested and sophisticated professionals, the absence of real sanctions does not substantially affect the procedural aspects of the decision-making process itself, although it may well affect the substantive nature of these decisions (as, for example, by downgrading the role of weapons technology in decisions or by increasing risk-taking behavior).

For research purposes, then, the small-group setting inherent in gaming affords a singular opportunity for studying aspects of decision-making and communication processes in crisis situations. At the intra-team level there is the opportunity to observe the processes of situation-definition, information-search, risk-taking, group compromise, and policy formulation. Simultaneously, at the inter-team level, there are present such phenomena as bargaining, negotiation, and the communication of intent, commitment and resolve.

However, the respondents regarded the technique more highly for generating new hypotheses than for testing tentative ones, and they indicated that a great deal more systematization and standardization are required before it may be considered a reliable and valid research tool. The role of Control especially, the respondents indicated, would have to be standardized, and many replays of the same problem run in order to build up a sufficient number of cases for the kind of statistical analysis associated with contemporary political science research. At present the technique strikes them as too cumbersome, costly and nonreproducible for

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such systematic research purposes. Standardized games, providing a standardized scenario and role for Control, played by standardized groups of individuals, would seem a first step in this direction.

Nonetheless, 41.3% (19) of those respondents specifically engaged in research stated that their gaming experience had been of practical value to them in doing their research. And while most felt that this experience had been of a "general and imponderable value," several respondents cited tangible practical effects of the experience on their own research. Six (7.5%) of the respondents have used the technique themselves for research purposes, and sixteen (20.3%) have recommended its use for this purpose.

More than a research tool, the technique of gaming was regarded by the participants as a heuristic and testing tool for, or as an adjunct to, policy planning. It was regarded not as a technique for predicting events, reactions or the outcomes of conflict, or for evolving actual contingency plans as such. Rather, it was valued as a technique for generating evaluative insights into policy problems and, especially, for discovering unanticipated possibilities in the international arena. It is within this realm, if the sheer amount of substantive output by our respondents is any indication, that gaming's greatest potential and seemingly greatest "danger" both reside.

Of the study respondents, 43.9% (36) felt they had learned from gaming something about the nature and requirements of the foreign policy planning process; of those actually engaged in policy planning, 55.9% (19) felt the experience had been of practical value to them in their work; and 26.6% (21) of all respondents have had the opportunity to recommend its use for policy planning purposes. What values did these individuals feel gaming affords the policy planning process? These are manifold and, while often overlapping the realm of "training," all highly pertinent to the complex and difficult task of the policy planner.

When asked what elements of gaming struck him as being particularly unrealistic, one respondent noted that in the real world only "rarely can one focus on one item at a time." Indeed, the degree to which, in games, the focus of all attention is concentrated on a single critical issue or problem is typical of only the rarest of international events. Yet this is the source of gaming's value to the policy planner: its capacity for subjecting to stress a variety of variables, assumptions, policies, techniques and

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instruments, and controlling that stress in the interest of testing the subject for its validity and implications. Accordingly, in the words of one respondent:

> The necessity under the pressure of gaming for resolving the conflicting tendencies and action preferences within one's own team forces the articulation of assumptions behind these preferences. To the extent that the policy planner is not aware of the assumptions being ground into policy planning, gaming helps one guard against temperamental, unconscious assumptions in dealing with problem situations which can have many chance factors in them.

In so doing, gaming stretches the limits of one's imagination, of one's notions of the plausible and the possible, and one's awareness of the role of the unanticipated in international affairs.

A second important effect of this experience for the policy planner is the exposure it provides to crisis-type behavior and the possibility that such exposure may help to minimize its undesirable effects in the real-life instance. For many respondents the importance of communications was surely dramatized, and its role in inducing crisis-type behavior noted. As one personal interviewee noted, "in the light of this experience, President Kennedy's reported emotional detachment during the thirty-eight divided council sessions at the time of the Cuban missile crisis looms as a major prerequisite for a great diplomat or statesman."

In the same vein, the importance of communications between governments, and even of allowing communications in a hostile camp to go largely unjammed in time of crisis were dramatically illustrated. Several other respondents, reflecting upon the experience, cited a now more urgently felt need for empirical study of the bases of reactions of people in other societies, both by conventional research methods and by adding non-Americans to gaming teams. One noted that while, in the games, "some of the assumptions made about how and why people would react were primitive, they were nonetheless made by more sophisticated individuals than many of those making them in real life."

Another frequently mentioned value of the gaming experience for the policy planner is that of having had the opportunity to work around the periphery of a potential or incipient crisis in advance of an analogous situation that might arise subsequently in real life. It is believed that the planner will acquire more of a "feel" for the timing, logistics, political implications, and other aspects of the problem than he would in the absence of the game experience.

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However, this "familiarization" issue is also among the most common objections to gaming among its detractors and especially among those who have not played in this type of game. They are concerned that such a prior game experience might constrict or inhibit the participant's imagination and range of choice in the face of a real crisis situation which he perceived as being analogous. Several questions were designed to examine this most salient, even poignant, issue. The respondents were asked how they felt a decision-maker's prior participation in a political-military exercise might tend to affect the *quantity* and *quality* of policy alternatives perceived by him, should a real crisis situation arise similar to that hypothesized in the game. While many noted that the answer to this might well depend upon the personality and abilities of the individual involved (suggesting that they were answering in terms of their *own* experience and expectations), the results were:

Quantitative Effect		*Qualitative Effect*	
Increase the Number	76.7%	Enrich the Quality	87.5%
Leave Unaffected	19.2	Leave Unaffected	8.3
Decrease the Number	4.1	Impoverish the Quality	4.2

As a check on this response, each respondent was also asked to complete a section of fourteen "forced choice" questions on "hypothesized international events," indicating the policy choice and outcome he considered more or most likely in such an event. The hypothesized situations were chosen directly from the scenarios and final reports of the first eight exercises in this series, and the alternative choices posed represent the actual alternatives considered in the relevant game, including the one ultimately selected, established or indicated. The responses to these questions were tabulated separately for those who had participated in the relevant game and for all other respondents.[7] In only one of the fourteen questions was the difference between the responses of these two groups found to be significant beyond the 60.0% level. For the set of fourteen questions, there was found to be no significance in these differences beyond the 80.0% level. The differences in response, then, were not significant; and this set of questions would tend to demonstrate the validity of the assertion that participation in a game does not tend to inhibit one's range of choice in the face of a similar crisis situation.

More than a mere "familiarization," the experience of gaming

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is in general enriching to policy planners. That the enrichment provided by the game is not restricted simply to similar situations in real life was indicated by the personal interviewees, 60 per cent of whom indicated that they felt their gaming experience was applicable to more general types of crises. The response of these individuals suggested that the gaming experience had provided them with insights which might well be extrapolated to more general classes of crisis.

Generally speaking, then, gaming affords the policy planner the manifold values and effects of: (1) subjecting his assumptions,

[7]For example, the following set of questions was taken from the final report of a game conducted in November 1963:

	Total Response	Specific Game Participants	Other Respondents	X^2	P
a. In the event of an invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam, a successful counter-attack by the South, and subsequent Communist Chinese intervention in the conflict, is it likely that the United States and Communist China would become involved in a major military confrontation in Vietnam?					
*Yes	88.7%	87.5%	88.9%		
No	11.3	12.5	11.1		
	N=71	N=8	N=63	0.0	1.00
b. In the case of such an event, the U.S. government would:					
take no direct military action to counter the Chinese intervention.	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		
use tactical nuclear weapons against the intervening Chinese troops.	11.8	0.0	13.3		
*counter the Chinese intervention with conventional arms only.	85.3	100.0	83.4		
do none of the above.	2.9	0.0	3.3		
	N=68	N=8	N=60	1.31	0.99

*Indicates the outcome that actually occurred in that game.

X^2 and P indicate the chi-square significance test value and probability. P indicates the probability that differences in responses (between game participants and non-participants) are due to chance, are *not* significant. Thus, the probability that the differences are significant is 1-P.

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policies and techniques to controlled stress, thereby testing their validity, viability and implications; (2) exploring contingencies and alternatives not readily obvious and which may emerge only too late in the development of a real situation to be taken into account and compensated for; (3) illustrating the sequential unfolding of move and countermove in a longer perspective than can be achieved in the myopic setting of day-to-day events; (4) encouraging the flexibility of thought that results from challenging the "givens" of one's policies, and a correspondingly greater flexibility in policy planning and operation; and (5) emphasizing and delineating the human element in crisis management.

The one warning note that must be sounded here is that we are *not* tracing cause and effect in this study. We are merely reporting on what the individual participants in these games—highly sophisticated individuals by any normal standard—consciously felt and stated that they had derived from this experience. However, as was noted earlier, gaming is primarily a "sensitizing" device, illuminating, intensifying and contrasting what is brought to the game by the individual. Thus, the experience of gaming is only as beneficial, or as dangerous, as the raw intellectual and attitudinal materials brought to it. So long and insofar as policy planners may be assumed to be sophisticated and flexible individuals, the problem may be assumed to resolve itself.

Gaming for Teaching and Training Purposes

Although it was in both cases advocated as a supplementary and synthesizing technique, political-military gaming received its highest ratings as a technique for teaching and for training. In terms of both, gaming is of obvious value as an interest-arousing and learning-by-doing technique. But it offers further distinct benefits for each.

As a training technique for professional senior-level military and diplomatic officers, gaming was not regarded by the respondents as a substitute for solid study of the traditional disciplines upon which each profession is founded. It was, however, regarded by them as having substantially unique value for: (1) forcing the individual to survey the landscape above and beyond his own job; (2) affording the individual the stimulus to think in terms of dynamic relations rather than in terms of discrete objects of policy with respect to the behavior of both the United States and other nations; and, (3) acquainting him with the complexi-

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ties of crisis management and decision making in such situations.

Foremost among these values for the professional is the fact that gaming underscores and vivifies the relationships among the diplomatic, political, military, sociological and economic factors involved in any high-level policy decision. In the gaming experience the individual is afforded the opportunity to expose himself to these differing functional viewpoints and to familiarize himself with the varying assumptions, prejudices and problems of the individuals holding them. It was generally felt by the respondents that this common experience among diverse functional types facilitates communication among them in real life, and provides a convenient analogue in terms of which the participant subsequently can and does perceive the larger reality of policy problems.

The nature of these values, as well as the almost identical ratings given gaming as a training aid by the participating State Department and Defense Department personnel, indicate that the technique is of essentially similar and equal value for the training of both military and diplomatic personnel for policy positions.

It was further suggested by several respondents that gaming might prove an extremely valuable "testing tool," to enable senior professional personnel, acting as observers, to evaluate the potential performance of trainees and candidates for policy positions. In view of the extent to which the pressures of gaming throw light on the personality of the individual, revealing many of his strengths and weaknesses, it was believed that gaming would perhaps prove superior to the traditional "oral" examinations in assessing an individual's qualifications for a given position. At the very least, it was believed that gaming should prove a worthwhile addition to the usual battery of assessment tests.

For the university student of international relations and foreign policy, especially at the graduate level, gaming was likewise recommended by the respondents as a supplement to the curriculum. The technique has already demonstrated that it adds to routine course matter the dimensions of both personal excitement and an appreciation of international rivalries as conflicts in basic assumptions, values and real interests. As one teacher reported:

I've had my class act as the U.S., USSR, and Egyptian teams in dealing with the projected deterioration of Libyan stability subsequent to the present King's death. Voluntary reading by the class clearly rose; emo-

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tional and intellectual understanding and discrimination rose; and all voted for making a game a regular feature of the course.

Gaming was further cited for its value to students as an aid in: (1) substantiating certain models and theories, as well as specific theoretical views about (a) the role of uncertainty, indeterminancy and risk in international relations, and (b) compromise, bargaining and negotiation within and among nations; (2) illustrating the complexities of diplomacy and of political-military relations in international affairs; and (3) illustrating the problems and processes of policy planning and decision making, with especial emphasis on the constraints on the freedom of action in decision making.

The technique of gaming was likewise highly rated and recommended as a supplementary technique for preparing university instructors and professors for teaching international relations and foreign policy, particularly as only a small proportion of teachers ever become actively involved in the planning and making of foreign policy. In the words of one Ph.D. respondent, a former teacher turned policy planner: "Gaming can give them a sense of responsibility in what they're talking and writing about, by providing them with a glimpse of what they might do if they were participating in reality rather than just observing it."

Fully half of the thirty-two respondents who are engaged in teaching or training felt that the gaming experience had helped them in their work. Among all respondents, eleven (13.8%) have used the gaming techniques in teaching, and three (3.5%) in training professionals. Twenty-three (29.1%) and twenty-two (27.8%) have had occasion to recommend its use for teaching and training, respectively.

Summary and Conclusions

The reactions of the participants to their experiences in the nine exercises conducted by the Center for International Studies since 1958 suggest that political-military gaming is a diffuse learning experience of unique intensity and personal involvement. In its capacity to exert controlled stresses upon various isolated subjects and concepts, this particular technique generally affords the individual participant the unanticipated and vivid insights that arise from increased consciousness and awareness. Often, these insights will form the bases of new and lasting interests and concerns, testifying to the intensity of the live experience.

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What is actually learned, however, is primarily a function of the knowledgeability, preoccupations and imagination of the individual participant himself. Thus, depending upon the sensitivities of the participant, gaming can provide many vivid illustrations of and insights into the manifold aspects of international political and military processes. The extent to which such is the case is reflected in the fact that each of the major institutional groupings of respondents rated gaming as being of principal value for its own primary purposes. Thus, the academics rated it highest for teaching; the State Department personnel, for policy planning purposes; the Defense Department personnel, for training purposes; and the independent government agencies' personnel, for research purposes.

This also illustrates the fact that gaming affords differing values for each of these purposes, necessitating trade-offs and modifications within the gaming technique to adapt it most effectively to its various heuristic, pedagogical and testing purposes. Though it is a general-purpose tool, gaming is not maximally effective for all its possible purposes in the same structural format.

In general, the technique of gaming as presently employed is regarded as having far greater value for generating insights and hypotheses than it has for testing these. A great deal of study and systematization of the myriad variables in the technique, especially the insufficiently understood role of Control, is required before the problems of its nonreproducibility can be resolved. A singularly promising prospect of gaming for basic research, however, is provided by its inherent structure as a laboratory for the study of small-group interaction and communication.

Within the policy planning realm, gaming's capacity for subjecting systems, assumptions and policies to controlled stresses, as maintained by an alert Control Team, affords a unique testing and heuristic value. It has been demonstrated that, for the policy planner, the experience of so subjecting himself, his assumptions, his proposals and his technologies is an enriching experience, widening the boundaries of his imagination and preconceptions and leaving him a more flexible and aware individual.

As a learning-by-doing device, gaming is most highly rated by the participants as a supplementary technique both for training professional military and diplomatic officers and for teaching students of international relations. For the professional, gaming offers the especial value of exposing him to functional viewpoints

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and responsibilities different from his own, thus enlarging his understanding of policy problems and facilitating his communications across functional boundaries. It has also been suggested that, given the stresses to which the game participant is subjected, gaming might well be employed as a supplementary "testing tool" for the evaluation of candidates for policy positions.

For the student of international relations, gaming has been found not only to arouse interest in substantive subject matter but also to provide vivid illustrations of certain selected theoretical notions and models in that field. It has also been used effectively to demonstrate the problems of policy planning and constraints on decision making.

One negative comment frequently made by respondents on the use of gaming for teaching and training is the disproportionate investment of both time and money, compared with more traditional techniques, required to conduct a game. Given the enthusiasm for gaming's value, and the additional research benefits that might be afforded a central agency in terms of systematizing the technique, it would seem well worth the effort at this juncture to program a standardized instructional gaming device that would allow game sponsors flexibility in scenario construction and subject stress.

The many uses to which gaming is now being put attest to the breadth of its applicability as a heuristic, pedagogical and testing tool. Among the current or recent uses to which it has been put are: in communications research, to examine organizational decision making; in policy planning, to test and determine force structures, weapons systems, and command and control communication systems; in the training of professionals, to illustrate escalation potential in conflict areas and the local commander's role in combating and containing such situations; and in teaching students, to dramatize the roles of risk, uncertainty and indeterminancy in international relations.

Political-military gaming has thus proven its relevance and value in several areas of contemporary practical and intellectual concern. It would seem that the next task is to examine closely the variables and factors of which it is composed and systematically to construct at least a partially reproducible technique. In so doing, gaming's present utility can only be enhanced, and its applicability broadened throughout the policy sciences.

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NATIONALITIES, NATIONS AND THE SOVIET WORLD STATE: KHRUSHCHEV'S AMBITIONS AND FRUSTRATIONS

by Elliot R. Goodman

ONE way to measure former Premier Khrushchev's success or failure as a political leader and a communist prophet is to trace the evolution during his reign of Soviet doctrine concerning nationalities and nationalism. Few political issues present a greater challenge to a communist leader—or a better gauge of his ambitions and achievements—than the commitment to refashion a national consciousness and reshape the nation-state system.

I

Khrushchev's classic, comprehensive formulation of his aims is found in his speech of March 7, 1959, in which he speculated upon the process of the future fusion of national entities. "With the victory of communism on a world-wide scale," he predicted, "borders between states will disappear, as Marxism-Leninism teaches. In all likelihood only ethnic borders will survive for a time. . . . They will simply demarcate the historically formed location of a given people or nationality in a given territory." In keeping with the tradition of Soviet nationality theory, Khrushchev insisted that the evolution of nations under Soviet control would foreshadow the evolution of nations on a global scale, for the multinational Soviet state is viewed as the prototype for the amalgamation of all nations into a Soviet world state after the anticipated global victory of communism. That nations will lose their separate political identities and survive for a time only as ethnic groups "is shown by the process going on in the Soviet Union, which is a multinational state."

Looking at those nations outside the Soviet Union that were already under communist control, Khrushchev relied heavily upon the laws of economic determinism: the growing economic integration of the bloc countries would foster the political merger of these nations. "Speaking of the future, it seems to me that the further development of the socialist countries will in all probability proceed along the lines of the consolidation of a single

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world socialist economic system. The economic barriers that divided countries under capitalism will fall one after another. The common economic foundation of world socialism will grow stronger, eventually rendering pointless the question of borders." It was this unified economic base that would facilitate the fraternal *rapprochement* of nations. Again, viewing the USSR as the model endowed with universal validity, Khrushchev said that just as "all the peoples of the Union and Autonomous Republics of our country are united in a single family," so on a broader scale one could look to "the amalgamation of nations in a single family. The question of borders as it is presently conceived will gradually cease to exist. No sovereign socialist country can shut itself up within its own borders. . . ."[1]

What Khrushchev did not explicitly specify in this statement, but what is amply documented by official Soviet policy as well as by numerous other pronouncements of Soviet authorities, is the Russian-centered and Russian-dominated character of such an anticipated fusion of nations. On the issue of a future, single, universal language, for example, Soviet theorists have made it clear that this language is expected to be Russian.[2]

II

In pursuing the goal of the amalgamation of nations within the Soviet Union, Soviet leaders have adhered to Khrushchev's prescription. The authoritative 1961 Program of the CPSU repeatedly emphasized the inevitability of the fusion of Soviet peoples and nations.

> The boundaries between the Union Republics of the USSR are increasingly losing their former significance. . . .
>
> Full-scale Communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR, in which the nations will draw still closer together until complete union is achieved. . . .

[1] *Pravda,* March 27, 1959.

[2] For a concrete picture of the projected Soviet image of the future for all nations, see this writer's *The Soviet Design for a World State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), especially Chapters 3 and 4 on the Russified nature of the intended world state, and Chapter 9 on Russian as the future world language. Doubtless this image remains a valid statement of Soviet aims and intentions, although Khrushchev, and now his successors, obviously lack the power to fulfill their ambitions. This study was purposely entitled the *Soviet,* not the *Communist,* design for a world state, however, since it was apparent that Moscow could not continue to speak for the entire world communist movement. The Sino-Soviet dispute, which has broken into the open since the appearance of this book, was examined briefly in its embryonic and muffled form, and the query concerning Peking's view of the Soviet design was directly posed and answered: "When it is asked how China, and all the multitudes of Asia, fit into this picture, it must be recognized that they do not." (*Ibid.,* p. 370).

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. . . Communism will call for still greater inter-connection and mutual assistance between the Soviet republics. The closer the intercourse between the nations and the greater the awareness of country-wide tasks the more successfully can manifestations of parochialism and national egoism be overcome.

In order to ensure the successful accomplishment of the tasks of Communist construction and the coordination of economic activities inter-republic economic organs may be set up. . . .

There is a growing ideological unity among the nations and nationalities and a greater *rapprochement* of their cultures. . . . An international culture common to all the Soviet nations is developing.

The Party Program reaffirmed that the new "international" culture was to be Russian-based and Russian-dominated, and picked out for special mention the essential role of the Russian language:

The voluntary study of Russian in addition to the native language is of positive significance, since it facilitates reciprocal exchange of experiences and access of every nation and nationality to the cultural gains of all the other peoples of the USSR, and to world culture. The Russian language has, in effect, become the common medium of intercourse and cooperation between all the people of the USSR.

The Program also echoed the familiar claim that the Soviet nationalities policy is a model of universal significance:

Attaching decisive importance to the development of the socialist content of the cultures of the peoples of the USSR, the Party will promote their further mutual enrichment and rapprochement, the consolidation of their international basis, and thereby the formation of the future single world-wide culture of communist society.[3]

Khrushchev's speech to the Congress that adopted the new Party Program made explicit the connection between Russification and the fusion of nations. He warned that "even the smallest manifestations of nationalistic survivals must be eradicated." That these were survivals of the non-Russian peoples only was evident when he added:

One cannot fail to note the growing striving of the non-Russian peoples to master the Russian language. . . . This voluntary study of the Russian language is a process of positive significance for the development of cooperation between nations. The nations of our country are drawing closer together and their social homogeneity is being strengthened. In the course of the full-scale building of communism, complete unity of nations will be achieved.[4]

A flood of subsequent statements in the Soviet press by non-

[3] *Pravda,* November 2, 1961.
[4] *Ibid.,* October 19, 1961.

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Russian political and cultural figures praising the "contributions" of the Russian peoples to the lives of the non-Russian nationalities leaves no doubt that the "mutual enrichment and rapprochement" of nations is intended to be a one-way process.[5]

The drawing together of nationalities by means of inter-republic economic organs, of which the Party Program spoke, has begun to attain organizational structure. Following the November 1962 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, a Central Asian Bureau was created and attached to the CPSU Central Committee. It was made responsible for coordinating the political and economic activity of the Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik and Kirghiz Union Republics. Simultaneously a number of new "supranational" state organs came into being, including the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz, the State Committee for Building of the Central Asian Economic Region, the Central Asian Directorate for Cotton Growing, and the Main Directorate for Irrigation and the Construction of Sovkhozes. The composition of the new Central Asian Party Bureau, comprised of eleven members, is revealing: the native first Party secretaries of the four Union Republics were given seats, but the chairman and deputy chairman are both Russians, and the other five places are also occupied by Russians. As one observer has commented: "The new bureau, standing between Moscow and the authorities of the Union Republics, and visibly controlled by Russians, cannot possibly fail to diminish the already meager powers left in the hands of Moslem Communist officials."[6]

Similar arrangements apparently are under consideration for the Transcaucasian republics as well. In December 1962 the First Party Secretary of Azerbaijan announced that proposals for uniting some affairs of these four Union Republics had been placed before the CPSU Central Committee, and in March 1963 it was revealed that a Transcaucasian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee had come into being.[7]

It would appear that these moves are only the beginning. The chief editor of *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo,* A. I. Lepeshkin, writing in the May 1963 issue, hinted at the eventual state merger

[5]Perhaps the fullest exposition is found in K. Khanazarov, *Sblizhenie natsii i natsional'nykh iazykov v SSSR* (*The Drawing Together of Nations and National Languages in the USSR*) (Tashkent: 1963).

[6]Michael Rywkin, "Central Asia and the Price of Sovietization," *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1964, pp. 13-14.

[7]"The Future of Federalism," *Central Asian Review,* XI, No. 4, 1963, p. 335.

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of the various Union Republics. "It would be incorrect to think that Soviet federation and, even more, Soviet national statehood have already fulfilled their historical mission," he explained.

> The national-state and federal links between the four Union Republics of Central Asia no longer meet the needs of their new economic relations with each other. . . .
>
> The formation of single economic agencies for the four Union Republics of Central Asia has also given rise to a new kind of legal relations between them, which by their nature are federal relations of a new type. There is no doubt that in the process of creating the material and technical basis of communism, a further unification of the efforts of the Central Asian Soviet Republics will take place in other branches of economic and cultural construction, which may lead in certain circumstances to the creation of new joint state agencies for all these republics. It is not ruled out that this process could end with the creation of joint all-federal legislative and governmental bodies for the Central Asian republics. Analogous processes are now taking place in relations between the republics of Transcaucasia, which also constitute a single economic region.[8]

III

Khrushchev's goal of proceeding with the continuous integration and amalgamation of nations around the ruling Russian center apparently will be pursued unremittingly for those nations under direct Soviet control. But what about Khrushchev's goal with respect to those communist nations not under direct Soviet control? Here the configuration of power in the communist world changed so radically during Khrushchev's relatively brief tenure that his grandiose vision was reduced to a fanciful daydream.

It was, of course, the failure to contain the conflicts between Moscow and Peking, which burst into the open during Khrushchev's ascendancy, that fundamentally reshaped the communist world. The Sino-Soviet rift did more than affect the relationship between these two power centers. The challenge to the authority of the former single center of world communism has also loosened Moscow's discipline over its once obedient satellites, and has provided them with considerable latitude to maneuver between the two major communist powers.

The startling extent to which Moscow's writ has shrunk is perhaps best illustrated by the case of Rumania. In Khrushchev's 1959 statement about the future elimination of borders between communist states, he singled out the people's democracies of East

[8]Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 337, 339-340.

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Central Europe as the next likely candidates for merger with each other and with an expanding Soviet Union. Khrushchev cited the past controversies over the borders between Poland and the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Hungary, Rumania and Hungary, and Rumania and the Soviet Union as examples of the legacy of capitalism—a legacy which would gradually disappear.[9] But today Rumania's borders are obviously of greater, not less, importance than they were in 1959.

As early as April 1958 Rumanian spokesmen objected to Khrushchev's plans for the economic integration of the satellites with the Soviet Union under the aegis of the Soviet-directed Council for Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon). Khrushchev held that the "socialist international division of labor" required Rumanian specialization in limited economic areas, whereas the Rumanians insisted upon a many-sided economic growth that would give priority to heavy industry and permit Rumania to develop all branches of its national economy. Consistent with the goal of creating an independent, viable national economy, the Rumanian leaders undertook, by a decision of November 1958, to reorient their nation's trade away from its dependence upon the Soviet bloc and to increase trade with the West. For several years the Soviet-Rumanian dispute remained muted, but the Rumanians did not step back from their original defiant stance. Then in June 1960 the Rumanians unveiled an ambitious six-year plan based on a rapid, balanced development of heavy industry. In December 1960 the controversy within Comecon broke into the open and became publicly acrimonious, after which relations between the Rumanian leaders and Khrushchev's agency for regional economic integration became steadily worse.[10]

The boldest statement of Khrushchev's theoretical position was set forth in his report on the Comecon heads of government meeting, held in Moscow in June 1962. Khrushchev's interpretation of the plans discussed there showed that he had resumed his demands for the economic fusion of the Soviet-bloc countries so that it would, to use his earlier phrase, "render pointless the question of borders" among these states. He began by citing Lenin's view in 1918: "Lenin conceived of the future cooperation of socialist nations in the form of a single world cooperative in which

[9] *Pravda,* March 27, 1959.

[10] John M. Montias, "Background and Origins of the Rumanian Dispute with Comecon," *Soviet Studies,* October 1964, pp. 125-151; J. F. Brown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," *Survey,* October 1963, pp. 19-34.

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the economy would be run under a common plan." Khrushchev bolstered this by quoting from Lenin's famous 1920 Comintern Theses on the National Question, which were conspicuously resurrected during Khrushchev's tenure.

> The tendency towards a single worldwide economy, regulated as one whole by the proletariat of all nations according to a common plan, Lenin declared, "is already quite clearly revealed under capitalism and unquestionably will be further developed and fully consummated under socialism." Now with the emergence of socialism beyond the bounds of one country, we observe a process unprecedented in human history of the working people joining together in the effort to build a new society on the scale of a world system. . . . Now the world socialist system is forming itself into a single whole not only politically but also economically.

Specifically, the Comecon countries were decreed ripe

> for raising their economic and political cooperation to a new and higher level. Coordination of national economic plans, international socialist division of labor, and coordination and specialization of production, ensuring successful development of the socialist countries in an organic interrelationship, acquire special importance at this stage. The world socialist system is now at a stage where it is no longer possible correctly to chart its development by merely adding up the various national economies.

Rather, Khrushchev insisted, the time had come to "develop the ties among them and gradually advance, within the framework of the system as a whole, towards that single economic organism which Lenin's genius foresaw."[11] In order to implement his aim of more closely coordinated international planning, joint financing of common socialist enterprises, integrated national investment plans and the like, the powers granted to Comecon would clearly have to be augmented. In short, Khrushchev was seeking, however gradually, to make Comecon a supranational organ.

The Rumanians understood perfectly Khrushchev's schemes. During 1963 Bucharest determinedly blocked all progress toward Khrushchev's objective. Following a plenary session of the Party's Central Committee in April 1964, the Rumanian communists made public their counter-doctrine. They bluntly rejected proposals for the establishment of "a common plan and a single planning body for all member countries, interstate joint production by branches of the economy, enterprises belonging jointly to different countries, interstate economic complexes, etc." The Ru-

[11] *Kommunist*, August 1962, pp. 3-6.

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manians insisted that nothing valid could be accomplished without strict "respect for national sovereignty and national interests on the basis of mutually beneficial and comradely aid." In their view, the essence of Khrushchev's measures consisted "in transferring certain functions of economic administration to the competence of suprastate bodies or organs." But "the sovereignty of the socialist state demands that the state make full and effective use of the means for applying in practice the attributes of this sovereignty, and have all the levers for controlling economic and social life in its hands. To give these levers to the competence of suprastate or extrastate bodies would be to turn sovereignty into a meaningless concept."[12]

The Rumanian communists then disputed Khrushchev's use of Lenin's authority by tossing back another of Lenin's famous statements, also made in 1920. In his diatribe against "left doctrinairism," expounded in " 'Left-Wing' Communism, an Infantile Disorder," Lenin warned against abstract, stereotyped attitudes which oversimplified the differing conditions of struggle that existed in different nations. Citing this passage, the Rumanians recalled:

> Lenin pointed out that even when socialism has triumphed on a world scale, or at least in most countries, the diversity of the peculiarities of these countries, of their distinctive national and state features, will prevail for a long time, even after the victory of the proletariat on a world scale, and this will make it an extremely complex task to find the organizational forms of economic cooperation.

From this, they concluded that "there is now no basis for establishing these organizational forms, linked to setting up a single world economy, which is a problem for a future stage in history." For the Rumanians, the "Leninist truth" that was revealed in their own choice of texts proved that "socialist countries can achieve their unity of actions in all domains, economic as well as political, by reciprocal consultation and the joint elaboration of certain common positions with regard to major problems of principle, and not by establishing exclusive solutions by some suprastate authority."[13]

IV

The spectacle of communists exchanging blows with passages from the Leninist, and other Marxist, scriptures, is an old one.

[12] *Scinteia*, April 26, 1964.
[13] *Ibid.*

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It is not always easy to render a clear decision in such a dispute, since these scriptures, like the Bible, can be quoted to prove almost anything. But if one were to hazard a judgment in this case, it would seem that Khrushchev was hewing closer to Lenin's intent than the Rumanian leaders. Lenin's reference to a single economic plan elaborated for all socialist nations was founded on his assumption of the ever-increasing penetration and interweaving of economic forces across the boundaries of nation-states, which were, after all, considered a typical expression of bourgeois society. It is most unlikely that Lenin would have sanctioned the strivings of socialist nations for economic independence and self-sufficiency, or, as in the case of Rumania, the breaking of economic ties with the Soviet bloc so that they might be replaced by trade and economic assistance from the capitalist West. Moreover, the Rumanians conveniently overlooked a sentence which prefaced the passage they cited, in which Lenin said that unless such national differences were taken into account it would be impossible "to create a really centralized, leading center, capable of directing international tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for a World Soviet Republic."[14]

While Khrushchev may have had doctrinal authority on his side, the Rumanians had the power realities of the 1960's on theirs. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization in 1956 led to the tumult of the Polish "October" and the Hungarian Revolution. Khrushchev could not—and, indeed, did not try to—reimpose a Stalinist straitjacket on Eastern Europe. He was not successful after 1956 in his attempt to create stability and voluntary political reunification of the Soviet empire by means of the economic integration of the bloc states. The centrifugal and nationalist forces unleashed in 1956 could not so easily be recaptured. Beyond this was the decisive fact that Khrushchev was cast in the role of a suppliant, pleading for support from the leaders of the bloc states in his struggle with Peking. The ability to exploit this weakness, demonstrated most astutely by the Rumanians, caused Khrushchev's supranational ambitions to fade into oblivion.

In the summer of 1964 the issue of supranationalism came to a head in the "Valev affair." Professor E. B. Valev published a seemingly innocuous academic study in the bulletin of Moscow University, in which he examined the logic for a joint international authority for the development of the lower Danube region

[14]Lenin, *Sochineniia,* third edition (Moscow: 1935), XXV, p. 227.

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among the Soviet Union, Rumania and Bulgaria. This study, which was issued in limited numbers and was not advanced as a proposal of the Soviet government, evoked an explosive reaction from Bucharest. The Rumanian journal *Viata Economica* first characterized the plan it went on to attack:

> In the eyes of E. B. Valev, the socialist states, as constituent parts of the world socialist economic system, as subjects of economic cooperation, begin to disappear, their place being gradually taken by interstate complexes, and it is these latter which have to integrate themselves into the socialist international division of labor.

But who, the journal asked, invited a Russian to study the Rumanian economy?

> On this territory nobody has anything to study, neither in detail nor in lesser detail, without authorization from the Rumanian government, for both the efficient use of the resources and the location of projects, as well as any other problems, big or small, are of the exclusive competence of the Rumanian government and people.

Valev's proposal was viewed as an attempt to violate Rumania's territorial integrity and to dismember its national unity.

> Rumania would be liquidated as a state and the Rumanian people as a nation, by simple administrative means, justified "economically" in the name of pseudo-Marxist-Leninist considerations. . . . As far as Rumania is concerned she will not participate in any "interstate complex," in any "superstate" form of cooperation of "socialist integration."[15]

Khrushchev was by now in such a defensive position that *Izvestiia* promptly censured the Soviet professor, acknowledging that he had approached his topic from "an insufficiently high theoretical level."[16] Khrushchev's subsequent fall from power has only served to invigorate Rumanian defiance and self-assertion. Soviet admission of defeat was reflected in the report at the beginning of 1965 that the Comecon members were engaged in redrafting their statutes so as to strip them of even the shadow of supranational powers.[17]

Rumania's recent assertion of nationalism has taken many forms. Abroad, Rumanian leaders have shuttled back and forth

[15]The full text of this long article is reproduced in English, significantly enough, in *Peking Review,* July 31, 1964, pp. 28-40. Rumania's concept of the proper approach to joint Danube projects was demonstrated by the bilateral Rumanian-Yugoslav ceremony of September 7, 1964, which inaugurated joint navigation and bridge construction at the "Iron Gate" and a related power generating system. (*New York Times,* September 8, 1964.)

[16]*Izvestiia,* July 4, 1964.

[17]*New York Times,* January 2, 1965.

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between Moscow and Peking, acting as self-appointed intermediaries, while demonstrating their own independence. Or they have flown off to Washington and Paris seeking to negotiate economic deals that will make them less dependent upon Moscow. At home, the study of Russian has been conspicuously downgraded, while preference for things Rumanian has been conspicuously upgraded, at the expense of the Hungarian, German and other national minorities living in Rumania. An American reporter who recently toured these minority areas related that an uninhibited Rumanian citizen, pointing at a map of the adjoining Soviet territory which contains the former Rumanian provinces of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, said simply: "Those are ours."[18] The atmosphere which has stimulated and encouraged the open expression of this type of sentiment hardly accords with Khrushchev's hopes about the withering away of state borders and the fusion of nations.

V

What, then, has become of the long-standing Soviet ambition, which Khrushchev sought to reaffirm, to merge all nations upon the anticipated global victory of communism into a single, Moscow-controlled world state? In a speech to high Party functionaries in Moscow on January 6, 1961, Khrushchev continued to insist: "The Soviet Union stands at the head of the socialist camp and the CPSU at the head of the Communist movement." But he added: "It is impossible to lead all the socialist countries and Communist Parties from a single center. It is both impossible and unnecessary. . . . The fact that we are called 'the head' spells no advantage for our Party or the other Parties. Just the reverse. It only creates difficulties."[19] By claiming that there was no longer a single center for the world communist movement, Khrushchev could disavow responsibility for Peking's policy which "creates difficulties." He could also hope to gain greater freedom of action to protect special Soviet interests. But by the same token, he acknowledged that without a single world communist movement ruled from Moscow it would no longer be conceivable to create a Soviet world state, also ruled from Moscow. Thereafter, Khrushchev's spokesmen maintained that

[18]David Binder, *ibid.*, July 14, 1964. Peking has openly supported Rumania's view that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina should be returned by the Soviet Union, and Rumania has become bolder in raising this issue. (*Ibid.*, December 19 and 23, 1964.)

[19]*World Marxist Review*, January 1961, pp. 25-26.

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"the Chinese leaders wanted to set up the official 'post' of head of the communist movement in order subsequently to usurp it."[20]

As the Sino-Soviet conflict developed, Soviet spokesmen, in order to rally, entice and cajole communist parties to align themselves with Moscow against Peking, even had to de-emphasize the notion of the Soviet Union as "the head of the Socialist camp," and play up, instead, the equal rights of all of its members. Making a virtue of necessity, Moscow feigned the greatest solicitude for its former satellites:

> If we want to achieve the genuine, stable unity of all the socialist countries, we must learn to understand and respect one another. Marxist-Leninists have always respected and continue to respect national sovereignty and stand for the full flourishing of the national economies and cultures, for the equal rights of the socialist countries. Communists see the only way to a steady rapprochement of nations, their fraternal cooperation and close alliance, is by unconditionally recognizing the right of each nation, each country to independent development and in promoting it in every way.

In sharp contrast to this, the argument ran, Peking rejects

> respect for the laws, practices and traditions that have become established in this or that socialist country; respect for the government and Party authorities to whom the people have entrusted the administration of the country; and respect for historically evolved state borders. The Chinese authorities are crudely trampling on all these elementary norms of relations between sovereign states.[21]

If the Kremlin feels constrained to tread so lightly with traditional members of the socialist camp, composed of countries like Rumania, how much more remote does firm Soviet control appear to be over Cuba, or perhaps over a future communist regime in Indonesia or Zanzibar? In the future, if some "national democracies" make the transition to "socialist" states, we are likely to see emerge an eclectic type of communism influenced by many national peculiarities. Such states would still be profoundly hostile to the noncommunist West, but in terms of fundamental Soviet ambitions, they would also be hostile to the Soviet design for a world state.

It is, of course, possible that some Asian communist states would coalesce around Peking, which would advance an extravagant Chinese communist supranational design. It would be natural for Peking to build upon the centuries-old belief in the

[20] *Pravda*, May 10, 1964.
[21] *Izvestiia*, May 31, 1964.

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political and cultural superiority of the Han people, who regard themselves as residing at the center of the civilized world, surrounded by barbarians. The Chinese would also exploit the racist theme which they have been preaching in the Afro-Asian world. Moscow has pulled no punches in combating this Chinese gambit. "The modern splitters inside the international Communist movement are in effect trying to instil in the people of Asia and Africa the idea that the West is still the West, and the white people are still white people." By insisting that they are more revolutionary and "the leading Marxists in the world," the Chinese are "consciously or unconsciously impressing on the peoples of those areas the idea that they are 'chosen people,' or 'special people' and that they are superior to the 'white race'. . . . But the question arises, what has this in common with Marxism?"[22]

What, indeed, noncommunist observers might also ask, has this to do with Marxism-Leninism, or the vision of redeeming all mankind in a single universal, Marxist commonwealth? A once universal doctrine has been shattered, fragmented and relativized, so that now instead of one intolerant church there are several major and many minor intolerant churches. Perhaps this, in time, will be an improvement, although we should brace ourselves for many religious wars.

[22] *Ibid.*, July 16, 1964.

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DE-STALINIZATION AND THE HERO CULT OF MAO TSE-TUNG

by James T. Myers

IN 1950 the Communist Party of China (CPC) emerged victorious from a grim and prolonged struggle. Much remained to be done, but to the Chinese leaders it must have seemed that the "socialist" nations were indeed riding the crest of the wave of the future. Surely the death knell would soon sound for the imperialist West, and the man most responsible for the successes of international communism was the master of the mighty, victorious Soviet Union, Marshal Stalin.

In the first flush of victory the Chinese press could scarcely find adjectives powerful enough to describe this great figure. The leader of the CPC, Mao Tse-tung, was, of course, not slighted. His great leadership in the struggle against imperialism and reaction was heralded with the most ringing phrases, but a clear order of rank developed: it was evident that, of the two, Stalin ranked decidedly higher. Mao was unchallenged as the foremost among the Chinese communists. It was always made clear, however, that Mao was *only* the "great leader of the Chinese people," while Stalin was the "liberator of mankind," the "sun of humanity," the "teacher of the working people of the whole world."

The superior position of Stalin was reflected in many ways. Whenever the portraits of Mao and Stalin were displayed together, Stalin's always hung to the right of Mao's. When Mao was displayed with other Chinese leaders, Mao was given the right side. The "cult of personality" which was to become so important later was present in China even before 1950. Mao's image was gradually being built into that of a great, wise and kind father-figure who had brought his children to the threshold of abundance and would lead them on to even greater and more glorious victories in the future. Mao was acknowledged an authority on everything from art to agriculture. Yet Mao was content with his subordinate status vis-à-vis Stalin and did not attempt immediately to place himself among the immortals of the communist movement.

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Stalin had inherited the mantle of the immortal Lenin and with it a right to claim for himself the role of legitimate "developer" of Marxism-Leninism. Stalin was the teacher; the Chinese were students only. During Stalin's lifetime the Chinese were always careful to recognize this. The only claim made for Mao was that of tactician: one who had learned his lessons well and had applied certain "universal truths" in a correct manner. It was declared that "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's contribution has been to synthesize the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the *guidance of Lenin and Stalin regarding the principles* of the Chinese revolution with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution."[1] The "principles" of the revolution had been promulgated by Lenin and Stalin; Mao carried out the line stipulated by Moscow.

It was entirely fitting that Mao, though ruler of 600 million, should acquiesce in his inferior role. Stalin, after all, had been comrade-in-arms to Lenin. He led a mighty, modern nation, and he had emerged victorious from the greatest war in history. Mao, only beginning on the "path to socialism," readily acknowledged Stalin's supremacy.

The comparative position of the two leaders was clearly illustrated in a speech by the Soviet Ambassador to China on February 20, 1953. He closed his remarks with:

> Long live Comrade Mao Tse-tung, *leader of the great Chinese people* of the new and powerful People's Republic of China *now engaged in construction!*
>
> Long live Comrade Stalin, leader of the great Soviet people and *of all progressive elements of humanity, and standard bearer of world peace!*[2]

Within two weeks Comrade Stalin would be dead.

II

The death of Stalin was given front-page coverage in the Chinese press. The March 16 issue of *People's China* was black-bordered and was almost entirely devoted to Stalin. In death the departed leader was accorded the same respect as in life. *People's China* carried articles by Soong Ching-ling, "For Stalin!"; Chu Teh, "Eternal Glory to the Great Stalin!"; Li Chi-shen,

[1] *People's China,* Foreign Language Press, Peking, Vol. 4, No. 6 (Emphasis added.)

[2] *Current Background,* U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 229. (Emphasis added.)

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"Stalin's Teachings Lead Us Forward!"; and one by Mao Tse-tung in which he wrote: "Since the death of Lenin, Comrade Stalin has at all times been the central figure in the world communist movement. We rallied round him, ceaselessly asked his advice and ceaselessly drew ideological strength from his work. . . . The glorious name of Stalin is immortal!"[3]

Jen Min Jih Pao published an editorial on March 7, entitled "Mourning our teacher and guide—the great Comrade Stalin," in which Stalin was once again characterized as "the great leader and teacher and guiding genius of the working people of the whole world," whose death was, since the deaths of Marx, Engels and Lenin, the "heaviest and most irreparable loss to the world proletariat and all progressive mankind." It was once again affirmed that the Chinese revolution had achieved victory "under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung following the guidance of Comrade Stalin."[4] A later editorial in *Jen Min Jih Pao* called Stalin the "best comrade-in-arms to Lenin . . . greatest Marxist after the death of Lenin," and then went on to explain how, by applying the correct principles of Marxism-Leninism, Stalin had stipulated the "political line and strategy and tactics for the Chinese revolution."[5]

The script was virtually unchanged. All of the tributes could have been written by the same person. As the Chinese communists repeatedly affirmed their long-time allegiance to the Stalinist line, they felt it necessary to point out the "correctness" of this line. Mao's "legitimacy" was in large measure based on his being the person who most correctly applied the principles of Marxism-Leninism as "developed" by Stalin. This was to become a source of some embarrassment to the Chinese leaders in 1956 following the departed despot's fall from grace.

The first anniversary of Stalin's death was given wide coverage in Chinese publications. A *Jen Min Jih Pao* editorial, in Stalin's honor, stressed the need to follow his teachings on party affairs in order to ensure the unity of the CPC. A nationwide campaign called on the people to observe the anniversary of his death. The seventy-fifth anniversary of Stalin's birth was also celebrated in 1954, and more laudatory editorials were carried in the Peking papers.

The second anniversary of Stalin's death in March 1955 was

[3]1953, No. 6.
[4]*New China News Agency,* March 8, 1953.
[5]April 3, 1953; in *Current Background,* No. 261, September 25, 1953.

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conspicuously played down. Although Peking mounted a campaign to celebrate the anniversary, the space given it in the Chinese press was exceedingly small. This meager effort, it may be noted, corresponded to the period of "silent de-Stalinization"[6] in the Soviet Union. It is unlikely that the Chinese were taking instruction from their Soviet comrades, but they seemed to be de-emphasizing the glorification of Stalin just one year before de-Stalinization became public knowledge.

III

The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU opened in Moscow on February 14, 1956. It was on this occasion that the public attack on the image of Stalin was begun. Stalin's photograph had been removed from the meeting hall and numerous unfavorable references were made to him by leading Soviet speakers. Apparently, however, the results of this attack did not satisfy the Soviet leaders. On February 25, the last day of the Congress, a closed meeting was called for ten o'clock in the morning. At this meeting Khrushchev delivered his now famous "secret speech."

Much has been written about this event and its effect on the Chinese leadership. The general consensus is that the Chinese were furious at not being notified in advance. If Khrushchev decided only during the course of the Congress to deliver the speech, this fact would, indeed, rule out any possibility that the Chinese could have been notified in advance of this most significant decision.[7] More than likely, however, the Chinese had advance notice that some sort of de-Stalinization was to take place. For one thing, according to Wolfgang Leonhard, in January 1956 a "number" of communist party leaders from "the most varied countries" had been summoned to Moscow and informed of the "political aims" of the Twentieth Congress.[8] Also, the Chinese could not have been oblivious of the several instances of de-Stalinization which had already been carried out in the Soviet Union.

In China itself Stalin had been receiving far less attention than in the past. The speech delivered at the Congress by Marshal Chu Teh, widely cited for its favorable reference to Stalin, is vastly different in tone and content from previous Chinese refer-

[6]For "silent de-Stalinization" see Wolfgang Leonhard, *The Kremlin Since Stalin* (New York: Praeger, 1962).
[7]For this formulation see Leonhard, *op. cit.*, p. 120 f.
[8]*Ibid.*, p. 160; cf. *ibid.*, p. 121.

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ences to the "sun of humanity." Chu mentioned Stalin's name only once (in reading a message from Mao Tse-tung), in the following manner: "The consolidation of the CPSU and the successes of the Soviet Union in many fields, shows the firmness and invincibility of the Soviet Communist Party created by Lenin and reared by Stalin and his close comrades-in-arms."[9] Although this was little more than faint praise for Stalin, it was still considerably out of tone with the mood of the Twentieth Congress and would seem to indicate that the Chinese did not comprehend beforehand the full extent and intensity of the attack which was to take place. It does not, however, demonstrate that the Chinese were opposed to an attack on Stalin as such. Their own "selective" de-Stalinization campaign which began about six weeks later showed that the Chinese found a few faults in Stalin which they were not reluctant to point out and to use to their own advantage. Nevertheless, Mao must have been shocked and embarrassed by Khrushchev's slanderous attack. Mao's position in China in 1956 was already quite similar to that enjoyed by Stalin during the later years of his life. Many of Khrushchev's complaints about the abuses of the "cult of the individual" in the USSR could be applied to Mao with little change.

The Chinese began their coverage of the Twentieth Congress by carrying the full text of Khrushchev's regularly-scheduled address in the *Jen Min Jih Pao* of February 18. *Jen Min Jih Pao* of February 19 called the address a document of "profound historical significance" but did not mention Stalin. Other Chinese papers also acclaimed the success of the Congress but made no mention of the theme of de-Stalinization which dominated it. The *Jen Min Jih Pao* editorial of February 28 (three days after the secret speech) hailed the "world significance of the CPSU Congress," but again made no mention of Stalin. The following day the *Peking Daily Worker* editorial hailed the Congress but omitted any reference to Stalin or de-Stalinization. By March 7 the Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin Works Translation Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC had prepared translations of the resolutions of the Twentieth Congress for sale with the promise that "other documents" of the Congress would soon follow. On April 2 Chu Teh returned from the Soviet Union—the rest of the delegation having returned nearly a month earlier—and on April 5 the Chinese broke the silence.

[9] *New China News Agency*, Moscow, February 15, 1956. In *Survey of the China Mainland Press*, U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 1231, pp. 33-37.

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The Chinese response to the attack launched by Khrushchev in the secret speech came in the form of a document entitled "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,"[10] which was said to be based on discussions of an enlarged session of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee. Mao's name was not attached to the document, nor was he mentioned in the text. The tone of the Chinese statement was quite different from that of the secret speech and appeared to have several definite objectives—above all, to limit the attack to Stalin himself and to explain how such a state of affairs could arise. The Chinese did not want the attack to spread to the system as a whole or to Mao Tse-tung personally. To accomplish this they, first, reduced the scale of Stalin's crimes:

> Stalin made certain serious mistakes in his work, in the latter part of his life, as a top leader of the party and the state. He became conceited and not circumspect. His thinking was subjective and one-sided and he made erroneous decisions on certain important questions, bringing about serious, harmful consequences.
>
> He indulged in inordinate exaltation of his own role and posed his individual authority against collective leadership.

Second, these "mistakes" were then fitted into an ideological framework produced for the occasion:

> It is naive to assume that contradictions can no longer exist in a socialist society. To deny the existence of contradictions is to deny dialectics. The contradictions in various societies differ in character as do the forms of their solution. But society develops at all times amidst continual contradiction.
>
> The existence of contradictions between the individual and the collective of a socialist society is nothing strange. Any leader of the Party or state will inevitably become rigid in his thinking and consequently make grave mistakes if he isolates himself from collective leadership, from the masses of the people, and from real life.

Finally, the Chinese delivered a short lecture to the other parties explaining why such a thing had not occurred, and was not likely to occur, in their party: "To counter subjectivism in the method of leadership, the Central Committee of the CPC issued a decision in June 1943 on the methods of leadership." This Chinese method involves gathering the views of the masses, formulating certain ideas on the basis of these views, taking the resulting ideas back to the masses, explaining the ideas to the

[10]See *Jen Min Jih Pao*, April 5, 1956; in *Current Background*, No. 403 (revised translation by *Jen Min Jih Pao* editorial department). An earlier version appeared in *Current Background*, No. 383.

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masses, and re-evaluating the results, so that the ideas emerge with even "greater correctness." "For a long time this method of leadership has been described in our party. . . . The whole history of our work teaches us that whenever this line is followed the work is good. . . . This is the Marxist-Leninist method of leadership and the Marxist-Leninist line of work." But, lest there be any misunderstanding about Mao's position as leader, the following was added: "The people and their party need outstanding personalities who can represent the interests and will of the people and stand in the forefront of the historical struggle to lead them."

The Chinese then cleverly turned adversity to advantage. Stalin was not, they declared, infallible. Certain of Stalin's revolutionary tactics were said to be, "according to our experience," incorrect: "There was a period (the ten years of civil war from 1927-1936) in which some of our comrades crudely applied this formula of Stalin's to the Chinese revolution," and as a result "instead of isolating the real enemy we isolated ourselves while benefitting the real enemy." The implication is, of course, that since 1936, i.e., since Mao assumed leadership of the CPC, no more mistakes have been made and the Chinese communists have gone from success to success. For good measure the statement also attacked Ch'en Tu-hsiu for "right opportunism," Li Li-san and Wang Ming for "left opportunism," and Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih and the "anti-party alliance."

The statement was carefully drafted to strengthen Mao's personal leadership. It sought to fill the ideological vacuum left by Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and to show other parties the way out of the confusion and uncertainty which had resulted. If handled improperly, de-Stalinization could have been extremely embarrassing, if not disastrous, for Mao personally. He could hardly have ignored such an important development as Khrushchev's attack on Stalin. Yet he could scarcely have become a full-fledged participant in the denigration campaign. The statement set forth the basis for Mao's personal claim to "legitimacy" and also established the general framework within which the verbal struggle between Mao and Khrushchev for leadership of the movement was waged.

Mao's claim to ideological correctness was based largely on the fact that he stood at the end of the historically "correct" progressive development of Marxism-Leninism through Lenin *and* Stalin. The communists find it necessary to charge an opponent

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with being a "revisionist" or "deviationist" or in some other manner "incorrect." Only the leader always follows the correct line. As Mao's correctness had been based historically on Stalin's correct "development" of Marxism-Leninism, he could scarcely afford to have Stalin removed from this historical development. Khrushchev could say that he could not speak while living under the shadow of the despot. Mao could not make this claim, nor would it have been wise to try to do so. It was necessary for Mao to insist on tracing all ideological development through Stalin. Khrushchev might wish to declare that although Stalin had done a few good deeds, he had seriously violated the principles set down by Lenin. Mao, on the other hand, had no doubt that the path of Marxism-Leninism trod by Marx, Engels, Lenin *and* Stalin, led straight to his doorstep. The Chinese statement therefore concluded that Stalin, after all, had been a "great Marxist-Leninist."

The Chinese never really ceased to quote Stalin or use his writings. The *Liao Ning Jih Pao* of July 10, 1956 reported that "The theoretical training class for cadres . . . has now reached a general review period in studying the *History of the CPSU*." The fact that a training class for party cadres was using this work, prepared under Stalin's direction, indicates that Stalin's writings were never really downgraded. Although the "cults" of Stalin and Mao were played down during this period, the important ideological positions, from the Chinese point of view, were never given up.

In speaking before the Eighth National Congress of the CPC in September 1956, Liu Shao-ch'i defined the ideological justification for Mao's position which had only been hinted at in the April 5 statement: "[After 1935] thanks to the great improvement in the Party's ideological and organizational work, the course of the Party has had a speedy development. . . . During the 21 years since the January 1935 Tsun Yi Conference, our party, under the leadership of the Central Committee headed by Mao Tse-tung, has not once strayed from the party line." About Mao's "cult" in China, Liu had this to say: "Love for the leader is essentially an expression of love for the interests of the party, the class and the people, and not the deification of the individual."[11] One regular observer of the Chinese scene was moved to declare that "Never before has the role and infallibility of

[11] *Current Background,* No. 412, p. 49 f.

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Mao Tse-tung been so extolled in party documents as they were in this [Eighth] Congress."[12] Mao's image, already larger than lifesize, would become larger yet.

IV

As a result of the unrest in Eastern Europe in the summer and fall of 1956, the Chinese were moved to define at greater length Stalin's role in the world communist movement and to make another attempt to provide the ideological leadership which had been lacking since Khrushchev's attack on Stalin. "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" was published in *Jen Min Jih Pao* on December 29, 1956.[13] The December statement, said to be based on a resolution of an enlarged session of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, as was the previous statement, was clearly aimed at dissident communist parties everywhere. It had, according to its authors, four points of focus: (1) An appraisal of the fundamental course taken by the Soviet Union in its revolution and construction; (2) an appraisal of Stalin's merits and faults; (3) the struggle against "doctrinairism" and "revisionism"; and (4) the international solidarity of the proletariat of all countries.

Similar to the previous statement, the December statement was expanded to include a lecture to all other parties on the "international solidarity" of the movement. This was necessary, said the Chinese, because "The question of correctly understanding and dealing with Stalin's mistakes has become a matter of importance affecting developments within the Communist parties of many countries, unity between Communist parties, and the common struggle of the Communist forces of the world against imperialism." Criticism of Stalin's mistakes, they warned, "should be made only for the purpose of consolidating democratic centralism and for strengthening the leadership of the party. It should in no circumstances bring about disorganization and confusion in the ranks of the proletariat."

Stalin, the Chinese declared, made "great contributions" but he also made "serious mistakes" with regard to certain "domestic and foreign policies" of the Soviet Union. In handling "certain concrete questions" he showed a tendency toward "great nation

[12] *China News Analysis,* weekly newsletter, Hong Kong, No. 151, p. 6.
[13] Also in *Current Background,* No. 433; cf. *People's China,* 1957, No. 2.

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chauvinism" and was without a "spirit of equality." The Chinese quickly pointed out, however, that

> Stalin's mistakes did not originate in the socialist system; it therefore follows that it is not necessary to "correct" the socialist system in order to correct mistakes.
>
> Stalin's mistakes did not lie in the practice of democratic centralism in state affairs, nor in putting leadership by the party into effect; they lay precisely in the fact that in certain fields and to a certain degree, he undermined democratic centralism and the leadership of the party.

The Soviet Union, they said, made great progress during Stalin's lifetime. "This fact not only testifies to the strength of the socialist system but also shows that Stalin was after all a staunch Communist."

The statement, as before, includes an attack on those "doctrinaires" who ran the party before Mao took over. According to the Chinese, these "doctrinaires" did not understand that "The cause of the proletariat in a given country will triumph only if the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism is properly applied in light of its special national features." Between 1931 and 1935, the Chinese stated, there had been some "doctrinaires" in the CPC. They were, however, eventually "thoroughly liquidated" and the "doctrinaire line" discarded. Since that time, the CPC has made great progress.

Thus, the Chinese reiterated the same points contained in the previous statement. In addition, Mao jumped into the ideological vacuum created by Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and attempted to show the other parties the way to keep their respective houses in order. Most important for Mao's personal position, however, the Chinese retained Stalin as one of the four immortals of the movement. His mistakes were only a "partial infraction of democratic centralism" and, said the Chinese, "In our opinion Stalin's mistakes take second place to his achievements."

With the publication of this statement the delineation of the Chinese position on de-Stalinization was, in the main, completed. If the "cult" of the individual was somewhat de-emphasized in China, it was not completely forgotten. Mao emerged untouched by the de-Stalinization campaign and his image soon took on new and even more brilliant lustre.

V

Mao traveled extensively in the provinces during the summer

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of 1957. He was depicted as generating great enthusiasm among the masses, and was said to move among them as a beloved father. The image of Mao which emerged was that of a simple man of the people. A typical account in the Chinese press reported that "Chairman Mao . . . had a stout build, a swarthy face with a reddish glow, greying hair; he wore a half-new grey-coloured uniform and black cotton shoes. He had in his hand an ordinary black folding fan. What could be more appealing to human emotions?"[14] This image of Mao, as a hardy, simple peasant leader who leads a spartan existence, has persisted to the present time. One of the men who guarded Mao's home in Peking wrote of Mao's living quarters:

> The door screen for protection against the sun was made of reeds and the appointments within were very simple. Except for a bookcase full of books, a cot, a desk, and several chairs, there was nothing. Chairman Mao's clothes are simplicity itself. His silver-grey gown he has worn for several years, his shoes have lost their color; even his swim-suit has been patched.[15]

Beginning in 1957 a number of articles appeared, written by persons who had been with Mao on the Long March, extolling his bravery, stamina, foresight and feeling for the masses.[16]

By the middle of 1958 Mao's self-glorification campaign was in high gear. The widest possible coverage was given to his tours of the countryside in connection with the "great leap forward." Wherever Mao went his radiant presence was said to inspire the masses to put forth unprecedented efforts. In Hopei the people exhibited enormous spirit after Mao's visit: "This spirit is precisely the most impressive manifestation of *a great material force* engendered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung's thought among the people."[17] So intoxicating was the presence of Mao among the masses that the *Jen Min Jih Pao* correspondent at one of Mao's stops was moved to poetry.

> After Chairman Mao visited Hsishui, I could not suppress my enthusiasm and wrote a few poems. . . . I had two lines describing Chairman Mao's concern for . . . the children and the aged people here:
>
> In the nursery there is fresh morning dew,
> In the happiness gardens evening fragrance abounds.[18]

[14] *Lao Tung Pao*, Shanghai, August 3, 1957; quoted in George Paloczi-Horvath, *Mao Tse-tung: Emperor of the Blue Ants* (New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 315.
[15] *China Youth*, February 1, 1959.
[16] See, e.g., "Days With Chairman Mao," *People's China*, 1957, No. 13.
[17] *Jen Min Jih Pao*, May 13, 1958 (emphasis added); in *Current Background*, No. 509.
[18] *Current Background*, No. 520.

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In addition to inspiring such enthusiasm, it appears that Mao's presence even had a rejuvenating effect on some: "After Chairman Mao visited Tassukuo, several old men in the happiness home left the institution to return to labor."[19] *Jen Min Jih Pao* reported that "This kind of sincere and fervent love for Chairman Mao is something rare in ancient and modern times. . . . [People say] Chairman Mao is like the sun, giving light wherever it shines."[20]

The campaign to study Mao's thought was stressed in 1958. Newspaper readers were constantly reminded of the benefits to be derived from correctly "internalizing" Mao's "thoughts," and study groups were formed throughout the country to discuss Mao's writings:

> Chairman Mao's *On Practice, On Contradictions . . . Sixty Methods of Work,* etc., being creative application of the Marxist-Leninist Materialism and Dialectics, are forever our ideological weapons. Our party committees at *hsien* level and above have already set up teams for theoretical studies.[21]

Ch'en Po-ta, Mao's chief theoretician, wrote in *Hung Ch'i:*

> If the thought of Mao Tse-tung were not victorious in the struggle against erroneous thought of all kinds, and if the Chinese revolution did not march forward under the banner of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, then there would be no victory of the present Chinese People's revolution.[22]

Mao's military "thought" also came in for its share of praise:

> In the process of the Chinese revolutionary struggle Comrade Mao Tse-tung not only fixed . . . a completely correct political line, but also formulated a completely correct military line. . . . Whenever the thought of Mao Tse-tung is thoroughly carried out in army organization and warfare, we will have victory; otherwise there will be defeat.[23]

Chu Teh wrote of Mao's military genius:

> It is of special importance that Comrade Mao Tse-tung in his military writings decisively developed the theoretical foundation and methodology of Marxist-Leninist military science, that is, military dialectics. To study

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] November 4, 1958: quoted by Richard L. Walker in "Chairman Mao and the Cult of Personality," *Encounter,* June 1960.

[21] *Jen Min Jih Pao,* May 14, 1958; in *Current Background,* No. 509.

[22] *Hung Ch'i* (*Red Flag*), July 16, 1958.

[23] *Chieh Fang Chun Pao,* May 23, 1958; quoted in Peter S. H. Tang, *Communist China Today,* Second Revised Edition (Washington: Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1960), Vol. I.

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earnestly these writings by Comrade Mao Tse-tung will enable us not only to acquire knowledge concerning the laws of the overall war situation, get rid of blindness in military problems and gain awareness, but also to win complete victory in every battle.[24]

The campaign to glorify Mao was relentless. Even Mao's physical prowess became legend: he was reported to have swum the mighty Yangtze ("guerrilla style") on seven separate occasions in September 1958 at the age of 65.[25] The praise for Mao knew no bounds. At the height of the "great leap forward" on National Day 1958, the men at *Jen Min Jih Pao* outdid themselves. They wrote: "Today in the era of Mao Tse-tung, heaven is here on earth. . . . Chairman Mao is a great prophet. . . . Each prophecy of Chairman Mao has become a reality. It was so in the past; it is so today."[26]

VI

Between December 1958 and September 1959 Mao weathered two serious crises and appears, in each case, to have emerged stronger than before. By the time the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC was held in November-December 1958, the full extent of the "great leap" disaster was known to the Chinese leaders. At this session the Chinese leaders decided to retreat from the communes, and Mao Tse-tung announced his decision not to stand again for election as head of state. Whether his resignation was the price extracted by Khrushchev for further aid to China[27] we shall probably never know. The name and person of Mao Tse-tung were clearly associated with the commune policy, and much of the insanity of the "great leap" seems to have been Mao's personal contribution. Thus, his resignation had to be carefully engineered so as to preclude any speculation that he was resigning under pressure or because his policies had failed. There could, in fact, be no hint that Mao was in any way "incorrect" in his assessment of the situation. His "correctness" was affirmed at the time and regularly since then. The retreats have been attributed to mistakes from sources other than the CPC leadership. Regarding Mao's proposal

[24]*New China News Agency,* Peking, July 31, 1958. Speech delivered on the thirty-first anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army, in *Current Background,* No. 514.
[25]See Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
[26]October 1, 1958; quoted in Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
[27]For this formulation see Franz Michael, "Khrushchev's Disloyal Opposition: Structural Change and Power Struggle in the Communist Bloc," ORBIS, Spring 1963, p. 64.

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to retire as head of state, the Central Committee announced that this was

> a completely positive proposal because, relinquishing his duties as Chairman of the state and working solely as Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung will be enabled all the better to concentrate his energies on dealing with questions of the direction, policy, and line of the Party and the state; he may also be enabled to set aside more time for Marxist-Leninist theoretical work without affecting his continued leading role in the work of the state. . . . Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the sincerely beloved and long-tested leader of the people of various nationalities of the whole country. *He will remain the leader . . . even when he no longer holds the post of Chairman of the State.* . . . Party committees at all levels should . . . *give full explanation to cadres and the masses* . . . at appropriate meetings of the Party, sessions of the People's Congresses at various levels, meetings of workers . . . and meetings in people's communes, offices, schools and armed units, *so that the reasons for this may be understood by all and that there may be no misunderstanding.*[28]

The decision was widely discussed and occupied a large part of the Chinese press for the next few months. Whatever the actual reasons for it, Mao's resignation followed on the heels of the disastrous failure of policies associated closely with his name. Whether the masses of the population realized this or not, it was certainly well known to the party leadership. Still, it does not seem to have undermined Mao's power position. The extravagant praise for him continued through the remainder of 1958 and up to the Lushan Plenum in August 1959. At Lushan Mao survived the attempt by Marshal P'eng Teh-huai to oust him from his position of leadership and emerged even stronger than before.[29]

The praise for Mao on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the CPC, a month after the Lushan Plenum, reached new heights—at which it has continued to the present. Rather than being tarnished as a result of the commune disaster and the attack by high-ranking members of his own leadership group, Mao's image took on new lustre. Even greater and more exaggerated claims were made for him by his propaganda organs. At the tenth anniversary celebrations a chorus sang the song which, according to Richard Walker, has "almost supplanted the National Anthem."

[28] *Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China* (Peking: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1958). (Emphasis added.)
[29] See David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *The China Quarterly,* October-December 1961.

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The East shines red,
The sun rises,
China has brought forth a Mao Tse-tung.
He plans blessings for the people,
He is the great savior of the people.

Another "folk song," published in *Red Flag* (*Hung Ch'i*) in November 1959 proclaimed:

Chairman Mao is infinitely kind
Ten thousand songs are not enough to praise him.
With trees as pens, the sky as paper
And an ocean of ink,
Much would still be left unwritten.[30]

Chinese speakers at the tenth anniversary celebrations repeatedly exclaimed over Mao's physical vigor. His correct military leadership was praised by Marshal Lin Piao in an article entitled "March Ahead Under the Red Flag of the General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking."

The laying down of the policy for building a modern revolutionary army, the correct handling of relations between the building up of a national defense and national economic construction, the wise policy decision of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, and the correct strategic guidance . . . in the introduction of the policy of combining powerful regular forces, special technical units and armed militia in preparation for turning the whole population into fighting men, and so on—all these without exception are the result of leadership by the party and by Comrade Mao Tse-tung personally.[31]

Mao's theoretical genius was also praised during the celebrations. Liu Lan-t'ao, a member of the CPC Central Committee, wrote:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the most outstanding exponent of the heroic proletariat of our country, the most distinguished representative of our superior traditions in the entire history of our great nation, a beacon on our country's road to Communism, and the most outstanding contemporary revolutionist, statesman, and theoretician of Marxism-Leninism. He has creatively enriched the treasures of Marxism-Leninism on a series of important questions. The 600 million or more people of our country have placed in him their hopes for their own happiness and future, and consider him the incarnation of Communism and truth and the symbol of invincibility.[32]

The praise differs only in degree from previous eulogies of this sort. Mao wanted to leave no doubt that it was he, not

[30]Walker, *op. cit.*
[31]*Jen Min Jih Pao,* September 27, 1959; cf. *Peking Review,* October 6, 1959; also cf. *Hung Ch'i,* October 1, 1959.
[32]*Jen Min Jih Pao,* September 28, 1959; in *Current Background,* No. 598.

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Khrushchev, who rightfully wore the mantle of Lenin and Stalin. It was he, Mao Tse-tung, who was the most outstanding contemporary "theoretician of Marxism-Leninism."[33]

VII

In November 1961, after Chou En-lai's return from the Twenty-second Party Congress of the CPSU, the Chinese began systematically to deride Khrushchev and to accuse him of "modern revisionism."[34] In this connection Stalin's historical position in the communist movement, and particularly Khrushchev's handling of Stalin, began to assume added importance. Although the Chinese had never wavered in their affirmation of Stalin's position as a "great Marxist-Leninist," they had not used his name openly, prior to 1961, as a club against Khrushchev. They eventually asserted that the dispute originated at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU with Khrushchev's attack on Stalin. In May 1962 the Chinese reminded other comrades that

> Long ago at the 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev and his like pointed out that Stalin committed the error of individual subjectivism in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. Comrades! Did we not discuss it at the time? *Our conclusion from beginning to end, is that Master Stalin has led a busy life, his meritorious service is great.* Of course he made mistakes . . . but he should not be the only one to blame for such mistakes. He should still be regarded as the master of the revolution and a good student of Lenin.[35]

According to one party official, "Stalin's greatest mistake was that he did not kill Khrushchev during the big purges of his day!"[36]

The entire effort of the CPC has been directed at establishing Mao as the defender of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and also of the 1957 Moscow Declaration and the 1960 Moscow Statement. In a lengthy document entitled "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves,"[37] published in September 1963, the

[33]With the publication in 1960 of Volume IV of Mao's *Selected Works,* a new nationwide campaign was started to publicize Mao's "thoughts," to urge people to study Mao's newest edition of "theoretical" offerings.

[34]See J. L. Schecter, "Khrushchev's Image Inside China," *The China Quarterly,* April-June 1963, p. 212 f.

[35]*Union Research Service,* October 16, 1962; quoted by Schecter, *op. cit.,* p. 213.

[36]*Ibid.*

[37]Beginning of a series of articles commenting on the "open letter" of the Central Committee of the CPSU of July 14, 1963; prepared by the editorial departments of *Jen Min Jih Pao* and *Hung Ch'i,* in *Peking Review,* September 6, 1963.

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lines of the battle were very clearly drawn. The Chinese stated that:

The differences began with the 20th Congress of the CPSU . . . the criticism of Stalin at the 20th Congress was wrong both in principle and in method. Stalin's life was that of a great Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary. For thirty years after Lenin's death Stalin was the foremost leader of the CPSU and the Soviet government, as well as the recognized leader of the international communist movement, and the standard-bearer of the world revolution. . . . It was necessary to criticize Stalin's mistakes. But in his secret report . . . Comrade Khrushchev completely negated Stalin. . . . Khrushchev viciously and demagogically told a host of lies in his secret report. . . . He completely obliterated the meritorious deeds of the Stalin . . . who defended and developed Marxism-Leninism. . . . Khrushchev in effect negated the dictatorship of the proletariat and the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism which Stalin defended and developed.

The Chinese also accused the CPSU leadership of even more serious crimes:

The facts of the past seven years have amply proved that the road taken by the leadership of the CPSU is the course of allying with imperialism against socialism, allying with the U.S. against China, allying with the reactionaries of all countries against the peoples of the world, and allying with the renegade Tito clique against fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties. . . .

The leaders of the CPSU have a bad habit: they indiscriminately stick labels on anyone who criticizes them. They say, "you are anti-Soviet!" No, friends! The label "anti-Soviet" cannot be stuck on us. Our criticism of your errors is precisely for the sake of defending the great CPSU and the great Soviet Union, and preventing their prestige from being damaged by you. To put it plainly, it is you and not we who are really anti-Soviet and who are defaming and discrediting the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Ever since the 20th Congress of the CPSU, you have committed innumerable foul deeds. Not all the water in the Volga can wash away the great shame you have brought upon the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

The Chinese then came to the matter of leadership of the movement. They made it clear that such leadership should not be permitted to rest with the leaders of the CPSU.

They say, "you are trying to seize the leadership!" No, friends! It is not at all clever of you to make this slander. The way you put it, it

The 35,000-word open letter of the Central Committee, sent to all CPSU organizations and members, traced the history of the Sino-Soviet dispute, blamed the Chinese communist leadership for this state of affairs, and refuted point by point the Chinese letter of June 14, 1963. In this previous letter the Chinese had listed twenty-five points which they wanted to discuss at any future meeting with Soviet leaders, and on each of these points they had criticized Soviet policies.

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would seem that some people are contending with you for some such thing as "the leadership." Is this not tantamount to shamelessly claiming that some sort of "leadership" exists in the international Communist movement and that you have this "leadership?" It is a very, very bad habit of yours thus to put on the airs of a patriarchal party. It is entirely illegitimate.

The Chinese asserted that the party which was following the "correct" path should lead.

What confronts the international communist movement now is not whether this or that party should assume leadership, but whether to respond to the baton of revisionism or to uphold the revolutionary principles of the [1957] Declaration and the [1960] Statement and persevere in the revolutionary line of Marxism-Leninism.

Although the Chinese would have us believe that it is not a question of whether "this or that" party assumes the leadership, they wanted to make it quite plain that their party had the right to lead the movement.

The facts of the last seven years have . . . amply proved that the CPC has constantly striven to prevent the situation from deteriorating and to uphold principle, eliminate differences, strengthen unity and wage a common struggle against the enemy. We have exercised great restraint and done our very best. . . .

We Chinese persevere in principle and uphold unity; we did so in the past, we do so now, and we shall continue to do so in the future.

The personal attack on Khrushchev became more intense in the second Chinese article defending Stalin and replying to the Soviet "open letter" of July 14.[38] The Chinese reaffirmed their argument that Stalin had been a "great proletarian revolutionary" and pointedly raised the issue of Khrushchev's past association with Stalin. They asked: "In what position does Khrushchev, who participated in the leadership of the party and the state during Stalin's period, place himself when he beats his breast, pounds the table and shouts abuse at Stalin at the top of his voice? In the position of an accomplice to a 'murderer' or a 'bandit'? Or in the same position as a 'fool' or an 'idiot'?" The Chinese then accused Khrushchev of "wildly denouncing the Soviet system and state. His language in this connection is by no means weaker but is actually stronger than that of such renegades as Kautsky, Trotsky, Tito and Djilas." And finally, to drive their point home with even greater force, the Chinese

[38]"On the Question of Stalin," prepared by the editorial departments of *Jen Min Jih Pao* and *Hung Ch'i*, in *Peking Review*, September 20, 1963.

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linked Khrushchev with the most infamous reactionary of all: "Khrushchev said, 'Ah! If only Stalin had died ten years earlier!' As everybody knows, Stalin died in 1953; ten years earlier would have been 1943, the very year the Soviet Union began its counter-offensive in the Great Patriotic War. At that time, who wanted Stalin to die? Hitler!"

The Chinese maintained the attack on Khrushchev into 1964 with additional articles in reply to the Soviet Party's "open letter." In one piece[39] they charged that "all other revisionists are dwarfed by Khrushchev," and they warned that Khrushchev's policies might take him the way of all revisionists. They asked the CPSU: "Since so many revisionists have been thrown on the rubbish heap of history, why do you obdurately follow their example? . . . now is the time—now it is high time—to repudiate and liquidate Khrushchev's revisionism."

In mid-July the Chinese charged that some factories in the Soviet Union had fallen into the "clutches of degenerates" and that there were various "kulak elements" on the collective farms.[40] They declared that "unbridled activities of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat are wide-spread in the Soviet Union," even in the "economic departments of the Party" and in the "higher leading bodies." The CPSU under Stalin, said the Chinese, had "adhered to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the road to Socialism, and waged a staunch struggle against the forces of capitalism." However, since Khrushchev had "usurped" the leadership of the Soviet Party and state he had "carried out a series of revisionist policies serving the interest of the bourgeoisie and rapidly swelling the forces of capitalism in the Soviet Union." By presiding over this capitalist restoration the "revisionist Khrushchev clique" had become "the political representatives of the Soviet bourgeoisie and particularly of its privileged stratum."

On the question of how such a deplorable situation could be prevented, the Chinese announced that Comrade Mao Tse-tung had formulated a set of "theories and policies" after studying the "negative experience of other countries, *mainly the Soviet Union.*" (Emphasis added.) At the end of Comrade Mao's fifteen

[39]"The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism," Article No. 8, in reply to the CPSU open letter of July 14, 1963, in *Peking Review,* April 3, 1964.

[40]"On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World," Article No. 9 in reply to the CPSU open letter of July 14, 1963, in *Peking Review,* July 17, 1964.

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rather lengthy points of "theory and policy" the Chinese concluded that the "worthy successors" to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat must be "proletarian statesmen" not "careerists and conspirators like Khrushchev." They must be "models in applying the Party's democratic centralism, and must master the method of leadership based on the principle of 'from the masses to the masses.'" They must not be "despotic like Khrushchev." The Chinese clearly implied that Mao Tse-tung was the proper proletarian statesman, a truly worthy leader of the revolutionary cause of the proletariat. The "theories and policies" developed by Mao Tse-tung are, declared the Chinese,

> creative developments of Marxism-Leninism to the theoretical arsenal to which they add new weapons of decisive importance for us in preventing the restoration of capitalism. So long as we follow these principles, we can consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, ensure that our Party and state will never change colour, successfully conduct the socialist revolution . . . and guarantee the future transition from socialism to communism.

Along with the continuing polemics against the Soviet open letter, the Chinese were also strongly opposed to Khrushchev's plan to call a meeting of the fraternal parties for December 1964 in order to discuss the differences that had arisen among certain communist parties, i.e., Soviet and Chinese. The Chinese had offered a counter proposal which was not acceptable to the Soviet leaders. When it became evident that Khrushchev intended to go ahead with his plans for the meeting, the Chinese sounded a warning which in retrospect seems prophetic:

> Since you have made up your minds, you will probably call the meeting. Otherwise by breaking your word would you not become a laughing-stock down centuries? As the saying goes, you can't dismount from a tiger you are riding. You are caught in an insoluble dilemma. You are falling into a trap of your own making and will end by losing your skin. If you do not call the meeting, people will say that you have followed the advice of the Chinese and the Marxist-Leninist Parties, and you will lose face. If you do call the meeting, you will land yourselves in an impasse without any way out. In the present historical juncture this is a grave crisis for you modern revisionists, a crisis of your own making. Are you not aware of it? We firmly believe that the day your so-called meeting takes place will be the day you step into your grave![41]

This was to be the last major verbal cudgel wielded by the

[41] "Reply to the June 15 Letter from the CPSU Central Committee," in *Peking Review*, July 31, 1964.

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Chinese before the great "revisionist" was thrown onto the "rubbish heap of history."

VIII

The initial Chinese response to Khrushchev's "resignation" was a cautious note of congratulation to the new Soviet leaders. No comprehensive statement on the ouster was issued until one week after Chou En-lai returned to Peking from his talks with the new leaders. Then, with ill-concealed glee, the Chinese announced: "Khrushchev has fallen. This arch schemer who usurped the leadership of the Soviet Party and state, this Number One representative of modern revisionism, has finally been driven off the stage of history."[42] The Chinese statement completely rejected the fiction that Khrushchev had retired for reasons of poor health. More importantly, the Chinese at the same time issued a veiled warning to the new Soviet leaders: "The downfall of a fellow like Khrushchev is certainly not due to old age or ill health, nor is it merely due to mistakes in his methods of work and style of leadership. Khrushchev's downfall is the result of the revisionist general line and the many erroneous policies he pursued at home and abroad."

The revisionist general line was said specifically to include "peaceful coexistence," "peaceful competition," and "peaceful transition [to socialism]," as well as other policies which the Chinese had opposed. In other words, the Chinese leadership was concerned not merely with Khrushchev's "harebrained schemes" but with his entire approach to foreign and domestic problems. Even if it is assumed that these "ideological" attacks are little more than rhetorical smoke covering Mao Tse-tung's real struggle for leadership of the communist movement, they still indicate that the new Soviet leaders will not find Mao easy to deal with. If Brezhnev and Kosygin pursue Khrushchev's general policies without seeking Mao's advice and consent (and probably much more), they will be subject to the same attacks which the Chinese mounted against Khrushchev.

The Chinese also claimed in their statement of November 21 that the fall of Khrushchev represented a great victory for the pure brand of Marxism-Leninism which Mao Tse-tung and the CPC had been for years "upholding" and "defending," and thus, by implication, a great victory for Mao himself. They listed the

[42]"Why Khrushchev Fell," *Hung Ch'i* editorial, November 21, 1964; in *Peking Review,* November 27, 1964.

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twelve "bad things" which had caused Khrushchev's collapse, all of which coincided, of course, with the Chinese charges leveled at Khrushchev over the last several years. Claiming that history pointed to the inevitable victory of Mao's pure Marxism-Leninism, they declared:

> History has witnessed many buffoons who cherished the idle hope of turning back the tide of history, but they all came to an ignominious end. . . . "But progress is the eternal law of man's world." History has taught us that whoever wants to stop the wheel of history will be ground to dust. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung has repeatedly pointed out, imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers, and the revisionists are too.

Whatever the final outcome of Mao's struggle for leadership against the "modern revisionists," his accomplishments thus far are impressive. He has successfully challenged the leadership of the CPSU and has succeeded in splitting communist parties around the world. We do not know exactly how great a part Mao's dispute with Khrushchev played in bringing about the latter's downfall, but his scathing attacks certainly added to Khrushchev's misery. And Mao can claim for himself in Khrushchev's removal a great personal victory, a victory for his "pure" brand of Marxism-Leninism over the discredited revisionist line.

For the future it is difficult to foresee any true harmony between the two parties as long as Mao is alive. Mao has staked out for himself certain "ideological" positions from which there will be no retreat. Any genuine resolution of differences between the two parties would probably have to be on Mao's terms. He may not settle for anything less than the major share of leadership, as befits his theoretical pre-eminence and historical position in the communist pantheon. Mao has proclaimed himself the outstanding figure in the international communist movement, the legitimate heir to the mantle of Lenin and Stalin, and the leading theoretician in the struggle against "modern revisionism." He appears to be in the grip of an advancing megalomania. If so, then there is little chance that he will retreat from these positions.

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Reviews

WHITHER THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE?*

by Theodore C. Achilles

Over the years the Council on Foreign Relations has built an enviable reputation for solid and constructive thought in anything it produces. Under a major grant received in 1963 from the Ford Foundation, the Council will publish a series of twelve books by recognized experts on the military, economic and political aspects of the Atlantic Community. Each will be subjected, during its formative process, to the scrutiny of a special committee of experts and a distinguished Steering Committee which will serve during the entire project. The first book in the series to be published is Henry Kissinger's *The Troubled Partnership.* It is both a sound contribution in itself and a good augury for the series.

Kissinger puts his finger on the heart of the problem when he states that "Because we are the strongest member of the Atlantic Alliance, our acts have greater consequences, for good or ill, than those of other allies," and warns that waiting for De Gaulle's "disappearance is not a policy but an evasion." Not even the most hapless bureaucrat could quarrel with the first statement, although many U.S. policymakers will resent the second. Perhaps the shoe fits all too well.

Sensitive to criticism either that the United States seeks to "dominate" the alliance or that it fails to provide "leadership," U.S. statesmen find it all too easy to do nothing, to drift and to hope that somehow someone will sometime do something to improve the situation. The trumpet has long been uncertain and the results obvious. Kissinger sets out to describe the kind of leadership which cannot be taken or mistaken for domination.

The author traces the troubles of the alliance to fundamental changes in three factors: the relative weights of Europe and the United States, the very nature of alliances, and the character of strategy. With respect to each he turns over familiar coins to show the much less familiar side. For example, in assessing changes in the relative weights of Europe and the United States, Kissinger attaches less importance than others to the economic recovery of Europe and its desire for unity, and more to the psychological effects of decolonization, the loss of overseas empires and interests. As a result, it is only the United States—and to a limited extent Great Britain—which continues to have vital interests in remote corners of the globe. In this sense "equality" is further away than ever and no amount of European unity is likely to restore it. He scorns the tarnished official

**The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance.* By Henry A. Kissinger. New York: McGraw Hill, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1965. 251 pp. $5.95.

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cliches of a "partnership of equals" between a United States of Europe and the United States of America and urges that Washington get on with the job of exploring realistic forms of Atlantic relationship.

Far from believing that De Gaulle's policies are based on delusions of grandeur, Kissinger sees them based, now as in 1940, on a realistic appraisal of French weakness and the conviction that his only weapon is inflexible obstinacy in pursuit of the national interest. His analysis of De Gaulle's influence is refreshingly dispassionate.

The nuclear age, with its overriding need for centralized control over all weapons, poses for an alliance of sovereign states an acute dilemma. There will be either hegemony or chaos—unless the Atlantic nations are willing to give up a degree of sovereignty. Nuclear power is so terrifying and the restraints upon using it so impelling, that under present circumstances a lesser ally like De Gaulle can take advantage of U.S. protection to pursue his own policies of intransigent independence, which could even grow into a form of neutralism.

Similarly, the nuclear age has revolutionized the nature and geography of strategy. It requires a common strategy, capable of protecting all. But how can fifteen nations, varying widely in their perception of and distance from the threat, in historical experience and in ability to defend themselves, agree upon a common strategy? Kissinger concludes, and I fully agree, that strategy must be centralized and asserts that "unless this centralization is coupled with an effective sharing of political decisions—far beyond anything so far envisaged—the practical consequence could be a growing sense of irresponsibility among our Allies."

Compounding all of these difficulties is the conflict between optimistic American pragmatism, which believes that any problem can be solved with time and good will, and a pessimistic European sense of history bred in a continent strewn with ruins testifying to the failures of previous grand designs.

In seeking a solution to these complex problems, Kissinger repeatedly stresses—as Christian Herter, Lauris Norstad and William Fulbright in this country and Raymond Aron, Alastair Buchan and others in Europe have done—that the nuclear age presents a coalition of wholly sovereign states with a dilemma soluble only through the development of effective and acceptable methods of pooling sovereignty. To be effective they must meet American criteria of centralized control and technical soundness; to be acceptable they must meet European psychological desires for a choice of options and a real voice in determining major political policy. We must combine unity with diversity, with appropriate limits for each.

The strategic problem, as Kissinger recognizes, is political rather than military. He characterizes the MLF succinctly as "wrong problem, wrong answer." Of the various

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nuclear options, he prefers that of basing U.S. policy on existing national nuclear capabilities and seeking to coordinate them by strengthening political consultation. In the strictly military field, he recommends confining SACEUR's responsibility to land defenses and nuclear weapons having a range of up to 300 miles, and he makes the original suggestion of creating a new NATO Strategic Command which would have control of longer-range weapons. Such a command, like SHAPE, would be located in Europe and might in time be headed by a European. While the relationship between it and SAC is not elaborated, the idea seems worth considering.

For overall political control of nuclear policy, Kissinger suggests the creation of an Executive Committee of the NATO Council, at the Deputy Foreign Minister level or above, composed of the United States, Britain, France, the Federal Republic, Italy and a rotating representative of the smaller countries, and empowered to act by a two-thirds majority vote. This proposal seems to me to be the weak link in an otherwise strong line of reasoning.

Policy is not formulated, domestically or internationally, by large or small committees, much less by voting. Nor is it realistic to expect sovereignty to be pooled on this basis. The jealously manned ramparts of national sovereignty will not yield to the bold, frontal attacks of new institutions but only, as they have done in recent years, to the gradual development of common policy and common action in the common interest. This is where we need joint formulation of policy, going far beyond mere "consultation." It requires common or agreed intelligence, integrated staff work serving the common rather than the national interest, and full participation in the process by senior officials *responsible for policy formulation within their own governments.* The NATO staff and Council have made progress in these respects but it has been rudimentary. Given the political will on the part of the U.S. government to grant its allies a share in the *formulation* of its policies, the results could be spectacular. Policies formulated in common raise few decision-making problems when the time comes to implement them.

The solution of such major problems, as Robert Bowie points out in his book, *Shaping the Future,** depends upon clarity as to objectives, formulation of major programs directed toward their achievement, and the persistent carrying out of these programs by limited practical steps. I fully agree with Kissinger's concluding statements:

"But institutions based on present concepts of national sovereignty are not enough. The West requires a larger goal: the constitution of an Atlantic Commonwealth in which all the peoples bordering the North Atlantic can fulfill their aspirations. Clearly, it will not come quickly; many intermediate stages must be traversed before it

*New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.

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can be reached. It is not too early, however, to prepare ourselves now for this step beyond the nation-state. . . .

"At each previous critical juncture the West—though with much travail—found political forms adequate for its needs. It made the transition from feudalism to the nation-state. Its challenge now is whether it can move from the nation-state to a larger community and draw from this effort the strength for another period of innovation.

"Its ability to master this problem will largely determine whether the West can remain relevant to the rest of the world."

And I would repeat his warning: "Because we are the strongest member of the Atlantic Alliance, our acts have greater consequences, for good or ill, than those of other Allies."

The Politics of Soviet Succession*

by Wolfgang Klaiber

For most of the nearly fifty years of communist rule in the Soviet Union the Kremlin has managed to convey an impression of political stability based on the monopoly of power in one political party, reinforced by physical coercion. But during the past decade Western statesmen and political analysts have begun to present new evidence and offer new theories on the dynamics of Soviet politics. Some continue to hold to the traditional belief that political power in the Kremlin is wielded by a single ruler; some believe that the era of one-man rule in the Soviet Union is over and that Soviet politics hereafter will be dominated by oligarchies; others see the Kremlin as an arena of immense and incessant power struggles; still others claim to see an increasingly reciprocal and responsive interaction between the rulers and the masses, as evidenced by the progressive "liberalization" of Soviet life. Until Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964, however, few observers in the West would have suggested that the Soviet system of totalitarian dictatorship is fundamentally unstable, particularly during times of political succession, and that this instability may, at some time in the future, provide opportunity for crucial changes in the political structure and processes of the USSR.

That Soviet politics tends to be unstable is the assumption which underlies two recent books: *Political Succesession in the USSR* by Myron Rush, and *Russia After Khrushchev* by Robert Conquest. These studies offer new perspectives on how political power is wielded in the Soviet Union and some useful approaches to the study of Soviet politics.

Myron Rush postulates what he calls a "cyclical theory of Soviet politics" in which the following cycles appear: (1) a phase of personal rule marked by little or no overt expression of popular discontent; (2) a breakdown of personal

**Political Succession in the USSR.* By Myron Rush. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. 223 pp. $5.95.

Russia After Khrushchev. By Robert Conquest. New York: Praeger, 1965. 267 pp. $5.95.

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rule during a succession crisis with attendant opportunities for interest groups within the regime to influence politics; and (3) a resolution of the succession crisis in a new, stable regime.

The author views policymaking in the Soviet Union as a struggle among rival groups. It is the primary function of the ruler to resolve these factional disputes through the exercise of his personal authority. Once he has pronounced his verdict, the struggle must subside on the policy issue in question, "unless the losing group is prepared to challenge the ruler himself." (p. 79.) There is no one else in the system who can perform this function of conflict resolution.

Rush asserts that there is a tendency in Soviet politics for potential dictators to arrogate to themselves more and more authority in an incessant power struggle which must find its resolution in the emergence of one unquestioned ruler and the defeat of his rivals. For this reason he rejects any suggestion of rule by an oligarchy in the Kremlin. To be sure, Khrushchev appeared to be responsible to the "collective leadership" of the Presidium from 1953 to 1957, but this was at best a transitory arrangement, overthrown by Khrushchev in 1957.

Rush backs up this theory by pointing out that in 1960 only two of the original (1953) members were still on the Presidium, the others having been purged and replaced by Khrushchev's supporters. Nor, he contends, could the Central Committee ever perform in the manner of a ruling oligarchy. Its membership has been inflated and deflated like a rubber balloon, especially during succession crises, to serve the needs of the contenders for supreme political power; moreover, it is a far too unwieldy body to rule the Soviet Union. (Rush, incidentally, even raises serious doubts concerning the official Soviet announcement that the Central Committee was convened to consider Khrushchev's removal from power.)

While Lenin could rule by the strength of his own personal prestige, Stalin's rule and Khrushchev's after him, according to Rush, were characterized by a careful separation of powers among various institutions which were united only in the person of the dictator who alone held positions in all of them. In this way diffusion of power at secondary and lower levels was assured; no one could become powerful enough to challenge the dictator—that is, until Khrushchev overplayed his hand in trying to provide for his own succession.

Three succession crises have demonstrated that a dictator, once he is ousted from the seat of political power, has absolutely no influence over the choice of his successor. Yet, it is in the nature of a dictator's egoism to feel indispensable to his country and, therefore, obliged to designate someone to succeed him. Lenin did not have time to make concrete arrangements for his own succession; as Rush points out, Stalin was the last person Lenin wanted to step into his position.

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There is a remarkable similarity between Stalin's and Khrushchev's arrangements for their succession. During the last years of their rule, each appointed an heir presumptive —Malenkov and Brezhnev, respectively—as the "number two" man in the institutional hierarchy. Stalin also elevated Khrushchev to the "number three" spot—a "counter-heir" to keep Malenkov from usurping supreme power prematurely. This arrangement Rush calls a "triadic succession." (Rush argues that Stalin never meant Khrushchev to rule the USSR.) Khrushchev, a decade later, gave this same function to Podgorny.

Stalin, simultaneously with his "triadic" arrangement for his succession, took care to increase the power in his own hands over the political institutions of the Soviet Union. He did this by enlarging the Politburo from ten to twenty-five members and the Secretariat of the Central Committee from four to ten, thus diffusing the power of the individual members and increasing his own control over them. Last but not least, Stalin began another great purge, a reign of terfor which, in retrospect, may not have been an act of madness.

The causes for Khrushchev's premature political demise are not hard to find: by designating an heir apparent, he had created the opportunity for his own overthrow, and he could not, like Stalin did before him, institute a reign of terror. "Stalin," writes Rush, "was not mad in believing terror necessary to preserve his power against rivals. While it may be that a Soviet leader can rule till the end of his days without employing terror, this still remains to be seen." (p. 213.)

The Khrushchev succession is now in what Rush calls its second phase—unstable, oligarchical rule. The first phase is a redistribution of the dictator's power; the third phase is the arrogation of power by a single individual. Khrushchev's rule may have given the Soviet Union the most stable dictatorship it will see for a long time.

In accordance with his "cyclical theory," Rush advises U.S. policy-makers not to place all of their bets on a single strategy as they have been inclined to do. Succession crises in the Soviet Union can result in many unpredictable shifts in power and political leadership.

Robert Conquest's analysis of the succession problem in the Soviet Union differs from that of Rush primarily in his emphasis on the various forces influential in Soviet politics. He focuses his analysis and speculations on the philosophical and political, rather than on the institutional, aspects of political power in the Kremlin.

Conquest takes as his analytical point of departure the fact that the Soviet political scene has changed in several ways: (1) The power once exercised by Stalin is now irrevocably diffused among his successors. (2) The consolidation of power attained by Stalin through his reign of terror has been dissolved in the turmoil of succession crises; it can only be retrieved again through another reign of terror but this would be impossible

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to institute under present circumstances. (3) There is at this time no one in the Kremlin who combines in himself sufficient personal prestige and political acumen to demand unquestioned obedience. In fact, the present ruling group in the Kremlin is a lackluster body of men whose common outstanding virtue is mediocrity. The situation created by this combination of factors makes for instability at the top. Therefore, "the Soviet Union must now be regarded as being in a most unstable condition and subject to extreme change over perhaps quite a short period." (p. 10.)

According to Conquest, Khrushchev's rule was "either a dictatorship modified by oligarchical elements or an oligarchy modified by the primacy of a single personality." Thus, Conquest's view of the functions of a Soviet dictator differs fundamentally from that of Rush. Rather than a resolver of conflicts among rival groups, Conquest's Soviet ruler is a policy-maker who either can or cannot exact unquestioning obedience from his subordinates. If he can, he is a dictator (like Stalin) and his rule is likely to be characterized by stability; if he cannot, he is a dictator subject to pressures exercised by an oligarchy (like Khrushchev), and his rule is likely to be unstable.

Conquest points out that coups are a regular feature of Soviet politics. A *fait accompli* engineered by Malenkov and Beria in March 1953, an attempted coup by Beria in June of the same year, an open threat by Marshal Zhukov, and an "armed maneuver on the part of the Anti-Party Group"—all these serve to illustrate this point. Because Brezhnev and Kosygin lack sufficient prestige and personal authority, their overthrow by a conspiracy must be rated as a most likely eventuality. Their allies in the conspiracy against Khrushchev, after all, were united only in their opposition to their former ruler, not on basic policies.

Conquest believes there is a real possibility of renewed leadership crises in the Kremlin in the not-too-distant future. New combinations of political forces may emerge to take the place of the old; new or long-forgotten personalities may appear on the political scene in the USSR. After evaluating the present contenders for political power on the Soviet scene, Conquest suggests other political forces that might, either singly or in combination, make a bid for power. Some of these are old-timers, such as Molotov, with much more prestigious names and records than those of the present power-holders. In fact, many a fallen leader might be enlisted at some future time in the cause of some interest group or faction struggling for political power. Not the least important of these groups is the army. The managerial elite might also seek to usurp power in a leadership crisis. Intellectuals could provide the spark for rapid, radical change, especially in times of political instability. Indeed, Conquest suggests that, during a political crisis, the nationality problem might become so inflamed as to break up the

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USSR into a number of independent communist states.

Whereas, in the beginning of his book, Conquest asserts that no real institutional bases for fundamental changes in the Soviet system have yet been laid, he argues in the last two chapters that only by adopting a genuinely representative government and other free institutions can the USSR survive as a nation and "become a tolerable member of the world community." (p. 233.) Conquest is confident that such changes could occur in the Soviet Union; they can come about even within a communist system. ". . . Communist countries can remain 'Communist' . . . and yet cease to be a threat, to world peace and in a continual state of strife against their own populations." (p. 232.)

Conquest believes that the West should make a concerted effort to influence Soviet policymakers in every possible way. His recommendations range from a policy of exploiting the West's superior technological and economic resources in the development and production of armaments so as to force the Soviets to conclude reliable agreements to end the arms race to a policy of encouraging, by appropriate Western actions, any faction within the Soviet Union that might want to arrive at a genuine *détente* with the West.

Although the analyses and conclusions of these authors differ in some respects, both suggest that the struggle for political power in the Soviet Union may provide opportunities for influencing Soviet policies and even leadership struggles which the United States should be prepared to exploit.

Soviet Planning and Economic Rationality*

by Michael Roof

In his recent book, *The Economics of Soviet Planning,* Abram Bergson, a Western specialist in Soviet affairs, has turned his attention to the subject of economic planning in the Soviet socialist-type system. His study not only provides new insights concerning the subject, but offers a broad view of Soviet society, including the governmental mechanisms of an authoritarian regime, and the roles of individuals in such a society and how they are forced to adjust to such a form of government. He helps us to gain a better understanding of the interdependence of government officials, wage and salary earners, and collective farmers and their families, and of the forces which on different occasions push them together or pull them apart.

Professor Bergson's study is a carefully structured effort to assess Soviet planning from the point of view of economic rationality, stressing economic efficiency and ignoring, insofar as possible, the human factor. His first concern is to probe the nature of working arrangements for resource allocation in the USSR — arrangements determined by the fact of government ownership of almost all of the means of

**The Economics of Soviet Planning.* By Abram Bergson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. 358 pp. $7.50.

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production and by the evolution and current status of the Soviet bureaucratic structure. Most of the book deals with the country's actual use of its resources.

The method is unusual. Basic economic postulates are made at the beginning of each chapter. Then the author introduces descriptive and statistical data to show how effectively these principles of economic rationality have been realized in the Soviet Union. The data are measured against the principles, conclusions are drawn, and unanswerable questions are dropped.

A summary of some of Bergson's basic findings may be of interest. Although ownership is highly concentrated in the hands of the state in terms of such measurements as industrial production (97 per cent of the output) and sown area (98 per cent of the holdings), about one-fifth of the livestock herds are not state-owned. Furthermore, in cities, private ownership comprises better than one-third of all urban housing space; ownership of homes in the countryside has been and continues to be traditionally private.

Bergson's dispassionate treatment of the allocation of housing space, with no attention to the well-known chronic shortage in total living space, illustrates his method of divorcing materialistic values from human ones. The same thing can be said of his analysis of the "disposition" of consumer goods: he does not debate the issue of whether or not more consumer goods should be produced. "In distributing foodstuffs and manufactures to households at money prices," he states, "the government has long maintained an open market, but in fixing prices it has often violated an efficiency rule that is imperative for economic rationality where consumers' welfare is the end. The rule requires that prices be nondiscriminatory and at clearing levels." He believes that from the standpoint of consumer welfare in general the concern for "administrative costs in the USSR surely has been inordinate," and that the different objectives concerning retail prices all combine to support a more or less systematic practice of fixing prices below clearing levels. This analysis is closed with a trenchant comment. "We may also observe . . . the phenomenon referred to at the outset: the reluctance of the system's directors to commit themselves to economic principles of any sort."

In fixing prices of industrial goods which require further processing the government has adopted the norm that they should cover average costs and allow producing enterprises to earn a limited planned profit, with measures for upward (subsidies) or downward (turnover tax) adjustments for enterprises with deficient or excess profits. Prices were revised on a general basis four times between 1950 and 1963, but apart from this they have been altered only infrequently or not at all.

Chapter 7 contains an illuminating discussion of the method by which plans are drafted. Bergson

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points up the complex interplay among upper, middle and lower administrative echelons, which employ the "method of balanced estimates"—a method so complicated as to require the issuance of hundreds of thousands of supplementary production and delivery orders. Bergson thinks it significant that the Soviets had not employed the method of input-output analysis until 1959 when they published part of a detailed analysis of this type. In the case of supplies of materials as well as in the general plan itself, numerous revisions are commonplace: for example, during 1959, because of supply difficulties, the "Kazakh republican office of Gosplan changed allocations of rolled steel 538 times."

Industrial administrators at the lowest echelons, insofar as they have been able to influence planning, have sought diverse aims, "but one of these manifestly tended to be uppermost: to limit the task." Thus, to improve managerial motivation and as part of a general reform of premium arrangements in the economy, industrial enterprises were required by a decree of July 1959 to institute a new system for payment of premiums to supervisory personnel based on cost reduction. Although these conditions suggest inadequate managerial incentives, Bergson is surely correct in pointing out that incentives for collective farmers are in a much poorer state, with serious consequences for productivity. Nevertheless, he mentions many innovations in recent years in the system of payments to collective farmers, which have improved the situation, and he reminds us that collective farm homesteads (not government-owned) still produced one-fifth of the country's milk and one-third of its meat in 1958.

Other chapters deal with choice of technology, consumption structure, and capital formation. The final chapter, entitled "Economic Merit," is a most lucid and informative summary. He criticizes the Soviet economic system for its inefficiency: ". . . decisions again and again have had to be arbitrary and resources again and again to be misused" because of the sheer complexity of the task, the lack of information, and the consequent need to negotiate among different levels of the bureaucratic structure. Another criticism is that, apart from unfavorable collective farm incentives, "The ruble price system fails to perform the function which a good price system should —to convey reliable information on prevailing scarcity."

Bergson gives some attention in his analyses to unfavorable geographic and climatic factors. In an appendix, he assumes one acre of Soviet crop land to be equivalent qualitatively to one-half of an acre of cultivated U.S. crop land. But he tends to overlook the Soviet Union's unfavorable position on the globe (analogous in many respects to that of Canada rather than the United States) as well as internal regional differences (as in his treatment of wages, where differential regional bonuses are in effect). It is curious, also, that while Bergson devotes so much

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attention to, and criticism of, the bureaucratic structure in the USSR, the structure and function of the Communist Party and specifically the Central Committee are not analyzed at all, notwithstanding the crucial role they play in controlling the governmental agencies.

The chapter on industrial labor recruitment and utilization, while fundamentally sound, is weak in some respects. For example, he ignores the pirating of skilled workers and the government's compulsory assignment of specialists upon graduation. This latter practice culminated in 1964 in a decree that "temporary" graduation certificates will be issued until the compulsory assignment period is completed; the certificates become void if assignments are not fulfilled. It is particularly regrettable that, in the sub-section on the volume of farm employment, Bergson did not use the official statistics. In addition, he used the figure of 23 million instead of the correct 18.5 million as the net rural-to-urban migration from 1926 to 1939, and ignored entirely the published figure for 1939-1959 of 24.6 million.

General works on the economy of the USSR since the avalanche of new data in the mid-1950's have been slow to appear; most analysts seem to prefer to concentrate on limited aspects of the economy. Thus, one should not exaggerate the few shortcomings in this book but should express appreciation for its broad scope and careful scholarship.

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

China, Russia and the U.S.A.: Changing Relations in a Changing World. By Edgar Snow. New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1962. 173 pp. $2.35 (paper).

The seven chapters of this paperback form the conclusion for Edgar Snow's larger study, *The Other Side of the River* (Random House, 1962). In them, he discusses the changing relationships among these three powers and recommends major revisions in U.S. policies. While he cannot "predict that the Chinese will remold their thinking on foreign policy" ("Mao Tse-tung himself can no more change a nation's pace and direction all alone than President Kennedy can"), he does know "that some Chinese leaders have long been prepared to respond to a 'let us begin anew' approach by the United States." Snow says that in his interviews he thought the Chinese leaders exaggerated the "resistance of Washington to the introduction of useful information," but he changed his mind after a "brief colloquy" with Secretary Dean Rusk. ". . . I felt sympathy for Mr. Rusk, himself (like all of us) a prisoner of the 'complex' [military-industrial] President Eisenhower mentioned."

The Cold War: A Re-Appraisal. Edited by Evan Luard. New York: Praeger, 1964. 347 pp. $8.50.

The papers making up this volume grew out of a series of seminars held at St. Antony's College, Oxford. They provide a broad survey of the Cold War with special relation to its possible course of evolution. The authors include Geoffrey Hudson on China and the Far East; Philip Windsor on Berlin; Elizabeth Monroe on the Middle East; Brian Crozier on Southeast Asia; Edward Crankshaw on the polarization of the communist bloc; Max Beloff on polycentrism in the West; Evan Luard on the possibilities of coexistence; and Sir William Hayter on the Cold War and the future. Papers on Germany, Africa, Latin America and the partition of Europe are included, as well as a twenty-five page chronology of the Cold War.

The Developing Nations: A Guide to Information Sources Concerning Their Economic, Political, Technical and Social Problems. By Eloise G. ReQua and Jane Stratham. Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1965. 339 pp. $8.75.

A bibliography of materials dealing with underdeveloped areas, the processes of economic development and social change, and problems in foreign aid policy.

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The listings are drawn from scholarly books, journals, and documents published by governments and international organizations.

The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War. By John Albert White. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 410 pp. $8.50.

Dr. White, Professor of History at the University of Hawaii and author of *Siberian Intervention,* utilizes newly available source materials issued by the Soviet Union, Japan, Britain, France and Germany in this reappraisal of the political, diplomatic and economic aspects of the Russo-Japanese War.

The Economics of the Developing Countries. By Hla Myint. New York: Praeger, 1965. 192 pp. $5.50 ($1.95, paper).

The author, an Indian economist at Oxford University, presents a balanced, coherent picture of the diverse problems faced by developing countries and attempts to ascertain the relevance of some of the main theories about economic development.

The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment. By Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1965. 237 pp. $5.50 ($1.95, paper).

Believing that nonalignment is likely to become an increasingly important phenomenon in international relations, the author undertakes "to make the nature of this challenge more intelligible and to provide a more satisfactory basis for appraising it than mere dislike of neutralism or the belief that neutralist governments have simply abandoned the normal process of diplomatic decision-making." Crabb feels that all too frequently in the past Western explanations of neutralism have consisted of clichés, stereotypes, crude value judgments and factual errors.

Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach. By Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, with contributions by Robert H. Billigmeier. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 626 pp. $7.95.

Written by three sociologists and university professors as a textbook for advanced undergraduate students, this work examines relations between ethnic groups and presents a theory of these contacts embracing social change in underdeveloped areas, nationalist revolutions, race riots and litigation for civil rights.

The Foundations of Morality. By Henry Hazlitt. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964. 398 pp. $9.95.

One of America's foremost journalists and a long-time political and economic analyst probes both private and public ethics. He finds morality to be essential to the very existence of human society and asserts that social cooperation is at the heart of morality. He discusses such topics as economic value and moral values, ethics and law, ends and means, absolutism and relativism, equality and inequality, freedom and justice, free will and determinism, international ethics, the ethics of capitalism and socialism, and morality and religion.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

How Nations Negotiate. By Fred Charles Iklé. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 272 pp. $5.95.

A study in the strategy and tactics of negotiation which draws liberally upon diplomatic and military history, the records of East-West conferences in the Cold War, and interviews with more than fifty senior diplomats in Washington, London, Paris, Bonn and Brussels. Iklé discusses such topics as negotiating for "side-effects," e.g., intelligence, deception, propaganda, impact on third countries; the use of warnings, threats, bluffs and commitments; the advantages of adhering to agreed agenda, maintaining flexibility, negotiating in good faith, avoiding emotionalism and rudeness; the influence upon negotiation of domestic pressure groups, the public, and the executive and legislative branches of government; and the importance of the negotiator's personality and characteristics. He concludes with an evaluation of Soviet and Western negotiating skills.

An Introduction to World Politics. (Fifth edition.) By Wolfgang Friedmann. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965. 497 pp. n.p.

This standard text in international politics, now in its fifth edition, is divided into three parts: the first analyzes the basic factors operative in world politics today; the second discusses problems in their regional context; and the third treats the challenges facing mankind in the mid-twentieth century. The appendices contain important statistical tables and documents.

The New Meaning of Treason. By Rebecca West. New York: Viking, 1964. 374 pp. $6.95.

A revised and greatly expanded version of Rebecca West's original (1947) classic work on traitors and defectors of World War II, *The Meaning of Treason.* The author has included in this volume some of the famous spy and subversion cases of the 1950's and 1960's, including those of Alan Nunn May, the Rosenbergs, Klaus Fuchs, Burgess and Maclean, and Colonel Abel.

The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy: The Yearbook of World Polity. Volume III. Edited by William V. O'Brien. New York: Praeger, for The Institute of World Polity, 1965. 323 pp. $7.00.

A discussion of the place of new nations in an international community based on Western civilization. The topics covered are state succession, military servitudes, U.S. recognition policy, and the new states and the United Nations. The contributors are D. P. O'Connell, Albert J. Esgain, William V. O'Brien, Ulf H. Goebel and J. E. S. Fawcett.

The Political Philosophy of Bakunin: Scientific Anarchism. Compiled and edited by G. P. Maximoff. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. 434 pp. $2.45 (paper).

This study of the political philosophy of Mikhail Bakunin, originally published in 1953 in hardcover, is divided into four sections: his underlying philosophical position, his criticism of existing society, his system of anarchism, and his tactics and methods of realization. The compiler has brought together the most important writings of this revolutionist, who was Marx's greatest historical enemy in the socialist movement and the founder and main inspiration of the libertarian wing of the First International.

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Politics and Opinion in the Nineteenth Century: An Historical Introduction. By John Bowle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 512 pp. $2.50 (paper).

In an effort to elucidate the present ideological conflict, the author traces the development of liberal-social-democratic political thought from the Romantic Age to the early twentieth century, the attacks made upon it by the doctrines of class war, nationalism and nihilism, and its later reinforcement by the developing science of sociology.

Power Transformed. By Robert M. MacIver. New York: Macmillan, 1964. 244 pp. $5.00.

One of America's leading social scientists, now President of the New School for Social Research, discusses the significant changes which are taking place in the nature of power in society, especially with respect to the shift from crude force to organization, knowledge and personality as modes of power.

The Red Pawn. By Flora Lewis. New York: Doubleday, 1965. 283 pp. $4.95.

Foreign correspondent Flora Lewis traces the career of Noel Field, who vanished behind the Iron Curtain in 1949. Field's brother, his wife and foster daughter also disappeared from different places in rapid order. Later, as survivors trickled out of jails with the death of Stalin, there were reports of one or the other of the family in various prisons, and Field and his wife finally reappeared. This account of Field's adventures and ideology is written with the skill, excitement and thoroughness of a detective novel.

The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism. By Stewart C. Easton. New York: Praeger, 1964. 402 pp. $7.50 ($2.95, paper).

This is a political history of the acquisition of empires, the impact of two world wars, the spread of nationalism, and the rapid devolution of empires since 1945. The treatment is by geographic area—the Far East, Islamic world, sub-Saharan Africa and Caribbean—rather than by a chronological account of national empires. A 14-page bibliography and maps are provided.

Self-Government in Modernizing Nations. Edited by J. Roland Pennock. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Spectrum Books, 1964. 119 pp. $1.95 (paper).

This group of essays, contributed by Lucian W. Pye, Francis X. Sutton, Thomas L. Hodgkin, Zbigniew Brzezinski and W. Howard Hopkins, discusses various problems of the new nations—modernization, their readiness for self-government, the relevance of Western ideas to their situation, U.S. policy toward political development, and communism.

Sociology and the Military Establishment. (Revised edition.) By Morris Janowitz in collaboration with Lt. Col. Roger Little. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965. 136 pp. $1.50 (paper).

Various social aspects of the military organization—its means of assimilating new members into military roles, its rank structure and status systems, its tech-

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niques of organizational control—are the concern of this revised book, originally published in 1959.

The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations. By Paul W. Blackstock. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. 351 pp. $7.50.

An analysis of the complex problems and dangers inherent in the policy, management and control of "covert political warfare," in which the author utilizes historical examples culled from U.S., German, Tsarist and Soviet Russian files. He discusses the theory of covert political operations; propaganda, violence and manipulative persuasion; the problem of divided policymaking and operational responsibilities; Congressional watchdogs and current misconceptions about the CIA and other intelligence agencies; and the problem of reliable intelligence and counterintelligence. The book, cleared by the Departments of Defense and State after five years of careful scrutiny, provides some new information and judgments on the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

World Perspectives on International Politics. Edited by Walter C. Clemens, Jr. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965. 481 pp. $3.95 (paper).

A collection of significant pronouncements on current issues by world leaders and publicists from the Western, communist and nonaligned camps. Introductory essays to each section of the book are designed to incorporate the material into the framework of a field theory of international relations.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

Components of Defense Policy. Edited by Davis B. Bobrow. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965. 445 pp. n.p.

A book of readings on a wide variety of military security topics. In the first section on the strategic context, the editor has selected four articles on Soviet, Chinese and NATO military strategy, and nonalignment and the power balance. Section two on defense policymaking contains papers on civil-military relations, strategic planning, Congress and the making of military policy, and scientists and the military establishment. In section three, which treats of strategic alternatives, there are papers on deterrence, conflict limitation, guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, civil defense, and arms control. The last section, on "quality control," contains articles on intelligence, rationality and nonrationality, flexibility of response, the role of the intellectual, and military systems analysis.

The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Politics. Edited by R. N. Rosecrance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. 343 pp. $7.50.

Thirteen essays by H. A. DeWeerd, Albert Wohlstetter, Malcolm Hoag, Arnold Kramish, the editor and others concerning the efforts of powers other than the U.S. and the USSR to acquire independent nuclear capabilities, and the general impact of modern weapons technology upon international strategic stability.

The Green Berets. By Robin Moore. New York: Crown Publishers, 1965. 341 pp. $4.95.

A quasi-fictional account of the combat operations of the U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia. The author, who underwent guerrilla training before

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being allowed to participate in Special Forces operations, offers many insights into the nature of the war in Southeast Asia, and assures his readers that the incidents described are based on actual events.

A Study of War. (Abridged edition.) By Quincy Wright; abridged by Louise L. Wright. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964. 451 pp. $7.50.

This abridgment of the two-volume edition of Quincy Wright's *A Study of War* contains most of the original text, with some additions necessitated by significant developments since its publication in 1942. Some of the material has been reorganized and all of the footnotes and appendices have been eliminated.

Tomorrow's Weapons. By Brig. Gen. J. H. Rothschild, USA (Ret.). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 271 pp. $6.95.

An informative discussion of biological and chemical weapons. The author argues that misinformation and secrecy about nerve gases and germ warfare are at the root of the fear and horror the mention of these weapons evokes among people everywhere. General Rothschild contends that the controlled use of such weapons to incapacitate an enemy temporarily might be far more humane than the modes of warfare widely accepted today.

III. United States

American Government and the Economy. By Emmette S. Redford. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 674 pp. $8.95.

In this comprehensive examination of the role of the U.S. government in the economy, the author considers past experience, present conditions, group pressures, economic theories, administrative mechanisms and the constitutional framework. The text contains analyses of the effects of governmental legislation which the author hopes will stimulate thought about how best to meet future problems. Professor Charles B. Hagan of the University of Illinois contributed the three chapters on fiscal and monetary policy, communications and agriculture.

American National Security: A Reader in Theory and Policy. Edited by Morton Berkowitz and P. G. Bock. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1965. 448 pp. $7.50.

A collection of important writings on U.S. national security—its military, economic and political aspects—by such authorities as Bernard Brodie, Klaus Knorr, Charles E. Osgood, Gabriel Almond, Kenneth Boulding, Anatol Rapoport and Thomas C. Schelling.

American Politics and the Party System. (Third edition.) By Hugh A. Bone. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 684 pp. $8.95.

This textbook on the organization, activities, roles and significance of political parties in American politics has been completely rewritten to include analyses of political socialization, voting behavior, theories of political behavior, and political participation.

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Conduct of the New Diplomacy. By James L. McCamy. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 303 pp. $6.50.

The author uses the U-2 affair as a case study from which to draw recommendations for improving the organization and administration of U.S. diplomacy. McCamy's suggestions include the incorporation within the Department of State of all officials and units working directly on foreign policy matters, improvements in selection and training of personnel, and the creation of posts for deputy presidents in the Executive Branch.

Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive Branch or the Arrows. By Theodore C. Sorensen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. 94 pp. $3.50.

The two Gino Speranza Lectures, delivered at Columbia University in the spring of 1963, on the factors that shape the Chief Executive's decisions, as seen by the man who served the late President Kennedy in the post of Special Counsel.

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. By Herbert Feis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. 246 pp. $5.00.

A balanced and comprehensive study of foreign aid as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, written by an economist-historian. Professor Feis, a former adviser to the State Department on economic affairs and special consultant to the Secretary of War from 1944-1946, examines the "theory of material improvement"; the relationship of foreign aid to diplomacy; the objectives, achievements and shortcomings of the U.S. foreign aid effort; the possibility of tying "political strings" to foreign aid; and the relative advantages of national and multinational programs.

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. By Edward S. Mason. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 116 pp. $3.50.

This book contains the three Elihu Root Lectures of 1963 delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations, revised and expanded into four chapters: Aid as an Instrument of Foreign Policy; Foreign Aid in Search of a Rationale; The Problem of Equitable Sharing of the Foreign Aid Burden; and The Alliance for Progress.

Foreign Policy in American Government. Edited by Bernard C. Cohen. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965. 204 pp. n.p.

A collection of twelve essays which examine foreign policy as a special type of public policy, the impact of foreign policy on American political institutions, and the handling of foreign policy questions in the American political system. Consideration of the substance of U.S. foreign policy is limited to one essay. The authors include Richard E. Neustadt, Burton M. Sapin, Albert Wohlstetter, Roberta Wohlstetter and Franklin A. Lindsay.

The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs. By Philip H. Coombs. New York: Harper & Row, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1964. 156 pp. $3.50.

Mr. Coombs, the first man to hold the newly-created post of Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs in the Kennedy Administra-

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tion, calls for an expanded program of educational and cultural exchanges. Asserting that these exchanges have proven effective in promoting peace and understanding, he recommends stepped-up educational-cultural exchanges with satellite nations, especially Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia; continued major efforts in Japan and Germany which "represent the clearest success stories"; broader programs in Latin America and Africa; and a greater use of international organizations and private groups in the United States.

A History of United States Foreign Policy. (Second edition.) By Julius W. Pratt. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 573 pp. $11.95.

A completely revised edition of one of the standard textbooks on U.S. foreign policy. This volume presents new material up to the early months of the Johnson Administration, and devotes considerable attention to the aims of U.S. foreign policy and the intricate procedures that are employed in its formulation and implementation. More than twenty maps and many bibliographies are included.

The Makers of Public Policy: American Power Groups and Their Ideologies. By R. Joseph Monsen, Jr. and Mark W. Cannon. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 355 pp. $4.50.

This study attempts to present the official positions and ideologies of the interest groups in American society which play a major role in shaping public policy. The groups selected are business, labor, agriculture, Negroes, public school teachers, intellectuals, and the civil and military bureaucracies.

The Moon-Doggle. By Amitai Etzioni. New York: Doubleday, 1964. 198 pp. $4.50.

A highly critical view of the Kennedy Administration's decision to place an American on the moon by 1970. The author, a Columbia University sociologist, claims that this "monumental mis-decision" has failed to achieve its economic, scientific and political purposes.

Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy. By Harold L. Nieburg. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1964. 255 pp. $6.00.

A study of the political, military and diplomatic significance of the postwar U.S. policy of preserving secrecy in the realm of nuclear technology, with considerable emphasis on the "atoms for peace" program and U.S. relations with European states.

Our Depleted Society. By Seymour Melman. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965. 366 pp. $5.95.

A Columbia University Professor of Industrial Engineering urges immediate conversion from arms to peacetime production since our defenses have already reached the level of "overkill." The author assesses the price America has paid for twenty years of Cold War and sets forth what must be done to repair the damage.

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Pride and Power: The Rationale of the Space Program. By Vernon Van Dyke. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964. 285 pp. $6.50.

A political scientist analyzes the various reasons given to justify the U.S. space program, and concludes that national pride (as distinct from national prestige) deserves more attention than it has hitherto received as an important factor in American political behavior, both domestic and international.

Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy. Edited by Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 551 pp. $7.95.

A collection of writings by government officials, political scientists and journalists on current topics in world affairs, budgetary problems, the intelligence community, national security, the role of the military, and overseas Americans.

The Representation of the United States Abroad. Edited by Vincent M. Barnett, Jr. New York: Praeger, for The American Assembly, 1965. 251 pp. $5.95.

A collection of papers, originally published in 1956 and brought up to date here, on the greatly enlarged and changing nature of U.S. overseas representation. Included among the topics are "The Growth of American Representation Overseas," by Lincoln Gordon; "American Military Representation Abroad," by Paul C. Davis and William T. R. Fox; and "American Representation to International and Multilateral Organizations," by Ben T. Moore.

The Strategy of Persuasion: The Use of Advertising Skills in Fighting the Cold War. By Arthur E. Meyerhoff. New York: Coward-McCann, 1965. 191 pp. $4.50.

The author, one of the leading professionals in the advertising business in the United States, argues that this country, with an advertising industry which has developed the arts of persuasion to the highest degree in history, has neglected to use professional advertising and promotion techniques as an important weapon in fighting the Cold War. He believes the American advertising profession could assist in the effort to improve the American image, check Soviet propaganda successes, and win over the uncommitted nations for democracy.

IV. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe. By Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin. New York: Random House, 1965. 243 pp. $5.95.

The authors argue the need for the United States to re-examine its objectives, commitments and policies in Europe. They contend that the arms race is an anachronism insofar as Europe is concerned and that our present policies inhibit a European settlement which would include the gradual reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Iron Curtain. The present U.S. commitment to NATO, they contend, is based partly on inertia and partly upon an ideology which is inadequate to deal with the real problems facing the United States.

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Community of Fate: German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1922-1928. By Kurt Rosenbaum. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965. 325 pp. $6.75.

Utilizing German Foreign Office files captured during World War II, the author recounts German-Soviet affairs in the years after Germany became the first major power to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR.

The European Past. Two volumes. Edited by Shepard B. Clough, Peter Gay and Charles K. Warner. New York: Macmillan, 1964. 453 pp., 530 pp. $3.50 each (paper).

An attempt to provide new materials for, and a new approach to, the study of European history. The editors include essays which present revaluations or conflicting interpretations of thirty-two important historical topics. The first volume covers the period from the Renaissance through Waterloo; the second treats topics since Waterloo.

Germans Against Hitler. By Terence Prittie. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964. 292 pp. $5.75.

Mr. Prittie, for most of the postwar period the *Manchester Guardian's* Bonn correspondent, traces the development of opposition to Hitler among Conservatives, Communists, Social Democrats, labor leaders, Catholic and Protestant clergymen, university students and other individuals and groups in Germany.

Mussolini: A Study in Power. By Ivone Kirkpatrick. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1964. 726 pp. $10.00.

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, former Permanent Under-Secretary of the British Foreign Office, portrays the important role which Il Duce played in European politics during the 1930's and assesses his responsibility for the outbreak of World War II.

Republic in Suspense: Politics, Parties, and Personalities in Postwar Germany. By Klaus Bolling. New York: Praeger, 1964. 276 pp. $6.50.

In this analysis of the political system of the Federal Republic, the author assesses West German attitudes toward East-West questions including German reunification, the building of a new army, European integration, and the Atlantic Alliance. The postwar German recovery is examined in considerable detail and the policies of Chancellors Adenauer and Erhard are compared and evaluated.

The Underdeveloped Areas within the Common Market. By Sergio Barzanti. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 437 pp. $10.00.

The author warns of the dangers to the European Economic Community should new industrial activity continue to be concentrated in the already highly industrialized areas to the detriment of the underdeveloped regions. He points out the need not only for intergovernmental cooperation in helping these regions but also for coordination through the EEC institutions.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

United States Direct Investment in France: An Investigation of the French Charges. By Allan W. Johnstone. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965. 109 pp. $4.00.

An examination of the dimensions of U.S. direct investment in France and the reactions of the French government. The author seeks to provide an understanding of French attitudes toward, and capabilities for, regulating U.S. investment in France, as well as to arrive at some conclusions concerning the future policies of France in regard to U.S. direct investment.

Western Europe Since the War: A Short Political History. By Jacques Freymond. New York: Praeger, 1964. 236 pp. $5.50 ($1.95, paper).

A lucidly written survey of postwar developments in Western Europe, with emphasis on Atlantic and European unity themes, economic growth and intra-European diplomacy, by the Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.

V. Communist Bloc

Comintern and World Revolution, 1928-1943: The Shaping of Doctrine. By Kermit E. McKenzie. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. 368 pp. $6.50.

This volume, one of a series published by The Russian Institute of Columbia University, analyzes the evolution of the communist doctrine of world revolution as developed during the fifteen years that Stalin dominated the Communist International. Using the published records of the Comintern, Professor McKenzie discusses topics such as the pattern of communist strategy and tactics, the proper timing for a communist seizure of power; the plans for a transformation of society; the role of the Soviet Union; and the nature of the communist utopia.

Communist China: The Early Years, 1949-1955. By A. Doak Barnett. New York: Praeger, 1964. 336 pp. $6.95.

In this intensive examination of the first five years of Chinese communist rule, the author describes (1) the rapid political consolidation of all of mainland China and the imposition of new forms of totalitarian mass political organization down to the village level; (2) the thorough social revolution through which the communists, using emotional mass propaganda and indoctrination campaigns, sought to break down the fabric of traditional Chinese society; and (3) the successful efforts at economic rehabilitation and the launching of the first Five-year Plan.

Communist Propaganda Techniques. By John C. Clews. New York: Praeger, 1964. 326 pp. $7.50.

An assessment of the communist propaganda system. Clews takes into account developments in communist propaganda techniques, from World War II to the beginning of 1964, and examines the apparatus of communist propaganda. He uses as a case study the germ warfare propaganda conducted against the United States during the Korean War and shows that the evidence produced could not withstand close political analysis.

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Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror. Edited by John Keep and Liliana Brisby. New York: Praeger, 1964. 331 pp. $7.50.

A collection of essays by Soviet specialists, including Merle Fainsod, Bertram D. Wolfe, Leonard Schapiro, Adam B. Ulam, George Kennan and others—the outgrowth of a conference sponsored by the British quarterly journal *Survey* to examine developments in modern Soviet historiography.

The Great Purge Trial. Edited by Robert C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965. 725 pp. $5.95.

A verbatim report of the 1938 Moscow Trial of Bukharin and twenty other defendants, with an introductory essay, biographical notes, annotations and suggested list of readings.

Marxism in the Modern World. Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Stanford: Stanford University Press, for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1965. 293 pp. $5.95.

This collection of essays analyzes the various political forms taken by Marxism in the twentieth century, notably Leninism, Stalinism, Khrushchevism, Titoism, Maoism and Castroism. The book begins with an examination of the overall impact of Marxism by Raymond Aron, and concludes with an assessment of the prospects of pluralism in the communist world by Richard Lowenthal. Bertram D. Wolfe, Boris Souvarine, Merle Fainsod, Adam B. Ulam, Arthur A. Cohen and Theodore Draper are the other contributors.

The Origins of Bolshevism. By Theodore Dan; edited and translated by Joel Carmichael. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 468 pp. $10.00.

This is the first translation into English of Dan's important study of the multiple elements of 19th and early 20th century Russian socialism. Dan, a leading Menshevik and one of Lenin's chief opponents, who died in 1947, traces the growth of the democratic idea, revolutionary populism and Marxism in Russia. In a lengthy section on Bolshevism and Menshevism and in his epilogue where he looks to the future, Dan contends that Bolshevism was not an accidental phenomenon in Russian history, but rather an "historically inevitable stage" on the road to the liberation of the Russian people. Menshevism and social democracy bowed to the organizational strength of the Bolsheviks, but Dan, writing at the end of World War II, expected the Soviet system to be influenced by socialist Europe and eventually to become truly democratic, i.e., truly Menshevik.

A Textbook on Communism. By Anthony Trawick Bouscaren. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1965. 216 pp. $1.80 (paper).

Designed for high school use, this book discusses the historical development of communism and the challenge it presents to Western democracies. Appendices include a glossary of terms, a list of publications by the U.S. government on communism, and suggestions for teaching aids.

World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith. By Richard Lowenthal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 296 pp. $6.00.

Lowenthal, Professor of International Relations at the Free University, West Berlin, traces the gradual breakdown of Moscow's control of the world commu-

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nist movement, from the death of Stalin to mid-1964. He shows how Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 forecast this trend; how Khrushchev's policy toward the Yugoslav problem signaled Moscow's acceptance of national communism; and how the events of 1956 further loosened Moscow's control. He devotes much of the remainder of the book to an analysis of the growing rift between Moscow and Peking.

Youth and Communism: An Historical Analysis of International Communist Youth Movements. By Richard Cornell. New York: Walker, 1965. 239 pp. $6.50.

A political scientist describes and analyzes the communist youth movement as it has unfolded over the years both in established communist societies and international organizations and in multifarious front groups.

VI. Middle East and Africa

Africa's Quest for Order. By Fred G. Burke. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 177 pp. $1.95 (paper).

Instead of studying Africa country by country, Dr. Burke attempts to diagnose the forces shaping the future of the African continent south of the Sahara. Among the topics he analyzes are tribalism, urbanization, racism, nationalism, the rise of new leadership, and the goals and methods of African leaders.

Between Niger and Nile. By Arnold J. Toynbee. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. 133 pp. $3.75.

A collection of essays (most of which were written originally for the *Observer* News Service) recording the impressions of the author during visits made between 1961 and 1964 to the U.A.R., Morocco, Nigeria, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Libya.

Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948. By Christopher Sykes. New York: World Publishing Company, 1965. 404 pp. $7.95.

The author, a former Member of Parliament during the early years of the British mandate in Palestine, has set himself the task of writing a "propaganda-free book" on the birth of modern Israel. He begins with the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and ends with a description of Israel in the 1960's. Sykes deals with the shifting pattern of Zionist tactics and strategy, its rising militancy, and its many intramural divisions. He gives close attention to the World War II period and the role of Britain, the United States and the United Nations in assuring Israel's independence.

The Foreign Policy of African States. By Doudou Thiam. New York: Praeger, 1965. 134 pp. $4.50.

A Foreign Minister of the Republic of Senegal writes about the ideologies and objectives of the foreign policies of African states, the implications of economic aid on the Continent's independence, the attraction of nationalism and socialism, and the vacillations of some states between neutrality and a commitment to either the Western or communist power blocs.

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French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity. Edited by William H. Lewis. New York: Walker, 1965. 256 pp. $6.50.

A collection of fifteen papers surveying the historical background and present political situation in French-speaking Africa. The authors examine such problems as tribalism and social change in North Africa, sub-Saharan education and rural development, the evolution of African elites in the various countries of the region, the cultural barriers to the modernization of labor, and the characteristics of developing foreign policies among African states.

A Handbook of African Affairs. Edited by Helen Kitchen. New York: Praeger, 1964. 311 pp. $6.00 ($2.25, paper).

Compiled from the journal, *Africa Report,* this volume contains information on the political, military and cultural affairs of sixty African countries, including brief, interpretive essays on each state by African specialists. Other parts of the study include major documents on the background to, and accomplishments of, the Addis Ababa Conference in May 1963 and essays by African critics on contemporary African poetry and prose.

Independent Black Africa: The Politics of Freedom. Edited by William John Hanna. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964. 651 pp. $8.50.

A collection of readings designed as a systematic introduction to African politics. Lucian W. Pye, Edward Shils, Tom Mboya, S. N. Eisenstadt and others consider many aspects of that part of the African continent which has a predominantly Negro population and is not under European rule, for example, the nature of political change, single-party systems, tribal loyalties, industrialization, political messiahs and the psychology of African nationalism.

Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood. By Christina Phelps Harris. The Hague: Mouton & Company, 1964. 276 pp. 22 Guilders.

This study is concerned primarily with a specific religious association, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been active in Egypt for more than a quarter of a century and which has become a powerful and implacable enemy of the present government.

Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo. By René Lemarchand. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964. 357 pp. $7.95.

Based upon extensive interviews with the Congo's political leaders, this book provides a detailed analysis of Congolese nationalism. The author treats the colonial period, the development, organization and functions of Congolese political parties, and the causes of political fragmentation in Congolese politics. Special emphasis is given to the interplay of political forces before June 30, 1960, when the nation became formally independent.

Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence. By Crawford Young. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 659 pp. $12.50.

An analysis of the decolonization process in the Congo. The author evaluates the impact of the colonial experience and Belgian policy upon Congolese politics

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and society, describes the structure of Congolese society which the Belgians sought to create, provides a portrait of the Congolese elite, records their responses to Belgian policies, and examines the rise of the nationalist movement.

VII. East Asia and the Pacific

Australia. By Russel Ward. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 152 pp. $4.95.

Although current events and attitudes are discussed, this book is primarily a study of those elements in Australian history deemed by the author to have been most influential in creating Australian nationalism.

Ceylon. By S. A. Pakeman. New York: Praeger, 1964. 256 pp. $6.95.

Nearly two-thirds of this history of Ceylon treats of the pre-British era and the British colonial period; the remainder examines the period of independence with particular stress on the manner in which successive governments have handled political, economic and social problems. Two chapters are devoted to the special problems of economic development and population explosion. The author lived for 31 years in Ceylon, as Professor of Modern History at University College and as a Member of the Ceylon House of Representatives.

Formosa Today. Edited by Mark Mancall. New York: Praeger, 1964. 171 pp. $5.75.

These thirteen papers on Formosa, all but two of which were published in the July-September 1963 issue of *The China Quarterly,* are generally impressionistic rather than scholarly and on the whole are critical of both Chinese rule on Formosa and U.S. policy.

Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia. (Second edition.) Edited by George McT. Kahin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964. 796 pp. $11.50.

This undergraduate text, originally published in 1959 and now updated, examines the historical background, contemporary setting, political processes and major problems of each of the nations of Southeast Asia. The contributors are David A. Wilson, Josef Silverstein, Herbert Feith, J. Norman Parmer, Roy Jumper, Marjorie W. Normand, Roger M. Smith, and David Wurfel.

Hill Farms and Padi Fields: Life in Mainland Southeast Asia. By Robbins Burling. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Spectrum Books, 1965. 180 pp. $1.95 (paper).

The author, a professor of anthropology, examines the history and cultures of the people of Southeast Asia. He believes that the unifying characteristic of this diverse area lies in the contrast and conflict, found in each country, between the hill peoples and the plains peoples. Chinese and Indian cultural influences and the clashes between immigrants and indigenous peoples are discussed in their past and present contexts.

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Japan and the United States in World Trade. By Warren S. Hunsberger. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 492 pp. $9.95.

This study of Japan's foreign economic relations examines her balance of international payments, export and import of capital and technology, composition of commodity exports and imports, the geography of her trade, the U.S. market for Japanese goods with special reference to cotton textiles, and Japan's foreign economic policies in the 1960's. Special attention is given throughout to U.S.-Japanese economic relations.

The Lucky Country: Australia Today. By Donald Horne. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965. 223 pp. $1.25 (paper).

An Australian journalist appraises political, social, economic and cultural aspects of his country and its relations with other areas, notably Britain and Asia. The author believes that important changes are necessary if Australia is to keep pace with the rest of the world.

Mao and the Chinese Revolution. By Jerome Ch'ên. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. 419 pp. $7.50.

A documented study of Mao Tse-tung's part in the Chinese Revolution and the founding of the People's Republic. The author analyzes, in particular, the establishment of the first and second United Fronts, the Stalin-Trotsky controversy in relation to China, the schism between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the story of the Long March. Also included in this volume are thirty-seven of Mao's poems which the author and Michael Bullock have translated.

New Zealand. By William J. Cameron. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 180 pp. $4.95.

An extensive survey of New Zealand, ranging from the culture of the Maoris, the literature of the islands, and the national character to the economic structure, international and regional relationships, and the forces for change.

Pakistan: Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation. By Richard V. Weekes. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964. 278 pp. $5.75.

This brief general survey of Pakistan is the latest addition to The Asia Library. Mr. Weekes, a former USIA information officer in Karachi and former *Time* magazine correspondent, sketches the history, religious background, and social and cultural traditions of Pakistan; examines the many ethnic, linguistic and religious differences among the various peoples that make up Pakistan; discusses Pakistan's relations with her neighbors, other Muslim countries, Britain, the United States and the communist bloc; and explores the two major problems of economic development and the clash with India over Kashmir.

VIII. Latin America

The Financial Sector and Economic Development: The Mexican Case. By Robert L. Bennett. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. 210 pp. $6.95.

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A study of the role of financial institutions in the economic development of Mexico since World War II and the changes which rapid industrialization has brought to these institutions. A wealth of statistical information is presented.

The Great Fear in Latin America. By John Gerassi. New York: Collier Books, 1965. 478 pp. $1.50 (paper).

In this revised edition of *The Great Fear,* originally published in hard cover in 1963, the author severely criticizes U.S. policy in Latin America and the powerful status quo forces in the individual republics. Among the many revisions of U.S. policy that he advocates are withdrawal from the OAS ("Let Latin Americans set up their own regional organization"), abolition of all military assistance pacts, elimination of Cold War propaganda from USIS programs, and concentration of U.S. aid on educational and technical projects.

Politics of Change in Latin America. Edited by Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead. New York: Praeger, 1964. 257 pp. $6.00.

Essays by Arthur P. Whitaker, Robert Alexander, Victor L. Urquidi, the editors and others on the forces of change and continuity in Latin America, illustrated with case studies pertaining to nationalism, political parties, trends in Mexico and Brazil, and problems of the Alliance for Progress.

Monographs and Reports Received

The Aftermath of Sabbatino. Background Papers and Proceedings of the Seventh Hammarskjold Forum on The Role of Law in the Settlement of International Disputes. Richard A. Falk, author of the working paper; Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., editor. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, for The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1965. 228 pp. $2.95.

The International Position of Communist China. Background Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth Hammarskjold Forum on The Role of Law in the Settlement of International Disputes. O. Edmund Clubb and Eustace Seligman, authors of the working papers; Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., editor. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, for The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1965. 116 pp. $1.75.

Latin America and the European Economic Community: An Appraisal. By Joe R. Wilkinson. Denver: University of Denver, The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs, No. 4, 1965. 65 pp. $1.00.

The Panama Canal. Background Papers and Proceedings of the Sixth Hammarskjold Forum on The Role of Law in the Settlement of International Disputes. Richard R. Baxter and Doris Carroll, authors of the working paper; Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., editor. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, for The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1965. 118 pp. $1.75.

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Problem Solving in the Department of State. By Dean G. Pruitt. Denver: University of Denver, The Social Science Foundation and Department of International Relations Monograph Series in World Affairs, No. 2, 1964. 56 pp. $1.00.

Soviet Disarmament Policy, 1917-1963: An Annotated Bibliography of Soviet and Western Sources. Compiled by Walter C. Clemens, Jr. Stanford: Stanford University, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, July 1965. 151 pp. $6.00 ($4.00, paper).

U.S. Diplomacy in the Development Agencies of the United Nations. By Nathaniel M. McKitterick. Washington: National Planning Association, Planning Pamphlet No. 122, June 1965. 63 pp. $1.50.

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Marxism in the Modern World

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Volume 360, July 1965

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

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